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Abstract 
This thesis explains that the development of the law of the carriage of 
goods by sea has led to the appearance of the Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg Rules. The existence of these different conventions plainly 
contributes to the breakdown of uniformity. The thesis, nevertheless, argues 
that international uniformity is still valuable since it reduces the legal costs 
significantly. However, many conflicts arise among the various countries in 
interpreting these conventions. Such conflicts lead to uncertainty and 
unpredictability, and in consequence, to the increase of legal costs. In proving 
the latter, the thesis examines and evaluates the conflicts of interpretations of 
these conventions brought on by containerisation. 
The thesis proves the inadequacy of various propositions on the 
question of how to avoid such conflicts. It argues, however, that the failure to 
consider foreign decisions is a significant factor of having such conflicts. In 
proving the latter, the thesis provides a comparative study in evaluating 
various courts' decisions that relate to containerisation. The thesis, however, 
evaluates different measures to achieve international uniform interpretations. 
Most of these measures are not completely satisfactory solutions to such 
achievement. Accordingly, the thesis examines the obstacles that may face the 
applicability of comparative law in practice, and the capability of avoiding 
these obstacles. The thesis also offers various observations in relation to how 
the national courts shall consider comparative law. 
The key point is that the divergence that characterised the 
interpretation of the existing conventions will reappear unless there is some 
obligation on national courts to consider and apply comparative law. The 
thesis therefore proposes that any future convention relating to the law of 
carriage of goods by sea shall specify that the national courts of every 
contracting state shall refer to the decisions of the other contracting states 
when dealing with questions of interpretation. 
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CHAPTER I: I~TRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY 
1.1. Introduction 
The principal objective of many international conventions is to achie\'e 
international uniformity of legal rules within their various contracting states. 
However, the uniform application of the texts of such conventions is by no 
means guaranteed, as conflicting national interpretations of international 
uniform conventions constitute a fact of international legal life. Substantive 
international uniformity, accordingly, cannot be achieved by only a uniform 
text but by both a uniform text and uniform interpretations of such text. 
Consequently, one must recognise that achieving both a uniform text and 
uniform interpretations of such text should not be separated, because the aim 
of achieving the former is to reach the latter. The present thesis examines the 
cause of the conflicts of national interpretations of uniform rules relating to the 
law of carriage of goods by sea, and how these conflicts can be reduced. It 
argues that the failure to consider comparative law l is a significant factor of 
having these conflicts of interpretations. It therefore proposes that any future 
convention relating to the law of carriage of goods by sea shall specify that the 
national courts of every contracting state shall refer to the decisions of the 
other contracting states when dealing with questions of interpretation. 
The development of the law of the carriage of goods by sea in the last 
century has led to the appearance of three conventions, namely the Hague. 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Although each of these conventions \\as 
I The phrase "comparati\'e I a\\' " is used in this thesis as a technique or a 
methodology for the consideration of foreign decisions by national courts. 
intended to achieve substantive international unifonnity, inconsistent judicial 
interpretations have contributed to significant degrees of differences2. Carriage 
of goods by containers is an appropriate subject to examine and evaluate such 
differences. The reasons behind choosing this subject are: First, the subject of 
containerisation contains many cases and comments, English, American, 
Canadian and others, that are suitable for examining the cause of inconsistent 
interpretations of the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Second, the 
practical importance of containerisation in the shipping industry is such that 
the lack of unifonnity creates significant unnecessary legal costs. Third, the 
issue of international unifonnity regarding carriage of goods by sea has not 
been linked specifically with the subject of containerisation. There are, of 
course, many publications on international unifonnity in shipping law 
generally, but they make a general comparison among the Hague, Hague-
Visby and Hamburg Rules3. There are also studies on international unifonnity 
in relation to subjects other than containerisation4, and there are studies on 
containerisation, but not linked to international unifonniti. This thesis is 
2 Of course, the appearance of the three different regimes themselves, plainly 
contribute to the breakdown ofunifonnity. 
3 See, for example, Robert Force, "A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules: Much Ado About (?)", (1996) 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051; R. 
Glenn Bauer, "Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg 
Rules-A Case by Case Analysis", (1993) 24 J.M.L.C. 53; John O. Honnold, 
"Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness-Hague or Hamburg?", (1993) 
24 lM.L.C. 75; A.J. Waldron, "The Hamburg Rules-A Boondoggle For 
Lawyers?", [1991] J.B.L. 305. 
4 See, for example, Michael F. Sturley, "International Unifonn Laws m 
National Courts: The Influence of Domestic La\\" III Conflicts of 
Interpretation", (1987) 27 Va. J. InCI. L. 729. 
5 See, for example, Bissell Tallman, "The Operational Realities of 
Containcrisation and Their Effect on the "Package" Limitation and the "On-
., 
unique in its use of the law of containerisation as a means of investigating 
obstacles to unifonn interpretation. 
The aim of the present thesis is to argue that a significant cause of the 
appearance of conflicts of interpretations of the Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg Rules specifically, and unifonn rules generally, is the failure to 
consider comparative law6. Thus, the thesis proposes that if in the future a new 
convention governing the law of carriage of goods by sea appears, the drafters 
should specify a provision, which provides that for the purpose of the 
interpretation of the Convention, the national courts of every Contracting State 
shall consider other decisions of other Contracting States. The thesis 
acknowledges that the present position of international unifonnity in relation 
to carriage of goods by sea is such that there is an urgent need for a new 
convention, since the existence of the three different conventions plainly 
contributes to breakdown unifonnity. Nevertheless, the key point is that the 
divergence that characterised the interpretation of the existing conventions 
will reappear unless there is some obligation on national courts to consider and 
apply comparative law. 
Deck" Prohibition: Review and Suggestions", (1970-1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 
902; David F. McEwen, "Per Package Limitation-A Diverging Approach in 
Canadian Courts", [1976] L.M.C.L.Q. 269; Frank M.K. Wijckmans. "The 
Container Re\'olution and the per Package Limitation of Liability in 
Admiralty", (1987) 22 Euro. Trans. L. 505. 
6 This means that providing clarified provisions is not enough to achie\'e 
uni fonll interpretations. 
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1.2. Methodology 
The method of the present thesis is a comparatiYe and doctrinal one. It 
analyses and evaluates the inconsistent decisions of the different national 
courts of different countries in relation to sea-carriage of goods by containers, 
to ascertain the cause of the appearance of these inconsistent decisions. The 
thesis, in consequence, clarifies how the failure to impose a duty to consider 
comparative law leads to these inconsistent decisions. In so doing, the thesis 
concentrates on examining the Hague Rules 1924 decisions, not the Hague-
Visby or the Hamburg Rules, since there are only very few reported cases on 
containerisation in relation to the latter two rules. The thesis, therefore, 
examines mostly the United States decisions, and some other common-law 
countries' decisions, such as the United Kingdom and Canada. The reasons 
behind depending largely on the United States decisions are: First, the United 
States still gives effect to the Hague Rules 1924. Second, the subject of 
containerisation has created a serious problem among the United States Circuit 
Courts, where many United States' cases are inconsistent with each other in 
dealing with this subject. In addition, this subject has created unique conflicts 
of interpretations, which only existed among the United States Circuit Courts 
due to different factors. Third, many argue that conflicts of interpretations 
among the various countries' decisions appear because of the different 
languages and the different legal systems. The United States, however, has a 
common language and a common law. In spite of this, inconsistent decisions 
have appeared among the United States Circuit Courts. The United States 
decisions, therefore, plainly constitute a suitable environment for investigating 
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and exammmg the conflicts of interpretations among the yanous national 
courts. 
The second chapter of this thesis is an introduction to the unification of 
international commercial law in general. This chapter deals with two topics: 
The first is the tendency of the international community (countries and 
international organisations) to unify international commercial la\v. This 
section briefly introduces the role of the most prominent international 
organisations in establishing various international conventions that relate to 
international commercial law. The section also addresses the importance of 
comparative law in the working method of these international organisations, 
where they prepare comparative law reports or studies designed for the 
preparation of conventions. The second topic of this chapter, on the other 
hand, examines the obstacles that face the attempts to achieve international 
unification. This section deals with the conflicts among the various national 
courts in interpreting international conventions, and the different theories of 
many international organisations, courts, and commentators in solving such 
conflicts. The section also explains that such conflicts have led several 
commentators to argue that the idea of achieving international uniformity is 
illusory. The purpose behind this chapter is to contend that the international 
community is becoming more involved in the unification of international 
commercial law by adopting international conventions, which are usually the 
product of comparative law studies. Its purpose also is to submit that the 
inten1ational unifonn interpretation of international conventions is not usually 
foIIO\\'ed by the implementation of such conventions. The chapter ends by 
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asking whether we do need substantive international uniformity, namely 
international conventions and uniform interpretations of such conventions. If 
so, then how can we achieve international unifonn interpretations of uniform 
rules? 
The law of carriage of goods by sea was one of the fields in which 
efforts were made to obtain international unifonnity. The sea is not part of the 
territory of any country, and in consequence, carriage of goods by sea is 
usually international carriage. In this sense, unifonnity has always appeared to 
be of the essence in carriage of goods by sea or even in maritime law 
generally7. The following chapters of this thesis, accordingly, concern the 
achievement of international uniformity in the field of carriage of goods by 
sea. The third chapter of this thesis introduces the international unification of 
carriage of goods by sea. This chapter is divided to two parts: The first 
clarifies the development of the liability of the carrier of goods by sea, where 
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules are at present in force in many 
countries. The primary aim of these conventions, like many other conventions, 
is to create unifonn rules to be adopted by the nations of the world. However, 
although these conventions recognise the importance of international 
unifonnity, the existence of these three different conventions plainly 
contributes to the breakdown of uniformity. Some countries adopted the best 
convention that fit with their own interests, while other countries created their 
O\\n codes, which are a combination of various provisions of the Hague, 
7 See Rene Dayid, "The International LTnification of PriYate La\\"", (chapter 5) 
(1975) ~ In1'1. Ene. Compo L. 1 at 150-51. 
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Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules, as well as other non-unifonn domestic 
prOVISIons. 
Although the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules recognise the 
importance of international uniformity, they raise an important question: Do 
we really need uniform rules? In other words, what are the advantages of 
having uniform rules? This question must be examined because one might 
argue that since the above first part shows that the international community 
has lost interest in reaching international uniformity, then there is no need for 
reaching international uniformity. The second part of the third chapter, 
accordingly, argues that achieving international uniformity is still valuable. 
Two arguments are discussed in this part. The first is that unifonn rules reduce 
overall costs of accidents, namely the costs of the damage or loss of the goods 
or the ship and the costs of injuries to persons. This argument is not 
convincing since it lacks any empirical evidence, and therefore, our concern is 
with the second argument. The second argument is that uniform rules reduce 
legal costs, namely the costs of the procedures of the transactions and the costs 
of litigation. This argument also lacks any empirical evidence, but it contains 
indirect evidence and is more logical or sensible than the first argument. The 
core of this chapter, therefore, is not only to introduce the present position of 
international uniformity in relation to the law of carriage of goods by sea, but 
also to argue that international uniformity is valuable since it reduces the legal 
costs significantly. 
In arguing that the unifonnity of the law of carriage of goods by sea 
reduces legal costs, \\'C assumed that the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg 
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Rules are unifonnly interpreted among the various countries. Of course, the 
role of the drafters when drafting these conventions is to reach both unifonn 
text and unifonn interpretation of such text. However, after drafting these 
conventions, the role would logically be transferred to the national courts of 
the countries that adopted these conventions to reach international unifonn 
interpretations. In reality, many conflicts arise among the various countries in 
interpreting these conventions. Such conflicts, in fact, lead to uncertainty and 
unpredictability, and in consequence, there will not be reduction in legal costs. 
In proving this argument, the fourth chapter examines and evaluates the 
conflicts of interpretations of these unifonn rules brought on by 
containerisation. Initially, the chapter provides a brief background on the 
advent of containerisation and how this brought many advantages to shippers, 
carriers and the whole shipping industry. The chapter, on the other hand, 
introduces the conflicts that have been brought on by containerisation. 
Conflicts of interpretations appeared in relation to whether a container is the 
package or its contents are the packages, and whether the carriage of a 
container on-deck deprives carriers from the limitation of liability. The chapter 
investigates how such conflicts would increase the transaction costs and 
litigation. The chapter also explains the indirect impact of the advent of 
containerisation on several conflicts that already existed, and investigates how 
such impact increases litigation. These conflicts relate to the "fair opportunity" 
doctrine and the "customary freight unit" concept. In examining the cont1icts 
of interpretations that relate to containerisation, the chapter concludes that 
there should be a mechanism to significantly reduce such conflicts; otherwise. 
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the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules would not produce reduction in 
transaction costs and litigation. This means, in consequence, that investigating 
how can we achieve uniform interpretations of uniform rules is a valuable 
issue, which urgently needs examination. 
By examining the conflicts of interpretations that relate to 
containerisation, the next chapters of the thesis evaluate and analyse how to 
achieve international uniform interpretations of uniform rules. As a first step. 
the recognition of why conflicts of interpretations appear is surely necessary 
for establishing the basics of the arguments in relation to the question of how 
to avoid such conflicts. The fifth chapter, therefore, examines a number of 
proposals, suggested by different commentators, to understand why conflicts 
of interpretations arise. Some suggest that the imprecise drafting of 
international conventions creates conflicts of interpretations. Others suggest 
that the various methods by which countries implement international 
conventions create conflicts of interpretations. According to these 
commentators, such methods create textual variations and lead the judges to 
lose sight of the international character of the international convention. Many 
commentators, however, argue that the impact of domestic law create conflicts 
of interpretations. Even several commentators allege that conflicts of 
interpretations arise because common-law countries interpret international 
con\'l~ntions in a different manner than civil-law countries. These proposals 
would without doubt playa role in explaining why conflicts of interpretations 
arise among the various national courts, but \\'ould not coyer all types of 
conflicts. In other words, none of these different proposals is entirely 
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satisfactory, since each of them only explains some conflicts. The method in 
this chapter of proving the inadequacy of these propositions is by a 
comparative study in evaluating various countries decisions, mainly the United 
States decisions, that relate to containerisation. 
Reviewing the above various propositions of the commentators and 
looking at how these propositions identify the problem of conflicts of 
interpretations creates an appropriate atmosphere to evaluate how conflicts of 
interpretations could be handled. The sixth chapter, therefore, examines the 
above suggestions on why conflicts of interpretations arise and explains how 
such conflicts could be avoided significantly. The chapter provides various 
decisions on containerisation as examples regarding the propositions of why 
conflicts of interpretations arise. It reveals that the failure to impose duty to 
consider comparative law is a significant factor in conflicts of interpretations 
since national courts usually interpret the international uniform rules 
independently, without considering foreign decisions. Although there is some 
consideration of comparative law by various national courts, still it is not 
persuasive. Many conflicts of interpretations could have been avoided if there 
was an appropriate reference to comparative law. The chapter, in consequence, 
addresses the significance of considering foreign decisions in reducing 
conflicts of interpretations. In doing so, the chapter investigates and analyses 
how the national courts of the various countries should consider foreign 
decisions. By this means, the chapter explains the methods and principles of 
interpretations of the various decisions that relate to containerisation. 
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The identification and clarification of the significant role of 
comparative law in reducing conflicts of interpretations leads us to question 
how we can achieve international uniform interpretations of international 
uniform rules that relate to law of carriage of goods by sea. The se\'enth 
chapter deals with the latter issue. Initially, the first part of the chapter 
examines and evaluates different measures, offered by different commentators 
and courts, for reaching international uniform interpretations. Some argue that 
developing specific uniform principles and rules of interpretation can lead to 
international uniform interpretations of uniform rules. Others argue that taking 
an advisory opinion from an international organisation as a guide of 
interpretation may lead to international uniform interpretations. Many, on the 
other hand, believe that the creation of an international court of appeals for 
construing international uniform rules is the best approach in achieving 
international uniform interpretations. Some, however, disregard the 
importance of achieving international uniformity in general, and argues that 
the application of the proper law of the contract avoids conflicts of 
interpretations, since such application meets the expectations of the parties of 
a contract of carriage by sea. Most of these measures are not completely 
satisfactory solutions to achieve international uniform interpretations of 
unifornl rules. The second part of the chapter, on the other hand, focuses on 
the importance of comparative law in achieving international uniform 
interpretations. This part examines and evaluates the obstacles that may face 
the applicability of comparative law in practice, and the capability of avoiding 
these obstacles. This part also offers various obser,ations in relation to how 
1 1 
the national courts shall consider comparative law. The key point of this 
chapter is that the consideration of comparative law is probably the most 
adequate solution to achieve international uniform interpretations of uniform 
rules. 
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CHAPTER II: THE L:\'"IFICATIO:\ OF I:\TER:"ATIO:"AL 
COMMERICAL LAW 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the problems of our time is the need to reconcile the demands 
of the national state with the ideal of international co-operation. The present 
world order is still founded on the concept of the national state, but we cannot 
disregard the tendency towards the unification of international commercial 
law. Indeed, such uni fication has acquired a great importance and become 
quite successful in spite of its occasional failing. Prominent among its results 
are the various international conventions in particular fields, providing a 
uniform law, which have either incorporated their dispositions into the 
national laws of the signatory states or committed each state to modify its 
national law to make it agree with the convention. However, despite the 
success of many conventions concerning international commercial law, where 
many are at present implemented by a large number of states, they have not 
been interpreted uniformly among the various national courts. Therefore, 
various national courts, international organisations and commentators 
emphasize that the interpretation is valuable as the implementation of 
international conventions. As Scott, LJ. observed, "the maintenance of 
uni fornlity in the interpretation of a rule after its international adoption is just 
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as important as the initial removal of divergence"l. The real problem. of 
course, is how such divergence can be avoided. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out, in as brief as possible, the 
prominent international organisations and their role in creating various 
international conventions governing international commercial la\\·. This 
chapter also sheds some light on the problems likely to confront the various 
national courts in interpreting such conventions, and the manner in which 
these courts could be likely to approach and resolve these problems. 
2.2. The Tendency Towards the Unification of International 
Commercial Law 
Through the centuries, international commercial law developed in 
different stages. In European medieval times, international commercial law 
took the form of international customary rules. These rules were then 
incorporated into the national laws of the various countries, but in this stage, 
international commercial law did not lose its international character since 
international commercial customs continued to grow among the international 
community2. This kind of international development suggests that complete 
state independence in a matter of law results in anarchy at the international 
level. The National law of every country is usually the product of its own 
historical, economic, and political developments, but is not designed for the 
regulation of international commercial relations. In reality, states wil1 keep 
I The Eurymedoll, [1938] Q.B. 41 at 61. Of course. there are many similar 
observations that can be found in later cases of various states. 
2 For a detailed discussion on the historical development of international 
commercial law. see Clive M. Schmitthoff, "The Unification of the Law of 
IntcI11ational Tradc", [1968] J.B.L. 105 at 108. 
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independent and sovereign, but this cannot and must not mean total isolation. 
In supporting this argument, for example, some states affirm their 
independence but feel bound to one another by a common culture or by 
common economic interests. In the United States, for example, the 51 states 
preserve their autonomy in many fields but they coordinate in the de\'elopment 
of their legal systems in certain fields. A similar situation also exists among 
many countries not allied by federal systems, such as the Scandinavian 
countries and the Arab League countries. At present, because of the 
development of international intercourse, such as the simplicity of 
transportation and the boost of mobility of people and capital, the world has 
become a smaller place, and in consequence, this has resulted in expansion of 
international commerce. According to these developments, it is doubtful 
whether any legal system, even of a large country such as the United States, 
can be satisfactorily developed in ignorance of the legal systems of other 
countries. If a country isolates itself from other legal systems, the development 
of the law of such country is likely to suffer3. The present world order is still 
founded on the concept of the national state, but the world community has 
tended to unify international commercial law. 
To regulate international commercial relations in the contemporary 
time, the world community has recognised that such relations require 
international laws uniformly understood and acceptable to all countries and 
construed in the same manner by all national and international courts, where 
3 See Rene Da\'id, "The International Uni fication of Private Law", (chapter 5) 
(1975) :2 InCI. Enc. Compo L. 1 at 4 -5. 
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these courts are required to consider such relations. In this context, 
Schmitthoff observes that: 
Weare beginning to rediscover the international character of 
commercial law and the circle now completes itself: the general trend 
of commercial law everywhere is to move away from the restrictions 
of national law to a universal, international conception of the la\\' of 
international trade4. 
The present international commercial law differs radically from national la\vs. 
The present international commercial law is the product of comparative law, 
which consists of norms, practices, and usages expressed in various national 
laws, and then are compiled by international organisations and agencies. In the 
present world order, studies in comparative law are necessary for many 
reasons. Many law reforms in the different national systems profit from 
studying the experience of various legal systems. It can be asked, therefore, 
whether the different national laws would not benefit from a more systematic 
harmonisation. International organisations, courts, and many commentators 
recognise the benefits of achieving uniformity in international commercial 
law. Predictability and stability of international commercial relations are the 
most important benefits of such unification. The parties of an international 
transaction usually worry about the application of unpredictable rules to their 
business relationship in case of a dispute appeared among them. Minimising or 
eliminating the possibilities of unpredictable rules by providing international 
uniform laws reduces transaction costs and litigation5. These benefits pro\'e 
-l Clive M. Schmitthoff, "Modem trend in English Commercial Law", in 
TidskrUf Utgivcl1 av lurisdiskll F(jrcllingcll Finland, (1 (57) at 354, qlloted in 
Schmitthoff, supra note 2, at 108. 
:' These benefits are discllssed in detail in the next chapter, inlra, at 63-72. 
16 
that the idea of unification of international commercial law did not appear by 
only a desire but also by an urgent need for it. 
The world community realised, from the beginning of the appearance 
of unifying international commercial law, that international unification of 
commercial law cannot replace the present national systems, where this view 
is so fictional since the states are not ready to give up even a small part of their 
sovereignty6. In addition, it will hardly be possible to develop a single global 
code of international trade law acceptable to all countries of the world since 
this suggestion is not only unrealistic but also may slow down the 
development of commercial practices and usages and may constitute an 
obstacle against the continued growth of international customary rules 7. If 
international unification of commercial law is understood in this way, then it 
has very limited prospects for the future. Therefore, the growing tendency 
towards internationalism, which despite occasional failing, has succeeded in 
developing new forms of global and regional organisation in different fields. 
The effort to achieve international uniformity in international commercial law 
has taken the form of conferences to which the various countries send their 
representatives, with the hope of drafting conventions embodying uniform 
rules in a particular area, where these conventions have to be enacted into 
domestic law by the various countries in order to become effective. That effort 
has been led by a variety of international organisations, institutions, and 
associations, such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
6 See Da\'id, supra note 3, at 4. 
7 See Schmittholl supra note~. at Ill. 
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Law (UNCITRAL), the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT), the Comite Maritime International (C\lI), and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). It is worthwhile to consider these 
international organisations briefly since they drafted various conventions that 
govern a wide array of international commercial transactions: 
1. UNCITRAL was created in 1966 by a United Nations resolution as a 
specialist legal body. UNCITRAL embodies thirty-six states, with 
membership structured to be representative of the various geographic regions 
and of the principal economic and legal systems of the world. The General 
Assembly, which established UNCITRAL, recognized that disparities in 
national laws governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of 
trade, and it regarded UNCITRAL as the vehicle for reducing or removing 
these obstacles. The purposes of UNCITRAL is, therefore, to "further the 
progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade"s. 
In relation to its methods of work, UNCITRAL has established three working 
groups to carry out the preparatory work on subjects within UNCITRAL's 
program of work. Each of these working groups is composed of all member 
States of UNCITRAL. These working groups collect and disseminate 
information on national legislation and modem legal developments, including 
case law, in the field of international trade9. In other words, these working 
groups prepare comparative law reports for the designation of international 
x See United 1'\ations Commission on International Trade La\\' (lTNCITRAL), 
from the Intenlet: http://\\'\\'\\,.uncitral.org/en-index,htm (accessed: 16/8 '2(00). 
'l See General ,\ssembly resolution 2205 (XXI), sect. II. paras. 8 (d) and (e); 
llNCITR:\L Yearbook, vol. I, 1968-1970, part one, II. F. 
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unifonn rules in particular fields. The most prominent conyentions of 
UNCITRAL, which are already in force, are the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980), and the 
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (the 
Hamburg Rules). The 1980 Vienna Convention provides comprehensive legal 
rules covering the fonnation of contracts for the international sale of goods, 
the obligations of the buyer and seller, remedies for breach of contract, and 
other aspects of the contract. This convention became the most widely adopted 
and influential of UNCIRAL projects. At present fifty-three countries adopted 
this convention. The Hamburg Rules 1978, however, establishes uniform legal 
rules governing the rights and obligations of carriers, shippers and consignees 
under a contract of carriage of goods by sea lO. These rules are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter!!. 
2. UNIDROIT was first set up in 1926 as an organ of the League of Nations, 
and then was re-established in 1940 as an independent intergovernmental 
organisation. It operates in much the same way as UNCITRAL. UNIDROIT 
membership consists of fifty-eight states, and its purpose is to harmonise and 
coordinate the private law of the states. UNIDROIT's working methods is 
perfonned by the Secretariat, where if necessary assisted by experts in the 
particular field, who draws up a preliminary comparative law report, designed 
to ascertain the desirability and feasibility of preparing international uniform 
rules. Over the years, UNIDROIT has prepared oyer seventy studies and 
!O It!. 
I I See the third chapter, i,~rra, at 50<~3. 
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drafts, which resulted in international conventions, such as the 196..+ 
Convention relating to a Unifonn Law on the Fonnation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (The Hague), and the 1964 Convention relating to 
a Unifonn Law on the International Sale of Goods (The Hague). These two 
conventions did not achieve a real international effect on a worldwide basis 
since the newly decolonised and developing countries did not accept them, so 
they get into force only with respect to few countries. UNIDROIT's work has 
also served as the basis for a number of international conventions, including 
the 1956 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods 
by Road (CMR) (UN/ECE) 12, and the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UNCITRAL)13. 
3. The CMI is a non-governmental international organisation, which was 
fonnally established in 1897. It is the oldest international organisation in the 
maritime field. Although it was established after the International Law 
Association (ILA) by several years, the CMI was the first international 
organisation concerned totally with maritime law and related commercial 
12 The intergovernmental UN/ECE Inland Transport Committee, which was 
established in 1947, created the CMR Convention. "The Inland Transport 
Committee provides a forum for its member Governments for (i) cooperation 
and consultation based on the exchange of infonnation and experiences, (ii) 
the analysis of transport trends and economics and transport policy trends, and 
(iii) coordinated action designed to achieve an efficient, coherent, balanced 
and flexible transport system in the ECE region which is based on principles 
of market economy, pursues the objectives of safety, environmental protection 
and energy efficiency in transport and takes into account transport 
developments and policy of member Governments". See Transport Division, 
from the Internet: http:/\vww.unece.orgitrans'\Velcome.html (accessed: 
15'9i~001). 
13 See International Institute for the Unification of Private La\\', from the 
Intenlct: http://\v\\\v.unidroit.org/englishipresentatioThpres.htm (accessed: 
03 9 ~OO1). 
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practices. Article 1 of the Constitution of the C\1I declares that its object "is to 
contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the unification of 
maritime law in all its aspects" 1-1. At present, the CMI has fifty-three national 
maritime law members associations (International Sub-Committees). The 
national associations' memberships include many judges, legal practitioners, 
academics and those interested in the shipping industry in general, and in 
maritime law in particular. The International Sub-Committees and subsequent 
Conferences of the CMI itself do the initial drafting of every convention. The 
reports of the International Sub-Committees include meetings and 
questionnaires, which end up in comparative studies designed for the 
preparation of conventions 15. The CMI drafted several conventions, including 
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills 
of lading and Protocol of Signature "Hague Rules 1924", and the Protocol to 
amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law Relating to Bills of lading, signed at Brussels on 25 of August 1924 
Visby Rules. These two conventions, as the Hamburg Rules, govern the rights 
and obligations of carriers, shippers and consignees under a contract of 
carriage of goods by sea 16. 
4. The ICC differs significantly III its structure from the international 
organisations mentioned above. It draws its membership from many of the 
private sectors in every part of the world. It was founded in 1919, and one of 
1-+ Sec Comite Maritime International-History, from the Internet: 
http:/;\'·ww .comitemaritime.org1histo/his.htmi (accessed: OJ 912001). 
15 It!. 
16 These rules are discussed in detail in the ne\J chapter. infra, at 39-48. 
21 
its purposes is to standardise contractual terms of particular transactions. Its 
national committees coordinate with their member companies and 
associations, who are engaged in international business, in addressing the 
concerns of the business community. The ICC gives priority to the issues that 
most urgently concern its members. The members set ICC's agenda. The 
members are instrumental in the development of international trading 
instruments. The ICC also coordinates its activities with other organisations, 
such as the CM!. Unlike other organisations, the ICC provides an arbitration 
service that allows it to supervise the interpretations of its instruments. The 
ICC created various uniform rules that govern the conduct of business across 
borders, including the International Chamber of Commerce's International 
Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms (Incoterms), and the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP). Incoterms provides 
standard trade definitions that are most commonly used in international 
contracts to make international trade easier and help traders in different 
countries to understand one another. The UCP, however, provides 
international standard for letter of credit17• 
Apart from the above international conventions, it is also worthwhile 
to mention the Warsaw Convention on Air Transport. In 1922 various groups 
representing the air carrier industry, including the Air Transport Committee of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, began an international effort to deal 
with air transp0l1. The French government organized a diplomatic conference 
17 See International Chamber of Commerce, from the Internet: 
http://ww\\..icc\\.bo.org . home intro _ icclintroducing_icc.asp (accessed: 
06/9/2001). 
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III 1925, where this conference had led to the creation of an International 
Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts 18• This Committee began work 
in 1926, which ended in 1929 in the approval of the Warsaw Conyention 
(Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air)19. This Convention governs, in general, the liability of air 
carriers for injuries to passengers and cargo. The Convention is one of the 
most widely adopted projects, where at present 146 countries ratified or 
acceded it2o. 
What we have seen during the twentieth century and up to the present 
moment is a systematic effort to enlist various countries and groups in the 
unification of international commercial law. This effort succeeded in many 
areas but still there are obstacles that face such unification. 
2.3. The Consequences of the Unification of International 
Commercial Law 
The practical consequences of the general trend of unifying 
international commercial law have now to be defined. Several comments are 
necessary in examining the obstacles that face unification. 
It is not enough to have international conventions be implemented in 
the various countries. These conventions must also be interpreted in the same 
manner in every country, which has adopted them. This raises the question: To 
18 See Paul B. Stephan, "The Futility of Unification and Harmonisation in 
International Commercial Law", (1999) 39 Va. 1. Inf1. L. 743 at 769. 
19 Warsaw Convention 1929, from the Internet: 
http://www.forwarderlaw.com/archivei\\·arsaw.htm (accessed: 06/9/2001). 
20 See Survey, Intell1ational Conventions: Membership List", from the 
Internet: http://w .. ·w.informare.it/dbasc.convuk.htm (accessed: 10/9 '2001 ). 
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what extent is this so? The interpretation of the written text of international 
conventions is a problem in every country. This problem has been the subject 
to many studies, and a variety of theories propounded21 . It is necessary. at 
first, to recall that many countries developed methods of interpretation to 
ensure uniformity of interpretation of their ordinary domestic laws. This 
problem, therefore, is not only at the international level but also at the 
domestic level. In the international level, however, the risk of differing 
interpretations is greater than in domestic law. Methods of interpretation differ 
more widely from one country to another. National courts have given the 
terms of many international conventions different meanings in different 
countries. Some courts rely on the literal meaning of the terms of the 
international convention, while others rely on the purpose of the provisions or 
the convention as a whole. National courts also try, in many cases, to reconcile 
their interpretation with domestic rules, where this has lead to different 
interpretations. The textual variations of international conventions among the 
various countries also constitute a problem that lead to different 
interpretations. Tra\'(7lIx pniparatoires (preparatory work), which might clarify 
the meaning of some terms or provisions, are more difficult to consult in case 
of international conventions than in that of domestic law22 . 
Many national courts' decisions, in interpreting international 
conventions concerning international commercial law, afford examples to how 
21 See, for example, R.J.C. Munday. "The Uniform Interpretation of 
Inten1ational Conventions", (1978) '27 In1'1. Compo L.Q. 45(); Honnold. 
Un~rorl11 LOll' For Internationul Sales Under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention, (1999). 
22 Sec David, slipra note 3. at 95. 
divergence of interpretation occurs among the national courts. The following 
concrete example demonstrates how the national courts apply varieties of 
interpretations. In James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Fonvarding & 
Shipping (U.K.) Ltd. 23, an English case, the members of both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords differed in interpreting the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road 1956 (CMR). The facts of this case were as follows: The defendants 
contracted with the plaintiffs to carry 1000 cases of whisky from the plaintiffs 
place of business in Glasgow to Tehran in Iran. The contract was subject to the 
CMR Convention. The defendants' driver loaded the whisky on his lorry and 
drove to London, where the whisky was stolen. The value of the whisky was 
about £7000. As the whisky was intended for export, the plaintiffs had not 
paid the excise duty of about £30,000 on it. However, since the whisky was 
stolen in London, the plaintiffs paid the excise duty according to section 85 of 
the Customs and Excise Act 1952. Therefore, the sum paid by the plaintiffs 
was about £37,000. On the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants for 
compensation under Articles 17 and 23 of the CMR Convention, Master Jacob 
held that the compensation to which the plaintiffs were entitled under these 
Articles included the excise duty, and in consequence, gave them judgment for 
)4 
about £37,000. The defendants appealed- . 
Article 17 of CMR Convention provides, in part, that "the carrier shall 
be liable for the ... loss of goods ... occurring between the time when he takes 
2J [1977] 1 Q.B. 208. 
24 Id, at 210. 
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over the goods and the time of delivery". In addition, Article 23(1) provides 
that the carrier's liability is to be "calculated by reference to the \"alue of the 
goods at the place and time at which they were accepted for carriage". The 
Court of Appeal and even the House of Lords agreed that this meant that 
prima facie compensation was limited to the original value of the whisky, 
which was about £7000. However, the dispute between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants was whether Article 23(4) could be read in a manner as to allow 
recovery from the defendants of the sum paid for the excise duty, which was 
about £30,000. Article 23(4) provides that: 
In addition, the carriage charges, Customs duties and other charges 
incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods shall be refunded in full 
in case of total loss ... but no further damages shall be payable. 
The Court of Appeal and the majority of the House of Lords held that the 
excise duty constituted "charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the 
goods". Although the Court of Appeal and the majority of the House of Lords 
reached the same conclusion, the significance of the James Buchanan case 
resides not in the decision itself but in the various methods afforded In 
interpreting international conventions, which are explained below. 
In the court of Appeal Lord Denning M.R. argued that the English 
methods of interpretation differ from the European methods. In England, he 
stated, judges stick closely to the literal interpretation of the words, while the 
European judges give greater attention to the purpose underlying legislation. 
Therefore, he argued that the English courts should apply the European 
method of interpretation in order to avoid conflicts of interpretations among 
the various states. Lord Denning, in consequence, stated that Artie Ie 2.'( -t) 
refers only to "other charges incurred in respect to the carriage of the goods". 
but says nothing about the charges consequent to the loss of the goods. This. 
according to Lord Denning, is a gap that should be filled. He stated that it 
would unfair that the plaintiffs bear the expense of the excise duty when the 
loss resulted solely from the negligence of the defendants' driver. He argued 
that the drafters of the CMR Convention must be presumed to have intended 
this to be the case. He held that the plaintiffs were liable for the full £37,000, 
and therefore, dismissed the appea125 . Roskill and Lawton L.J.J. dismissed the 
appeal, but considered that Article 23(4) of the English text in referring to 
"other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods" was 
ambiguous. According to them, in case of ambiguity, it is permissible to refer 
to the French text of the Convention to solve such ambiguity. Roskill and 
Lawton L.J.J. referred to the French text and argued that the French language 
in this text is quite general, and clearly entitle the plaintiffs to recover the 
. d 26 excIse uty . 
There are two points that should be mentioned in relation to the Court 
of Appeal's decision. First, Denning, Roskill and Lawton agreed that in 
interpreting international conventions, we should not refer to the English 
17 d common law rules-. In other wor s, we should not reconcile our 
interpretation with domestic rules. Second, whether their methods of 
interpretation were correct or not, they were all concerned \\'ith achieving 
25 Supra, at 213-15. 
2(1 Supra. at 215-24, 
27 Supra. at 21 L 218, and 221. 
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international unifonn interpretations of the CMR Convention. For example. 
Lord Denning stated that: 
This article 23, paragraph 4, is an agreed clause in an international 
convention. As such it should be given the same interpretation in all 
the countries who were parties to the convention. It would be absurd 
that the courts of England should interpret it differently from the courts 
of France, or Holland, or Gennany. Compensation should be assessed 
on the same basis, no matter in which country the claim is brought 2s • 
In the House of Lords29 , on the other hand, Lord Denning's method of 
interpretation was criticised by the Law Lords. The House of Lords refused to 
consider that this was a case of a gap in the legislation, on the ground that this 
approach entailed the courts' usurping the powers of legislature3o . In addition, 
the Court of Appeal was advised that there existed no decisions in other 
countries on Article 23(4) of the CMR Convention3!, but it turned out that in 
the House of Lords there was discussion of two decisions. One of the cases, a 
Dutch case, British-American Tobacco Co. (Nederland) B. r. v. van Swieten 
B. V. (unreported), was similar to the present case. The Dutch case was also 
concerned with the excise duty but unlike in the present case, a judgement was 
given in favour of the carrier. Lord Wilberforce and Lord Salmon refused to 
follow the latter decision. Although both Lords stressed that their 
interpretation should be in hannony with other countries' decisions, they 
stated that in Ulster-Swift Ltd. v. Taunton Meat Haulage Ltd. 32, twelve 
different interpretations of the courts of various countries were produced 
28 Supra, at 21~. Sec also Roskill and Lawton L.J.J., at 215-16 and 221-22. 
2 () r I 978] A. C. 1.f 1. 
'<0 Id, at 153, 156, 160, 166. and 170. 
11 ,..." ')1-
- Supranote __ ~.at-). 
'<2 [1977] 1 \\'.L.R. 625. 
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concerning the meanmg of specific pronSlOns of the CMR Conyention. 
Because of this confusion, they argued that the English courts must rely on 
their own methods of interpretation33 . 
As to the method of interpretation of Roskill and Lawton L.J.J. in the 
Court of Appeal, the House of Lords divided on when the English courts are 
pennitted to seek the assistance of the other language texts of the original 
convention. It has always been accepted to refer to foreign language texts only 
when the English text is ambiguous, but Lord Wilberforce suggested that this 
limitation should be relaxed and the English courts should have the liberty to 
consult the foreign language texts, without any limitation34 . HO\\'e\'cr, Lord 
Edmund-Davies refused this relaxation35 . The House of Lords did not accept 
that Article 23(4) was ambiguous and even strongly doubted whether Roskill 
and Lawton LJ.J. could have gained any assistance from the French text of 
Article 23(4)36. 
The majority m the House of Lords held that the phrase "charges 
incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods" of Article 23(4) was wide 
enough to include the excise duti7. The minority, on the other hand, argued 
that since there was no gap or ambiguity in Article 23(4), then the literal 
approach is preferable, and in consequence, held that the wording of Article 
33 Supra note 29, Lord Wilberforce, at 153-4~ Lord Salmon, at 161. 
34 Supra note 29, at 152. 
35 Supra note 29, at 167. 
3(1 Supra note 29, at 152,158,161,167, and 170. 
37 Supra note 29, Lord \Vilberforce, at 152: Viscount Di Ihome, at 157; Lord 
Salmon, at 160. 
23( 4) excludes the excise duty38. The conclusion of the case is, therefore, that 
although the members of both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
were concerned with reaching uniformity of interpretation of international 
conventions, there was no unity among their methods in interpreting the C~IR 
Convention. 
What observations can be made after a study of cases concerning the 
divergence of interpretation of international conventions that relate to 
international commercial law? Opinion is divided among international 
organisations, courts and many commentators. The first group argues that 
there are methods where conflicts of interpretations of international 
conventions can be reduced significantly. Various national courts, for 
example, argue that considering foreign decisions by the national courts in 
interpreting conventions can enhance ensuring uniformity of application of 
conventions. Kirby, J. of the Australian High Court, for example, in Great 
China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v. Malaysian International Shipping Corp. -
The "Bunga Seroja ,,39 observed that: 
The approach of this Court to the construction of an international legal 
regime such as that found in the Hague Rules must conform to settled 
principle. Reflecting on the history and purposes of the Hague Rules, 
the Court should strive, so far as possible, to adopt for Australian cases 
an interpretation which conforms to any uniform understanding of the 
Rules found in the decisions of the courts of other trading countries. It 
would be deplorable if the hard won advantages of international 
uni formity, secured by the Rules, were undone by serious 
disagreements between different national courts. 
3X Supra note 29, Lord Edmund-Davies, at 168~ Lord Fraser, at 170. 
39 A.M.e. 427 at 480 (1999), from the Internet: 
http://comitemaritime.orgjurisp ju_interprc.html (accessed: ~,19/2001). 
In fact, many International organisations recognise the value of comparative 
law in achieving international uniform interpretations of international 
conventions. The CMI, for example, seeks at present to set up an international 
Website of an up to date record of decisions of all national courts on the 
application and interpretation of international maritime conventions in national 
1 40 S I 41 . aws . evera commentators , on the other hand, argue that creatmg an 
international court of appeals can lead to the achievement of international 
uniform interpretations of conventions. Other commentators42 , however, argue 
that international uniform interpretations can be achieved by obliging the 
courts to take an advisory opinion from an international organisation as a 
guide of interpretation. These suggestions and many others are examined and 
evaluated later in this thesis43 . 
The second group, on the other hand, argues that conflicts of 
interpretations among the various national courts prove that the idea of 
unification is an unrealistic issue. Mann44 , for example, believes that 
uniformity of law is illusory, elusive, and leads to intensification of conflicts 
of interpretations. It could be argued, therefore, that divergence in 
interpretation is very dangerous to uniformity of law. Such divergence can 
40 See Comite Maritime International, from the Internet: 
http://comitemaritime.org/jurisp/jujntro.html (accessed: 10/9/2001). 
41 Sec, for example, Charles L. Black, "The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem 
of Conflicting Interpretation", (1973) 6 Vand. J. Transnafl. L. 365; David 
Michael Collins, "'Admiralty-International Uniformity and the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea", (1985-1986) 60 Tul. L. Rev. 165 at 202-03. 
4::! Scc Sau\'cplanne, Unidroit 1959, at 283. 
43 Sec the scventh chapter, iI~rra, at 177-2(l-t. 
4-+ F.A. Mann, "Unifom1 Statutes in English La,,''', (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 376 at 
~83 and ~99. ) I 
result in the birth, in the minds of many commentators and any interested 
person or groups, of the belief that unification of law has only limited effect. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter has described various intergoyernmental 
and non-governmental organisations striving for uniformity in relation to 
international commercial law. UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, CMI, ICC, and many 
other organisations are still working hard in the developing of international 
conventions concerning international commercial law wherever possible. This 
effort of unification of international commercial law has served as a useful 
means for promoting comparative research and deepened our understandings 
of the institutions of international commerce. The second part of this chapter, 
on the other hand, has explained that in spite of the effort of many 
international organisations in unifying international commercial law, the 
various national courts do not uniformly interpret international conventions. 
Several international organisations, courts, and commentators proposes 
solutions for achieving uniform interpretations of international conventions, 
while others argues that unification of international commercial law is a 
fictional issue. 
The discussion of this chapter raises important issues for examination 
in the rest of this thesis: whether all the effort, time, and money invested by 
intergovenunental and nongovernmental organisations in the search for 
uniforn1ity of international commercial law is worth\\hile. In other words, are 
the efforts to\vards uni formity a waste of time and money? I f the answer to the 
latter question is no, then another question may arise: is it important to reach 
32 
unifonn interpretations of international conventions? The writer believes that 
the evaluation and examination of the interpretation of international 
conventions is not only an interesting subject but also a valuable one since it is 
closely connected with the general question of whether uniformity of 
international commercial law is important. The writer argues that with proper 
intention given to how national courts interpret international conventions, 
there are several methods for achieving uniformity in such field. At present 
and at least for the near future, the writer believes that the consideration of 
foreign decisions by the national courts is a significant factor in reducing 
conflicts of interpretations of international conventions concernmg 
international commercial law. The subject of sea-carriage of goods by 
containers is an excellent example of an area of law that badly need revisiting. 
This subject is our consideration in the next chapters of this thesis to prove the 
above arguments. 
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CHAPTER III: THE DEVELOPME:\,T A~D THE L\IPORTA:-\CE OF 
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORMITY REGARDI:\G THE LA'" OF 
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 
3.1 Introduction 
Striving for unifonnity in relation to the law of carriage of goods by 
sea or to maritime law generally is not a modem phenomenon. Throughout the 
centuries, the need to unify maritime law has led to codes and laws by which 
nations seek to regulate matters of common interests, at least on a regional 
basis. In the twelfth century, the Rules of Oleron, a maritime code that was 
followed for many centuries, were applied from Northern Europe to the 
Mediterranean. The Consolato del Mare, very similar to the Rules of Oleron, 
appeared in the Mediterranean Sea, while the Rules of Visby, a subsequent 
formulation of the Rules of Oleron, prevailed in the North Sea and Baltic. 
These codes did not have any national boundaries, and each one was quite 
successful in creating one language for the community of international 
maritime commerce. However, the efforts to achieve unifonn maritime law 
declined with the growth of nationalism. The advent of nationalism 
jeopardized such uniformity, where new laws were enacted to protect national 
interests rather than those of the international maritime community. The 
regulation of maritime commercial relationships at the national le\'el became 
increasingly unsatisfactory since the number of sovereign states mUltiplied 
with the collapse of colonial empires 1. 
How different is maritime law today? As explained in the previous 
chapter, the present world order is still founded on the concept of the national 
state, but the efforts to achieve uniform maritime law are revived by the 
creation of international conventions to regulate certain maritime issues. In the 
context of the law of carriage of goods by sea, several international 
conventions appeared to regulate this issue, but many countries refuse to 
subscribe to them so that such law, to a certain degree, is neither unifonn nor 
universal. This situation led many commentators to question whether 
uniformity in the law of carriage of goods by sea is valuable or not. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first attempts to explain the 
status of the law of carriage of goods by sea today, and explores the lack of 
uniformity as many countries adopted various international conventions 
concerning such law. The second part, on the other hand, investigates whether 
the unification of the law of carriage of goods by sea is valuable. 
3.2. The Development of the Liability of the Carrier of Goods 
by Sea 
3.2.1. The Nineteenth Century-Freedom of Contract and 
Exculpatory Clauses 
In the early nineteenth century, a strict liability system protected cargo 
owners. In both common la\y and civil law systems, carriers were strictlv 
1 For a detailed discussion on the history of maritime la\\', see Gordon \\'. 
Paulsen, "An Historical Overyic\\' of the Dcvelopment of Unifon11ity in 
International \laritime La\\", (1982-198~) 57 Tut. L. Rev. 1065. 
liable for cargo damage or loss. Carriers, however, could escape this strict 
liability if they could prove two points: The first is that their negligence had 
not contributed to the loss, and the second is that one of the four excepted 
causes, namely, act of God, act of public enemies, shipper's fault, or inherent 
vice of the goods, was responsible for the loss. In other words, if one of the 
above exceptions applied, carriers were liable only if they had been at fauh, 
but in all other situations, they were liable without fault. This situation led 
many national courts and commentators to describe the carrier as "insurer" of 
the goods2. It is interesting to note that although the legal situation of the 
carriage of goods by sea of the early nineteenth century, as described above, 
was very strict with carriers, there was real international uniformity in relation 
to the carrier's liability at that time. 
By the late nineteenth century, the situation changed. Carriers avoided 
the strict liability and placed the risk of loss of or damage to the goods on their 
customers (the shippers) by including eXCUlpatory clauses in their bills of 
lading3. British and American shipowners issued bills of lading of the same 
2 See, for example, Forward v. Pittard, 99 Eng. Rep. 953 at 956-57 (K.B. 
1785) (per Lord Mansfield); Michael F. Sturley, "The History of COGSA and 
the Hague Rules", (1991) 22 I.M.L.C. 1 at 4-5; Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, 
"Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods 
Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions", (1996) 23 
Trans. L.J. 471 at 474. 
3 The exculpatory clauses included losses and damage from "thieves; heat, 
leakage, and breakage; contact with other goods; perils of the seas; jettison; 
damage by seawater; frost; decay; collision; strikes; benefit of insurance; 
liberty to deviate; sweat and rain; rust; prolongation of the voyage; 
nonresponsibility for marks or numbers; removal of the goods from the 
carrier's custody immediately upon discharge; limitation of value; time for 
notice of claims; and time for suit." See Benjamin W. Yancey, "The Carriage 
36 
sort, and so did almost all other foreign shipowners4. Only small Gennan 
shipowners, on the other hand, adopted a different unifonn bill of ladino 
.0' 
which gave emphasis to their liabilities as carriers5• Accordingly, the degree of 
international uniformity in relation to the carrier's liability at that time was 
very high, since almost all shipowners of the world issued bills of lading of the 
same sort. 
3.2.2. Reaction to Exculpatory Clauses-Early Legislation 
National responses to the situation of the late nineteenth century 
differed from one country to another depending largely on the size of the 
merchant fleet6. In the United States, for example, the federal courts pennitted 
carriers to limit their liability under some circumstances, but did not allow 
them to escape liability for their own negligence7, or for their failure to 
provide a seaworthy ship8. Likewise, the Japanese Commercial Code 
invalidated agreements exempting a carrier "from liability for damages caused 
by the ship owner himself, or by the wilful act or gross negligence of the crew 
of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg", (1983) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238 
at 1240. 
4 See M. Bayard Crutcher, "The Ocean Bill of Lading-A Study in 
Fossilization", (1970-1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 697 at 709, citing S. Dor, Bills of 
Lading Clauses and the Brussels International Convention of 1924, at 13 
(France), 16 (Great Britain), 18 (Italy) (1956). 
5 Id. 
6 See David Michael Collins, "Admiralty-International Uniformity and the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea", (1985-1986) 60 Tul. L. Rev. 165 at 166. 
7 See, for example, Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U.S. 
l04 at 11 7 (1897). 
8 See, for example, Pacific Mail Steamship v. Ten Bales Gunny Bags, 18 F. 
Cas. 950 (D. Cal. 1874) (No.1 0,648). 
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or any other employee, or by the fact that the ship is unseaworthy,,9. 
Conversely, the British courts viewed the carrier's strict liability as a default 
rule that should be applied only in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 
Thus, in regard to freedom of contract, shippers and carriers could agree to a 
risk allocation where carriers assumed no liability even for their own 
negligence 10. Most European and Commonwealth countries followed the 
British approach 11. 
In an effort to protect the American cargo interests from the British and 
other foreign shipowners' bills of lading, the United States Congress passed 
the Harter Act in 1893 12 . At that time, the British carriers were politically 
powerful in Great Britain itself, but not in the overseas Dominions. Therefore, 
the cargo interests in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were powerful 
enough to direct their governments to enact "Harter-style legislation". Outside 
the British Empire, the French-Morocco also enacted "Harter-style 
legislation". In this context, Sturley argues that many other countries including 
France, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, 
9 See Japan Commercial Code Art. 592 (trans. Yang 1911), quoted in Sturley, 
supra note 2, at 5-6. 
10 See Re Missouri s.s. Co., [1889] 42 Ch. D. 321. The use of negligence 
clauses by the British shipowners had begun following the decision of the 
Court of Common Pleas in Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., [1866] 1 
C.P. 600. See Sturley, supra note 2, at 5. 
llId. 
12 Ch. 105,27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-96 (1997». 
See Jan Ramberg, "Freedom of Contract in Maritime Law", [.1993] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 178 at 179. The Act was introduced by Congressman Michael 
Harter of Ohio, which was eventually enacted under his name. See Sturley, 
supra note 2, at 12-13. 
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and South Africa were at least considering the adoption of "'Harter-style 
legislation" \3. 
The Harter Act invalidated certain exculpatory clauses, where British 
and other foreign shipowners used to list such clauses in their bills of lading to 
exonerate themselves from their liability of loss or damage to the goods at sea. 
However, the Act did not address any limitation clauses to the carrier's 
liability. Carriers, therefore, were capable of including such clauses in their 
bills of lading to limit their liability to nominal amounts14 . Consequently, the 
Harter Act, though an important step in the development of the law of carriage 
of goods by sea, as a whole, was, at best, a partial, and, at worst, an 
unsatisfactory solutionIS. The Harter Act was significant in determining the 
way that international uniformity would take, but this occurred more through 
foreign imitation of it than through the United States efforts to spread its 
. . 1 16 pnnclp es . 
3.2.3. The eMI and the Effort to Achieve International 
Uniformity-The Hague Rules 1924 
The threat to international uniformity, which was created by the above 
developments, encouraged various international organisations to unify the 
13 Sturley, supra note 2, at 17-18. . 
I~ See Andrea R. Luciano, "Much Ado About Packages: Contamers & the 
COGSA Limitation of Liability Provision", (1982) .+8 Brooklyn L. Rc\'. 721 at 
723, 
15 See Howard M. McCormack, "Uniformity of Maritime Law, and 
Perspective From the U.S. Point of Vic\v", (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1.+81 at 
1520; Nlandelbaum, supra note 2, at .+ 76. . , 
\(1 Sturley's opinion is that prior to 1921, the llnited States failed to partICIpate 
in the intenlational movement for unifying the law of carriage of goods hy sea. 
Sturley. supra note 2, at 3(L 
world's maritime laws. In order to achieve this goal, these organizations have 
depended primarily on the promulgation of international conventions that deal 
with different aspects of maritime laws17. The attempt to promulgate 
international uniformity in the field of maritime law had taken the shape of 
conferences where the states send delegations to draft international 
conventions in particular areas. The Comite Maritime International (CMI), 
founded in Belgium in 1897, led that attempt 18. In 1921, the International Law 
Association's Maritime Law Committee adopted uniform rules in relation to 
carriage of goods by sea, which were formulated by the CMII9. Although 
shipowners argued that freedom of contract was best for all parties, they stated 
that "if freedom of contract in the over-sea carrying trade was to be restricted, 
it should be on international and not on national lines,,20. Shipowners, 
therefore, were willing to accept these uniform rules rather than the danger of 
the appearance of different legislations in the countries where they did 
business21 • Harter-style legislations already existed in many parts of the 
British Empire, but shipowners had feared that there might soon be Harter-
style legislation in France, Spain, the Netherlands, South Africa, Finland, and 
17 See Collins, supra note 6, at 165-66. 
18 See Charles S. Haight, "Babel Afloat: Some Reflections on Uniformity in 
Maritime Law", (1997) 28 1.M.L.C. 189 at 194. 
19 See Collins, supra note 6, at 167. 
20 See Report of the International Shipping Conference held at London, 23rd, 
24th, and 25th November 1921, at 42 (Sir Norman Hill, who represented the 
Liverpool Steamship Owners Association and was the l~adi~g sp~kesman for 
shipowners). Reprinted in Michael F. Sturley, The Legislative History of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Preparatoires of the Hague 
Rules. (1990) Vol. 2, at 181. 
21 [d. 
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the Scandinavian countries22. Many cargo interests, including several 
chambers of commerce, trade associations, bankers, and underwriters, 
approved these uniform rules23. On the other hand, some cargo interests, such 
as the English National Federation of Com Trade Associations and the 
Institute of American Meat Packers, criticised them24. Three years later, these 
uniform rules were modified into the form of a convention at the International 
Diplomatic Conference of Maritime Law in Brussels, and adopted under the 
name of International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to Bill of Lading, known as the Hague Rules 1924. The delegates 
who drafted the Hague Rules recognized the value of international uniformity 
by stressing this purpose in the official title: "Brussels Convention for the 
unification of Certain Rules of law Relating to Bills of lading,,25. 
The British government put the Hague Rules into the statute books 
(British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924) before the rest of the world had 
completed the diplomatic formalities of the Rules. The Parliament of the 
United Kingdom recognised the importance of international uniformity when 
adopting legislation based on the Hague Rules. Sir Leslie Scott, Member of 
the House of Commons in the Second Reading of the carriage of goods by sea 
Bill in 1924, stated that: 
22 See Sturley, supra note 2, at 25. 
23 See Comite Maritime International, London Conference, October 1922, at 
160-162. Reprinted in Sturley, supra note 20, at 292-294. 
24 See Sturley, supra note 2, at 25-26. . 
25 (emphasis added). See John F. Wilson and Charles DebattIsta, World 
Shipping Laws: International Conventions v. Carriage by Sea, VIl/CONV-
V/6/CONV, (October 1980) at 1. 41 
That draft convention [Hague Rules] has now been agreed to by a very 
large number of nations ... who have acted as sponsors of this 
movement for the unification of maritime law26. 
The British ratified the Hague Rules on February 1930. Other countries in the 
British Empire soon followed the British. Australia and India, for example, 
enacted their Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1924 and 1925. Outside of the 
British Empire, in 1927, Belgium and the Netherlands recognized the Hague 
Rules with national legislation. Italy enacted the Hague Rules as domestic law 
in 1929, while Spain and Portugal ratified the Hague Rules in 1930 and 
1931 27. However, it took over thirteen years to achieve a compromise in the 
United States. In 1936, the United States Congress passed the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), which adopted, with minor alterations, the 
Hague Rules. The Congress of the United States recognized the need of 
international uniformity when enacting its carriage of goods by sea Act. For 
example, Senator White, during the floor debates in 1935, stated that: "the 
[COGSA] bill is designed to bring about uniformity in ocean bills oflading,,28. 
In addition, Charles S. Haight, the chairman of the Bill of Lading Committee 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, stated in his testimony before a 
United States Senate Subcommittee in 1927 that: 
26 See Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, House of Commons (5th series-
Volume 174) at 1561 (1924). Reprinted in Michael F. Sturley, The Legislative 
History of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Preparatoires of 
the Hague Rules, (1990) Vol. 1, at 589. 
27 See Sturley, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
28 79 Congo Rec. 13341 (1935). See also 79 Congo Rec. 8954 (1935) 
(statement of Sen. Thomas) "The [COGSA bill] is simply to bring about 
uniform usage of bills of lading in the transhipment of goods and makes the 
usage uniform". Reprinted in Sturley, supra note 26, at 587. 
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Uniformity is the one important thing. It does not matter so much 
pr~cisely whe~e you draw the line dividing the responsibilities of the 
shIpper and hIs underwriter from the responsibility of the carrier and 
his underwriter. The all-important question is that you draw the line 
somewhere and that the line be drawn in the same place for all 
countries and for all importers29. 
The following year, the United States ratified the Hague Rules (July 1937)30. 
The maritime nations of the world agreed on the Hague Rules in an 
effort to unify the rules governing carriage of goods by sea. The Hague Rules 
have enjoyed widespread success throughout the world. For example, within 
two years of the ratification of the rules by the United States, France, Italy, 
Germany, Poland, Finland, and the three Scandinavian countries followed ie l . 
The Hague Rules entered into force on 2 June 1931. At present, the 
convention itself has either been ratified or acceded to by sixty-two countries, 
and only one country is landlocked32. 
3.2.4. The eMI Amendments to the Hague Rules 1924-The 
Hague-Visby Rules 1968 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Hague Rules 1924 were 
intended to unify certain rules of law relating to carriage of goods by sea. At 
the beginning, they achieved that purpose. In addition, they produced in their 
29 See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules in Regard 
to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearing on Executive E 
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th 
Cong., 1 st Sess. 3 (1927). Reprinted in Michael F. Sturley, The Legislative 
History of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Preparatoires of 
the Hague Rules, (1990) Vol. 3, at 327. 
30 Id, at 55. 
31 See Sturley, supra note 2, at 55-56. 
32 George F. Chandler, "A Survey of the Cargo by Sea Conventions as They 
Apply to Certain States", from the Internet: 
http://www.admiraltylaw.comlcargo%20regimes.htm (accessed: 28/9/2001). 
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times a fairer balance of carriers and shippers interests than previously 
. d33 Th eXlste . e Hague Rules were a workable set of rules that were acceptable 
to the world community, but changes in technology such as the container 
revolution, which the drafters of the Hague Rules could not have expected, 
made the rules less workable and less acceptable34. In addition, the changing 
world political position, as previous colonies became self-governing countries, 
and the problem of conflicts in interpretation of the Hague Rules among the 
national courts, were other important issues that made the Hague Rules less 
acceptable35. This, in consequence, led the Comite Maritime International 
(CMI) to consider amendments to the Hague Rules at its 1963 conference in 
Stockholm. This culminated in the 1968 Brussels Protocol to the Hague Rules, 
known as the Hague-Visby Rules 196836. The amendment introduced by the 
Hague-Visby Rules 1968 included the following prominent issues: 
1. Provide a new provision for containerisation: Carriage of goods by 
containers appeared in the 1960s. The Hague-Visby Rules 1968, accordingly 
added a new provision regarding containerisation37. 
33 See William Tetley, "The Lack of Uniformity and the Very Unfortunate 
State of Maritime Law in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France", [1987] L.M.C.L.Q. 340 at 341. 
34 This issue is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter, infra, at 79. 
35 See David C. Fredrick, "Political Participation and legal Reform in the 
International Maritime Rulemaking Process: From the Hague Rules to the 
Hamburg Rules", (1991) 22 lM.L.C. 81; Michael F. Sturley, "Uniformity in 
the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea", (1995) 26 1.M.L.C. 553 at 
560. 
36 "Protocol to Amend the International Convention For the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading Signed at Brussels on 25 
August 1924 (23 February 1968)". See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 25, at 
7. 
37This issue is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter, infra, at 80. 
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2. Attempts to standardise and raise the carrier's limitation of liability: The 
Hague Rules 1924, under Article 4(5), provide that the carrier's limitation of 
liability is 100 pounds per package or unit. The Hague-Visby Rules 1968, 
under the same Article, changed this limitation of liability to Frs. 10.000 per 
package or unit, or Frs. 30 per kilo. The Hague-Visby Rules 1968 attempted to 
provide a uniform standard of limitation of liability by stating that a "franc 
means a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness 
900,,38. 
3. Address the "Himalaya" problem: This problem named for the ship 
"Himalaya" in the case of Alder v. Dickson 39. The problem arose when 
successful attempts had been made by claimants to get round the limitations 
and exceptions contained in the bills of lading by suing servants or agents of 
the carrier in tort rather than on the contract of carriage40. 
4. Relieve carriers from liability for the negligence of an independent 
contractor: If an action is brought against an independent contractor, this 
independent contractor is not entitled to all exceptions and limitations of 
liability available to carriers under the Hague-Visby Rules 196841 • 
38 See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 25, at 7-8. 
39 [1955] 1 Q.B. 158. . 
40 For a full discussion of this problem, see, for example, MIchael F. Sturley, 
"International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic 
Law in Conflicts of Interpretation", (1987) 27 Va. J. Int'l. L. 729 at 755-73; 
Joanne Zawitoski, "Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and terminal 
Operators Under the Carrier's Bill of Lading and COGS A", (1985) 16 
J.M.L.C. 337 at 343-49; D.G. Powles, "The Himalaya Clause", [1979] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 331. 
41 For a detailed discussion of this issue and all other amendments, see 
Anthony Diamond, "The Hague-Visby Rules", [1978] L.M.C.L.Q. 225. 
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In 1971, the British Parliament enacted the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act. This Act was the first one that based on the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, 
where it received the Royal Assent on 8 April 197142. The British shipping 
industry supported the Act43 . The British government, however, decided not to 
implement the Act unless and until a sufficient number of countries ratify the 
Hague-Visby Rules 1968 in order to bring it into force44. The Hague-Visby 
Rules came into force on 23 June 1977, after its ratification by ten countries45, 
and the British Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 was implemented on the 
same day46. It was not the United Kingdom but the Scandinavian countries 
that gave the lead in implementing legislation based on the Hague-Visby 
On the other hand, in the United States, within only a few weeks after 
the appearance of the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, shippers supported their 
ratification by the United States. Joseph A. Sinclair, on behalf of the 
Commerce and Industry Association of New York (a shipper's organization), 
wrote to then Secretary of State Dean Rusk that his members were very 
pleased with the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, and hoped that they would be 
42 Id, at 235. 
43 See N.R. McGi1christ, "The New Hague Rules", [1974] L.M.C.L.Q. 255 at 
255. 
44 See Diamond, supra note 41, at 235. Article 13 of the Hague-Visby Rules 
provides that international implementation of the Rules would. ~ollow 
ratification of them by ten states of which at least five should have a mmlmum 
of one million gross tons of tonnage. See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 25, 
at 10. 
45 These countries are: Denmark, Ecuador, France, Lebanon, Norway, 
Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria and the Unite? K.i~gdo~. . " 
46 See Note, "The Hague-Visby Rules Now Operative III Umted Kmgdom , 
P977] L.M.C.L.Q. 512 at 512. 
7 See Diamond, supra note 41, at 235. 
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ratified by the United States48• Similarly, Joseph Baittner, on behalf of the 
Singer Company, summarized the opinions of most U.S. shippers by 
expressing support for the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 as a fair solution to ship 
owner and shipper interests49. Conversely, shipowners strongly opposed 
ratification of the Hague-Visby Rules. Ralph E. Casey, then President of the 
American Merchant Marine Institute (AMMI), representing most U.S. ship 
owner interests, stated that the prospects for ratification were doomed. In his 
letter to then Secretary of State Dean Rusk dated 22 May 1968, Ralph E. 
Casey expressed the strong opposition of the AMMI to the implementation of 
the Hague-Visby Rules1968 by the United States, and on behalf of ship 
owners' interests, he criticized it50. Similarly, Benjamin W. Yancey, formerly 
the President of the United States Maritime Law Association (USMLA)51, in 
his letter to then Secretary of State Dean Rusk dated 17 May 1968, expressed 
his sharp disagreement with the Hague-Visby Rules 196852. According to the 
above opposition from major parts of the maritime industry, the Executive 
Branch decided not to ratify the Hague-Visby Rules 1968. This was the sole 
48 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, "Why the U.S. Did Not Ratify the Visby 
Amendments", (1992) 23 1.M.L.C. 29 at 40. 
49 Id. 
50 See Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 40-44. 
51 The principal objectives of the Maritime Law Association of the l!nited 
States (USMLA), which was formed in 1899, were "to advance reforms In the 
maritime law of the United States, to facilitate justice in the administration of 
maritime law, and to promote uniformity in the enactment and interpretation 
of maritime law". See Maritime Law Association of the United States, from 
the Internet: http://www.richmond.edul-jpjoneslboating! (accessed: 
22/1111999). 
52 See Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 45-48. 
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reason why the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 were not ratified by the United 
States53 . 
The Hague-Visby Rules 1968 are an update to the original Hague rules 
1924. Not all the countries that adopted the Hague Rules 1924 ratified or 
acceded to the Hague-Visby Rules 1968. For example, Algeria, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Fiji, Grenada, and the United States of America did not adopt the Hague-
Visby Rules 1968. However, some countries, such as Iceland and Indonesia, 
who did not from the beginning ratify or accede to the Hague Rules 1924, 
adopted the Hague-Visby Rules 1968. Consequently, although the Hague-
Visby Rules 1968 intended, as the Hague Rules 1924, to unify the law of 
carriage of goods by sea, their appearance plainly contributed in breaking 
down international uniformity. At present, the convention itself (Hague-Visby 
Rules 1968) has either been ratified or acceded to by fifty-two countries, and 
only two countries are landlocked54. 
3.2.5. The 1979 Protocol Amendment to the Hague-Visby Rules 
1968 
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924, as stated in the previous section, 
provides that the limitation of the carrier's liability is 100 pounds sterling per 
package or unit. The Hague-Visby Rules, under the same Article, changed this 
limitation into Frs. 10,000 per package or unit, or Frs. 30 per kilo. The 
currency of reference in Article 4(5), therefore, was changed from pounds 
53 See Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 51-52. 
54 George F. Chandler, "A Survey of the Cargo by Sea Conventions as They 
Apply to Certain States", from the Internet: 
http://www.admiraltylaw.comlcargo%)20regimes.htm (accessed: 28/912001 )·48 
sterling to francs. Article 4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules also provides that a 
"franc means a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal 
fineness 900" commonly known as a "Pioncare gold Franc". If the expectation 
of the Hague-Visby Rules about the stability of gold had been right, then these 
changes would have produced a uniform standard. However, as Tetley 
observed, "neither the value nor the price of gold has been stable in relation to 
other goods or to national currencies,,55. Therefore, there are two systems of 
valuing gold, namely the free market value and the official national values56. 
Accordingly, in 1979, the Hague-Visby Rules were amended to cover 
currency exchange imbalances. The amendment was called as Protocol 
Amending the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law Relating to Bills of Lading (21 December, 1979)57. This protocol revised 
the gold standard to a system using a Special Drawing Rights (S.D.R.), the 
value of which is calculated daily by the International Monetary Fund ("the 
value of the S.D.R. is based on the weighted average of the values of a basket 
of key currencies,,)58. The limitation of liability was increased under this 
protocol to 667 S.D.R. 's per package or unit, or 2 S.D.R. 's per kil0
59
. 
The 1979 Protocol in respect of Special Drawing Rights (S.D.R.) 
entered into force 14 February 1984. Some Hague-Visby countries did not 
adopt the 1979 Protocol, such as Ecuador, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
55 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (2d ed., 1978) at 448. 
56Id. 
57 See Comite Maritime International, from the 
http://comitemaritime.orgljurisp/jujntro.html (accessed: 10/9/2001). 
58 See Collins, supra note 6, at 172-73. 
59 See Mandelbaum, supra note 2, at 481-82. 
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Tonga, and Vietnam. Consequently, although the 1979 Protocol intended to 
provide a unifonn standard for the carrier's limitation of liability, its 
appearance by itself also contributed in breaking down international 
unifonnity. At present, the 1979 Protocol has either been ratified or acceded to 
by thirty-seven countries, and only two countries are landlocked6o. 
3.2.6. UNCITRAL and the Effort to Create New Convention-
The Hamburg Rules 1978 
For many years, the developing countries did not desire that the CMI 
play the role of unifying the law of carriage by sea, since, according to their 
opinion, it was biased to carriers61 . In fact, in 1970, the political United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT ADt~ made a study 
on the significance of the Hague Rules in relation to contemporary trade 
situations. The result of the study viewed the Rules as an unfair product for the 
developing countries63 . Therefore, in 1971, work began in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD), and then shifted to the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). In 
1976, UNCITRAL introduced draft rules for unifying the law of carriage of 
()() George F. Chandler, "A Survey of the Cargo by Sea Conventions as They 
Apply to Certain States", from the Internet: 
http://ww\v.admiraltylaw.comlcargoo/o20regimes.htm (accessed: 18/<) 1200 1 ). 
61 See Collins, supra note 6, at 194; Joseph C. Sweeney, "The UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part Ir, (1975-1976) 7 
.T.M.L.C. 69 at 73. 
()~ UNCT AD was created in 1964, in Geneva, as a permanent 
inter~ovcll1mental body. Its primary aim is to accelerate economic growth and 
development especially in relation to developing countries. See Patrick 1.S. 
Griggs, "Uniforn1ity of Maritime Law-An International Perspective", (1999) 
7J Tul. L. Re\,. 1)) 1 at 1 )58. 
63 Sec I\lcGi1christ, supra note 4~. at 257. 
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goods by sea64 . In consequence, in 1978, the United Nations Convention on 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, known as the Hamburg Rules, was adopted by a 
diplomatic conference in Hamburg, Germany. The delegates who drafted the 
Hamburg Rules recognized the value of international uniformity by stressing 
this purpose under Article 3, which states that: 
In the interpretation and application of the prOVISIons of this 
Convention regard shall be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity65. 
As mentioned above in this chapter, the United States' shipowners and 
the United States Maritime Law Association (USMLA) strongly opposed the 
adoption of the Hague-Visby Rules 196866 . However, during the mid-1970s, 
the United States' shipowners and the United States Maritime Law 
Association (USMLA) changed their views on the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 
by describing it as a positive contribution to international maritime law. 
Shipper interests, on the other hand, abandoned their support for the Hague-
Visby Rules 1968, and quickly supported the Hamburg Rules 197867 • It is 
clear that these changes of views took place because of the appearance of 
creating the new convention, namely the Hamburg Rules 1978. The 
construction of the Hamburg Rules 1978 is significantly different from the 
Hague-Visby Rules 1968, and would provide for an increase in carrier 
liabili ty68. For example, under Article 6(1)(a) of the Hamburg Rules 1978, the 
(l~ See Collins, supra note 6, at 19-+. 
(l:\ See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 25, at 53. 
66 Supra, at -+ 7. 
(l7 Sec Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 52; f\landelbaum. supra note 2, at .+84. 
(lX For a general comparison between the Hague- \'jsby and Hamburg Rules 
sec. for example, Robert Force. ".\ Comparison of the I-lague, Hague- \'ishy, 
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liability of the carrier for loss or damage is limited to 835 SDRs per package 
or other shipping unit or 2.5 SDRs per kilogram of gross \\eight of the goods 
lost or damaged, whichever is higher69. The Hamburg Rules 1978 not only 
increased the limits of liability beyond the increased limits introduced in the 
original Hague-Visby Rules 1968 but also the 1979 Protocol of the Visby 
Amendments, which mentioned above70 . On the other hand, a comparison 
between the former conventions and the Hague Rules 1924 clarify the latter 
are out-dated, and created many problems for both carrier and shipper 
interests, such as the container problem. Therefore, it is logical that both 
carrier and shipper interests would change their views, and preferred the 
adoption of the more beneficial convention that suits their own interests, 
namely the Hague-Visby or the Hamburg Rules. 
The Hamburg Rules entered into force on 1 November 1992. At 
present, no developed country, such as the United States of America, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Germany and France, has ratified the Hamburg Rules. It is 
argued71 that this is because the Hamburg Rules 1978 are a result of political 
and Hamburg Rules: Much Ado About (?)", (1996) 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051; R. 
Glenn Bauer, "Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg 
Rules-A Case by Case Analysis", (1993) 24 1.M.L.C. 53; A.J. Waldron, "The 
Hamburg Rules-A Boondoggle For Lawyers?", [1991] J.B.L. 305; Douglas A. 
Werth, "The Hamburg Rules Revisited-A look at U.S. Options", (1991) 22 
.I.M.L.C.59. 
6<) See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 25, at 56. 
70 Supra, at 49. 
71 See Frederick, supra note 35, at 105; George F. Chandler, "After Reaching 
a Century of the Hal1er Act: Where Should We Go From Here?", (1993) 24 
.l.M.L.C. 43 at 44-:~5; George F. Chandler, "A Comparison of 'COGSA', the 
Hague/\,isb\' Rules, and the Hamburg Rules", (1984) 15 J.M.L.C. 233 at 236. 
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compromise rather than a real commercial compromise -. Kozolchyk. for 
example, argues that: 
Substantive unifonnity [is] ... only attainable when the various 
participants in the transactions arrive at a consensus with respect to the 
fairness of their rights and duties. This was the lesson of the success of 
the Harter Act and of the Hague Rules and of the failure of the 
Hamburg Rules73 • 
From this point, although the Hamburg Rules 1978, as the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules, intended to unify the law of carriage of goods by sea, again their 
appearance by themselves contributed in breaking down international 
unifonnity':'~. At present, the convention itself has either been ratified or 
acceded to by twenty-seven countries, where ten countries are landlocked?:'. 
3.2.7. Current Developments-Hybrid Systems v. International 
Uniformity 
At present, the world has three international regImes in relation to 
carriage of goods by sea, namely, the Hague. Hague-Visby, and Hamburg 
Rules. However. because some Hague-Visby countries have adopted the 1979 
SDR Protocol Anlendnlent to the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, while others have 
not. there are actually four international regimes in relation to carriage of 
goods by sea. In recent years, many countries have enacted their own carriage 
:2 In the United States, the Hamburg Rules were frequently criticised as that 
no developed country adopted them. See Bauer, supra note 68, at 53. 
73 Boris Kozo1chyk. "Evolution and Present State of the Ocean Bill of Lading 
from a Banking Law Prospective", (1992) 23 J.M.L.C. 161 at 245. 
74 Sturley argues that with the Cnited States support. the Hamburg Rules 
''might be a vehicle for greater international unifonnity" because the United 
States was major factor in the extensive international approval of the Hague 
Rules 1924. Sturley, supra note 35, at 568. 
7:' George F. Chandler, "A Sun'ey of the Cargo by Sea Conventions as They 
Apply to Certain States", from the Internet: 
http:! www.admiraltylaw.comJcargo% 20regimes.htm (accessed: 28/91200 1). 
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of goods by sea legislation. Some of these countries enacted legislation 
including hybrid provisions from both the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, 
as well as the original Hague Rules 1924, while others did the same but added 
nationalistic rules76 . The number of the international regimes in relation to 
carriage of goods by sea is five, which are as follows: 
1. Where the Hague Rules 1924 are in force; 
2. Where the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 are in force; 
3. Where the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 and the 1979 SDR Protocol are in 
force; 
4. Where the Hague Rules 1924 and the 1979 SDR Protocol are in force; 
5. Where the Hamburg Rules are in force. 
However, because some countries created their own codes, which are a 
combination of various provisions of the Hague Rules 1924, the Hague-Visby 
Rules 1968, the 1979 SDR Protocol, and the Hamburg Rules 1978, as well as 
other non-uniform domestic provisions, the number now exceeds five. 
76 Such as Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), and South 
Africa. For a general discussion of this issue see: William Tetley, "The 
Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
Intenlational Carriage of Goods by Sea Law", (1999) 30 J.M.L.C. 595: L. Li, 
"The Maritime Code of the People's Republic of China", [1993] L.M.C.L.Q. 
204: Peter N. Prove, "The Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1991, and International Uniformity", (1997) 1 at 10, from the Internet: 
http://law.llniscrYe.edll.au/law/pu b lie IItransconiintUni formity.html (accessed: 
23/11/1999); Rok Sang 'I'u and Jongkwan Peck, "The Re\'ised Maritime 
Section of the Korean Commercial Code", [1993] L.M.C.L.Q. -+()3; Paul 
Mybllrgh, "Maritime Transport and Marine Pollution: Law Reform in l\C\\ 
Zealand", [1995] L.M.C.L.Q. 167: C.C. Nicoll, "Significant CalTiage of 
Goods by Sea Refornl in Ncw Zealand", (199.5) 26 J.\1.L.C. -+-+~; Hugo 
Tihcrg, "The Nordic \Iaritime Code", [199:'1 L.\1.C.L.Q . .527. 
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All of the above systems are inconsistent with each other, and 
therefore, each represents another different international regime in relation to 
carriage of goods by sea. In addition, it is very clear that the focus of the 
debate in the above systems has surely not been on achieving international 
uniformity, but on having a fair solution for both national carriers and 
shippers, and on having an international regime to best meet domestic 
interests 77. In supporting this argument, in the United States, for example, 
because the power of carriers and shippers is nearly equal, neither of them has 
the power to enact its own favoured rules (whether the Hague-Visby or the 
Hamburg Rules), but each has the power to block the other78• While in the 
United Kingdom, for example, because carriers are in control, there was no 
conflict in adopting the Hague-Visby Rules 1968. 
In 1994, the degree of the breakdown of international uniformity in 
relation to carriage of goods by sea prompted the Comite Maritime 
International (CMI) to circulate a questionnaire to its member national 
associations seeking their views to stop the progress of this breakdown79• The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has also commented 
77 See Prove, Id, at 12. 
78 See Michael F. Sturley, "Proposed Amendments to the US Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act: A Response to English Criticisms", [1999] L.M.C.L.Q. 
519 at 520. 
79 CMI, Hague-Visby/Hamburg Rules: Questionnaire for the Member Nati~nal 
Associations 2 (1994). The response to the questionnaire was overwhelmmg: 
"The great majority of the [national associations'] replies is to the effect that 
[the current] proliferation [of differing regimes] is not acceptable." (1995) 1 
CMI News Letter 2. 
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on the confusion and lack of international uniformity in the area80. However, 
the Comite Maritime International (CMI) adopted a report, at its Annual 
General Assembly in New York City on 7 May, 1999, which recommend 
against amending the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 or adopting a new international 
convention in relation to carriage of goods by sea. Instead, both the CMI and 
UNCITRAL decided to undertake a long-term general study on a completely 
different subject, namely a broadly based convention on aspects of marine 
transport81 • It is interesting to note that the Canadian Maritime Law 
Association (MLA), at the CMI General Assembly, proposed that the CMI 
should draft a new international convention in relation to carriage of goods by 
sea. The chairman of the meeting, the CMI Vice-President, the CMI Secretary 
General, and the Chairman of the CMI Carriage of Goods Committee opposed 
the proposition82 . The United States was the only one that supported the 
proposition, as long as this proposition does not interfere with the progress of 
the United States new proposed Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Therefore, the 
proposition failed83 . It could be argued, in consequence, that there are no 
80 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status of the 
Hamburg Rules, UN Doc. AlCN.9/40IlAdd.l, at 2 (para.8) (1994). 
81 See Tetley, supra note 76, at 596. 
82 It should be noted that it is not clear why the CMI and UNCITRAL refused 
to create a new international convention in relation to carriage of goods by sea. 
Tetley argues that "part of the problem is perhaps that neither organisation is 
completely "transparent" ... UNCITRAL rarely takes an official. posi~i?~ on its 
practices, while the CMI often gets its back up over pubh~ ~ntICISm or 
suggestions". William Tetley, "NG?'s and Tran.sparenc~-A FIttIng Way to 
Celebrate in New York", (from FaIrplay Magazme, Apnl 22 (1999) at 40) 
from the Internet: httpllwww.admiraltylaw.com/tetley/fairplay.htm (accessed: 
2211111999). 
83 See Tetley, supra note 76, at 616-617. 
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immediate prospects that a new convention will appear in the near future in 
relation to carriage of goods by sea. 
3.3. The Importance of International Uniformity Regarding the 
Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea 
The conclusion of the previous part of this chapter is that the 
international community has lost interest in achieving international uniformity 
in relation to the law of carriage of goods by sea. Each country adopted a 
convention, or hybrid provisions from two conventions, or hybrid provisions 
from a convention and some domestic rules, depending on what suited its own 
interests. However, this does not mean that international uniformity is not 
valuable. This part, accordingly, argues that international uniformity is still 
valuable. Two arguments are discussed in this part: The first is that 
international uniformity is valuable because it reduces overall costs of 
accidents, namely the costs of the damage or loss of the cargo or the ship and 
the costs of injuries to persons. The second argument is that international 
uniformity reduces legal costs, namely the costs of the procedures of the 
transactions and the costs of litigation. However, since the first argument, as 
will be seen, is not convincing, our concern is in the second one. 
3.3.1. First Argument: Uniform Rules Reduce Overall Costs of 
Accidents 
An argument might be made that uniform rules reduce overall costs of 
accidents. In other words, uniform rules reduce loss by giving financial 
inccntives to act safely. This argument, however, does not depend on any 
practical evidence that can show \\"hether uniform rules reduce 0\ crall costs of 
57 
accidents or not. Economists and law commentators, in consequence. made it 
clear that international uniform rules will have no effect on carriers' behaviour 
to act safely. This is explained below accordingly. 
Sturley84 argues that a lack of uniform rules in relation to the law of 
carriage of goods by sea imposes real costs on the commercial system. Cargo 
damage or loss is an inevitable result of transporting goods by sea. He argues 
that liability rules that govern the carriage of goods by sea may affect the level 
of damage or loss85, but no liability rules would eliminate damage or loss 
completely. Thus, he states that the law must divide the financial 
responsibility for this damage or loss, and this influences the actions of those 
who are parties in the enterprise. He explains, therefore, that a carrier, a 
shipper, and a potential buyer must choose the appropriate level of care for the 
shipment. According to Sturley, all of these choices will be based partly on the 
liability rules that allocate the risk of damage or loss. Hence, liability rules 
have an effect on safety and accidents. 
Economists, on the other hand, dispute the above arguments. Professor 
R.H. Coase, in his article "The Problem of Social Cost,,86, points out that 
liability rules would not affect the conduct of the parties of a contract. He 
suggests that whenever people encounter legal rules that do not suit their own 
X-l Sturley, supra note 35, at 558; Michael F. Sturley, "Changing Liability 
Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments About Hague, 
Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence", (1993) 24 
.T.M.L.C. 119 at 126-27. 
85 For the same opinion, see Kenneth Diplock, "Conventions and Morals-
Limitation Clauses in International Maritime Conventions", (1969-1970) 1 
lM.L.C. 525 at 527-28. 
86(1960)3 J.L.Econ.1. 
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interests, they may negotiate around those rules and create a beneficial and 
socially optimal solution. The fundamental idea of Coase's theorem, therefore. 
is that a change in rules of liability does not necessarily affect the allocation of 
risks between the parties to the contract, or a way in which the parties decide 
to reduce the risks of loss. 
Sturley, in his article "Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: 
Conflicting Empirical Arguments About Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a 
Vacuum of Empirical Evidence,,87, considers Coase' s theorem. He states that 
in a perfect world, or at least in perfect markets, there would be no transaction 
costs88, and there would be perfect information89. Accordingly, he states that 
Coase's theorem explains why it makes no difference how the law allocates 
the risk in this hypothetical perfect world. Sturley explains that, under this 
hypothetical perfect world, the parties, who have perfect information and no 
transaction costs, would negotiate to reach the best efficient risk allocation in 
spite of what the law imposes. In consequence, changing the liability rules will 
have no influence on deciding which party will be responsible for any damage 
or 10ss90. Sturley, however, argues that anyone can recognise that transactions 
87 Supra note 84, at 122-23. 
88 Shippers and carriers, for example, could negotiate the terms of their 
contracts without investing any money or time. In addition, the parties of a 
contract, such as a shipper and a carrier, could solve any dispute that arises 
under their contract without spending money on lawyers and other litigation 
expenses. Sturley, supra note 84, at 122. 
89 The parties of a contract could calculate the specific chances of the arri\'ing 
of the car~o safelv at its destination. In addition, the parties of a contract could 
calculate ~the co;t of taking cxtra care of the cargo, and could accurately 
predict the benefit that they can achie\'e by this cxtra care of the cargo. 
Shirley. supra note 84, at 1 ~3. 
90 Sturley, supra note 84, at 123. 
cost money in our real world, and liabilities cannot be reallocated \\'ithout 
someone bearing these costs. He states that we will never see bills of lading 
where the liability terms are individually negotiated and litigation will 
continue to be expensive. Insurers also know that information is not perfect 
and not a free commodity. Even the parties of a contract, in a sophisticated 
commercial transaction, often make decisions without the benefit of 
information, which is available but too expensive to gather91. Sturley, 
therefore, argues that Coase's theorem, which can only apply in a hypothetical 
perfect world, may provide a helpful starting point against which to measure 
events in the real world, but with expensive transactions and imperfect 
information, liability rules may affect the level of damage or loss. 
If we suppose that Sturley's above arguments against Coase's 
arguments are right, does this mean that liability rules reduce overall costs of 
accidents? There is still another argument that runs against Sturley. Toedt92 
argues that liability rules are not an effective inducement to carrier prudence. 
In other words, liability rules would not affect the level of care of the carrier in 
relation to the cargo. Initially, Toedt argues that non-economic factors 
influence the conduct of the carrier to the extent that they may frustrate the 
influence of economic motivations. For example, the sea itself provides 
inducements to prudence, since it threats the physical safety of the ship, cre\\, 
and the individuals who handle cargo. The desire for peer and self-appro\'al 
also pro\'ides inducements to prudence. Toedt also argues that if we assume 
91 Sturley, supra note 8'+, at 125. 
<)~ D.C. Toedt. "Defining 'Package' in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", 
(1982) ()() Tcxas L. Rc\', 961 at 97'+-75. 
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that economic motivations provide inducements to prudence, it is questionable 
whether potential liability will playa role among such motivations. Thus, he 
argues that the economic impact linked with loss of customer goodwill and 
industry reputation, for example, could be a stronger motivation than liability 
rules. Whatever motivation the liability rules can provide, according to Toedt, 
will be attenuated by the effect of the carrier's insurance. 
Sturley93 argues that liability rules are an effective inducement to 
carrier prudence. To prove his argument, he provides the following example: 
Suppose that the carrier's prediction of a total loss of the ship (\vorth $20 
million) and its goods (worth $10 million) is a 0.01 % chance. If the carrier's 
responsibility is only in relation to the ship, then the predicted loss is S2000. If 
the carrier can cut the risk of total loss in half (which represents a $1000 
predicted savings) for $999, then he will spend the money for additional 
precautions. Nevertheless, if it costs $1001 to cut the risk of total loss in half, 
then he will not do it. However, once the carrier considers the value of the 
goods, then the predicted savings rise to $1500, and the $1001 precaution now 
makes economic sense94 . Therefore, Sturley argues that imposing liability for 
the goods on the carrier provides the motivation for the carrier to take more 
care of the ship and the goods-a motivation that the interest of the carrier in 
the ship alone was not enough to provide. Furthermore, Sturley argues that: 
93 Supra note 8 .. L at 129. For the same opinion, see Diplock, supra note 85, at 
"27-8. 
94 HowevCf, according to Coase's theorem. this follows that \\Oithout 
imposition of liability, the shipper will pay up to_ ~-+99 to t?e carrier, and 
therefore, both can'i~r and shipper could reach an effICIent solutIOn. 
hI 
In an era when a few carriers are still sailing vessels that should have 
been retired years ago and covering their cash flows through reduced 
maintenance, some of the most serious risks occur in situations where 
the cargo is worth far more than the ship. If the economic carrier's only 
incentive for careful navigation is based on the value of the vessel, he 
will fail to take precautions that he would have taken if he were also 
liable for damage to the carg095. 
Sturley acknowledges that if we lack the information needed to 
determine how liability rules will influence risks, it is impossible to predict 
how these rules will affect the motivations to care for the goods96• He, 
therefore, acknowledges that in order to prove that liability rules might affect 
the level of damage or loss, it needed to be supported by empirical evidence97. 
Sturley observes that there is no empirical evidence in his arguments. He 
argues that since there is no direct empirical evidence, it is possible to test the 
issue with indirect evidence98. He considers all his above argument, in this 
section, as an indirect evidence for proving that liability rules may affect the 
level of damage or loss. Accordingly, he argues that indirect evidence is better 
than no evidence at a1l99. It should be noted that SweeneylOO suggests that the 
lack of information in our subject is because insurance companies are reluctant 
to offer the statistics, which they consider as confidential informationlol . 
95 Sturley, supra note 84, at 129. Of course, this is not according to Coase's 
theorem, because, according to Coase, the parties can negotiate the contract of 
carriage and reach an efficient solution. 
96 Sturley, supra note 84, at 132. 
97 Sturley, supra note 84, at 148. 
98 Sturley, supra note 84, at 148. 
99 Sturley, supra note 84, at 149. 
100 Sweeney, supra note 61, at 108. 
101 Many commentators also acknowledge the lack of empirical evidence. S.ee, 
for example, Erling Selvig, "The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Manne 
Insurance Practice", (1981) 12 J.M.L.C. 299 at 314; William Tetley, "The 
Hamburg Rules-A Commentary", [1979] L.M.C.L.Q. 1 at 4; John D. Kimball, 
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Another suggestion is that the infonnation plainly does not exist in any usable 
form, since collecting infonnation about losses and risks is very expensi\'e. 
Therefore, it could be that insurance companies have detennined that the \'alue 
of the infonnation to them is not worth the costs of collecting itl02. In 
consequence, it could be argued that the international shipper and carrier 
interests are hesitant to make the effort and to spend so much money for 
reaching international uniformity, which could be, in their view, more that it 
worth since we lack the information for proving that liability rules reduce 
overall costs of accidents. 
All Sturley and Toedt's above arguments, in this section, lack any 
empirical evidence. Although each of them realises that his arguments lack 
any empirical evidence, each one is convinced that his arguments are much 
more logical than the other. It is the writer's belief that Sturley and Toedt's 
arguments are not convincing since they lack any empirical evidence. In other 
words, we need an empirical evidence to prove whether liability rules affect 
the level of care of the carrier in relation to the cargo. From this point, our 
concern is in the second argument, namely international uniformity reduces 
legal costs, which we now tum to accordingly. 
3.3.2. Second Argument: Uniform Rules Reduce Legal Costs 
Many commentators argue that international uniformity is \'aluable 
because it reduces legal costs, namely transaction costs and litigation. Of 
"Shipowner's Liability and the Proposed 
(197~) 7 J.J\I.L.C. ~17 at 250. 
102 Sec Sturle)" supra note 8-l, at 1-l8. 
Re\ision of the H ague Rules", 
.... 
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course, the important question that arises in this context is: Is there any direct 
evidence to prove that international uniform rules reduce legal costs? There is 
not any direct evidence that proves the reduction of legal costs that uniform 
rules can bring; nonetheless, there are sensible arguments and indirect 
evidence that proves this issue. 
Logically, a lack of uniform rules will make carriers offer different 
freight rates depending on each individual case. Insurers will quote different 
premiums, and therefore, expense and delay will arise in examining the details 
of each individual contract of carriage or the liability of the carriers in relation 
to the goods, which they insure. Moreover, buyers and sellers of goods cannot 
agree to the price of the goods until they know the cost of carriage and 
insurance. Commercial dealings with the goods in transit by way of resale 
cannot be done until the potential buyers determine what protection they 
require 103. Consequently, the economic purpose of limitation of liability, 
which is set in the Hague Rules and other conventions, is to enable the carrier, 
on the ground of knowing that his liability is limited to a figure 104, to offer 
standard freight rates for all cases. Thus, there would be no delay and cost to 
him and to the owner of the cargo, which would be arose by valuating the 
shipment and by changing the freight rate accordingly105. These logical 
arguments are recognised by many national courts. For example, in 
103 See Diplock, supra note 85, at 527. . . . . 
104 For example, in the Hague Rules 1924, under ArtIcle 4(5), the lImItatIon of 
liability is limited to £100 per package or unit. 
105 See Diplock, supra note 85, at 529. 
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Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. s.s. Hong Kong Producer106, a United 
States case, the Second Circuit stated that: 
At the time of its enactment [Hague Rules 1924] the House Report 
ili ' H.R. Rep. #2218, 74 Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936), said, 
~The uniformity and simplification of bills of lading will be of 
Immense value to shippers who will be relieved of the necessity of 
closely examining all bills of lading to determine the exceptions 
contained therein to ascertain their rights and responsibilities; to 
underwriters who insure the cargo and are met with the same 
difficulties; and to bankers who extend credit upon the bills of 
lading' 107. 
If the law is uniform, it is logical to say that this will simplify the law 
for the citizens of the nations of the world, their lawyers, their courts and 
every interested party, to know their rights and obligations, wheresoever these 
happened to arise. Of course, this will lead in the end to avoid conflicts of law 
and litigation will be less necessary\08. In effect, this will reduce transaction 
costs. A uniform law is particularly valuable in relation to carriage of goods by 
sea because carriage of goods by sea transactions involves parties from 
different countries. This can be explained as follows: Every transaction 
involves at least two countries: the shipper's and the consignee's. The carrier 
may be a third country. In addition, the carrier's indemnity insurer, the cargo 
underwriter, and the bank that finances the transaction may increase the total 
number of countries involved. Moreover, each of these parties may participate 
106 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969). 
107 Id, at 14-15. See also Tessler Brothers (B. C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 
F.2d 438 at 445 (9th Cir. 1974) (One of the specific purposes of COGSA was 
to obviate the necessity for shipper to make a detailed study of the fine print 
clauses of a carrier's regular bill of lading on each occasion before shipping a 
~ackage). 
08 See Tetley, supra note 33, at 340-41; Paul B. Stephan, "The Futility of 
Uni fication and Harmonization In International Commercial Law", (1999) 39 
Va. J. In1'1. L. 743 at 746 and 750. 
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In other transactions, each involving different countries. Therefore, these 
transactions could be subject to litigation in any of the countries involved or 
even in another country where a claimant obtains jurisdiction over the ship109. 
In this context, Tetley observes that: 
Most national maritime law crosses international borders. In other 
words, national maritime law is usually international law in its 
application. For example, the national law governing contracts of 
chartering or of carriage of goods is international, because the contract, 
although made in one country, is necessarily for the whole voyage and 
usually covers carriage to one or more foreign countries 110. 
Only uniform rules, in consequence, can provide the certainty and 
predictability for this matter. 
All the above arguments, in this section, can be supported by the 
following Congressional testimony in the United States: In 1998, a witness 
gave a Congressional testimony I II on the new proposed United States Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act (U.S. COGSA)112. The witness was in agreement with 
enacting the new proposed U.S. COGSA. The witness was Walter M. Kramer, 
the President of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters ("AIMU"). 
Kramer showed the importance of transaction costs to cargo insurance. He 
stated that AIMU is the trade association representing American insurers who 
write more than 80% of the ocean marine or transportation insurance 
109 See Sturley, supra note 35, at 559. 
110 William Tetley, "Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The 
Pros Cons and Alternatives to International Conventions-How to Adopt an , 
International Convention", from the Internet: 
http://tetley.1aw.mcgill.caluniformarlaw.htm (acce~sed: 13/11/2000). . 
III Federal Document Clearing House CongressIOnal Testimony (Apnl 21, 
1998, Tuesday). 
112 The United States' Maritime Law Association (USMLA) created this 
proposition. 
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generated in the United States. He explained that the Lnited States ocean 
marine insurance market writes S2 billion in direct written premiums every 
year. AIMU members insure the ships, which carry the United States exports 
and imports as well as the liabilities of shipowners. However, the most 
important component of AIMU members' premium income is cargo insurance, 
where $1 billion of the ocean marine premiums come from cargo insurance. 
Cargo insurance, according to Kramer, facilitates international trade by 
insuring against all transit risks, and provides invaluable protection to 
exporters and importers. He observed that: 
When cargo is damaged in transit, the parties to the sales contract can 
rely upon cargo insurance to pay claims swiftly throughout the world. 
It is then up to the cargo insurers to attempt to recover such losses from 
the shipowner or other party who caused the loss. The success of such 
recovery efforts affects directly the loss experience and premium rates 
paid by shippers. Cargo insurance is inexpensive ... because of the 
ability of cargo insurers to recover from carriers or others who are 
responsible for cargo damage. 
Kramer, however, explained that because of an unfortunate decision by 
the United States Supreme Court, the ability of American marine insurers to 
make recoveries from carriers or others who are responsible for cargo damage 
or loss is in jeopardy. The United States Vimar Segurosy Reaseguros, S.A. v. 
MIT'Sky Reefer decision l13 involved a clause in a bill of lading inserted by a 
foreign shipowner requiring a United States importer to submit to foreign 
arbitration. The Supreme Court, in this case, ordered the United States courts 
to dismiss cases if the bill of lading contained a clause requiring the la\\suit to 
be brought in a foreign country. Kramer argued that because of this decision, 
113 115 S. Ct. 2322,1995, :\.\1.C. 1817 (1995). 
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foreign shipowners could now unilaterally depri,'e American cargo owners of 
the right to pursue claims against them in the United States courts since caroo b 
interests have no opportunity to negotiate the contents of a bill of lading. In 
fact, because of this decision, recovery actions against foreign shipowners by 
Americans are being forced abroad to jurisdictions where the costs of pursuing 
the claims, and the usually disappointing outcomes, are such that seeking 
recovery there is for the most part fruitless. As a practical matter. according to 
Kramer, forcing cargo interests abroad to pursue recoveries has lessened the 
protections guaranteed by the existing COGSA, which enacted the Hague 
Rules 1924, to American shippers. Therefore, Kramer argued that "the 
inevitable results will be an increase in costs: either in increased premiums to 
the shipper or unprofitable results for the insurer, or both". Kramer stated that: 
Cargo insurance is extremely competitive. Today, insurers compete 
globally. An account in Boston may be placed with insurers in Europe 
or Asia. American marine insurers must be in a position to meet this 
global competition. If American marine insurers cannot pursue claims 
in American courts, they are forced to decide between certain high 
costs in unpredictable foreign legal systems or simply writing off the 
claims. Either choice will eventually add significantly to loss ratios. If 
the American insurers raises premiums, it could lose the account to a 
foreign insurer who faces no such restriction ... Now AIMU members 
are being forced to forgo claims against carriers responsible for the 
losses ... The resulting negative impact on net loss experience will be 
detrimental to U.S. policyholders who may be forced to pay higher 
premiums, possibly making them less competitive. 
Kramer's testimony clearly indicates that a lack of international 
unifonn rules increases transaction costs. If the law of carriage of goods by sea 
is uni fonn, then the aboye Sky Reefer decision \yill not affect cargo insurers in 
recovering from carriers or others who are liable for cargo damage or loss. 
There will not be unpredictable foreign legal systems where cargo interests are 
6S 
forced to pursue their claims. In other words, recovery in the United States 
courts or in other foreign courts will not make a difference since the 
protections guaranteed for shippers are the same under the international 
uniform rules. 
The above example explains how the lack of uniform rules increases 
transaction costs, but it should be admitted that we do lack the exact figures in 
providing the amount of reduction of costs that international uniformity could 
bring. As mentioned in the previous section, Sweeney11 ~ suggests that we do 
lack the information in our subject because insurance companies are unwilling 
to provide the statistics since they consider it as confidential information. In 
addition, Sturle/ 15 suggests that insurance companies have decided that the 
importance of the information to them is not worth the costs of gathering it. It 
could be argued, therefore, that carrier and shipper interests are not willing to 
take the risk and spend so much money for achieving international uniformity, 
which could be, in their view, much more than it worth since we lack the 
information to provide the amount of reduction of costs that international 
. c:. ld b' 1 16 umlormlty cou nng . 
As an indirect evidence of the importance of international uniformity, 
as mentioned earlier in this chapter, in 1994, the Comite Maritime 
International (CMI) circulated a questionnaire to its member national 
associations seeking their views as to stop the breakdown of uniformity in 
11 ~ S\\'CCl1CY, supra note 6 L at 108. 
1 J" Sturley, supra note 8-+, at 148. 
116 Of course, there are other obstacles to international unifomlity. For 
example, govcrnments' interference in relation to the \a\\' of carriage of goods 
by sea is an important obstacle to intenlationalunifornlity. 
relation to the law of carnage of goods by sea. The response to the 
questionnaire was overwhelming: "The great majority of the [national 
associations'] replies is to the effect that [the current] proliferation [of 
differing regimes] is not acceptable"I17. In addition, the United Nations has 
recognised the confusion that exists in the law of carriage of goods by sea. For 
example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) stated that: 
In recent years some States have adopted, and presently some other 
States are about to adopt, laws that combine elements from the Hague 
regime and the Hamburg Rules; those laws, however, do not follow a 
uniform approach in combining the two regimes l18 . 
This indirect evidence shows that the awareness of the CMI, the United 
Nations, and even other international organisations, of the urgent need to 
achieve international uniformity did not exist from nothing. It could be argued 
that the existence of different liability rules in different countries is creating 
very high legal costs, and therefore, these organisations are trying to achieve 
international uniformity in order to reduce such costs. 
One can argue, on the other hand, that if legal costs are so high, then 
why we did not achieve international uniformity until today? It is clear from 
our discussion in the first part of this chapter that the political process for 
achieving international uniformity has broken down l19 • In other words, every 
country is interested in achieving the liability rules that suit its own interests 
without considering the international interests. In addition, it could be argued 
117 Supra, note 79. 
11 R Surra, note 80. 
119 Sur ril , at 5J-56. 
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that, at present, the international institutional arrangements are weak. The 
CMI, UNCITRAL, and other organisations are not powerful enough to guide 
the international shipper and carrier interests for achieving international 
uniformity. Tetley, indeed, blames the CMI and UNCITRAL for the current 
situation of the breakdown of international uniformity in relation to carriage of 
goods by sea, where he observes that: 
The CMI, amongst many other international conventions, adopted the 
world's most important international carriage of goods by sea rules. the 
Hague/Visby Rules (196811979). UNCITRAL, a much younger NGO 
(formed in 1966), adopted its own international carriage of goods by 
sea rules-the Hamburg Rules (1978). But neither the CMI nor 
UNCITRAL has been able to update its own particular Rules or to 
make them compatible one with another, despite the fact that shipping 
nations all over the world have been crying for such updating and 
uniformity ... The international shipping community is thus tom 
between Hague/Visby and Hamburg ... How did we fall into this lack of 
uniformity mess? No doubt because UNCITRAL and the CMI are 
reluctant to act. UNCITRAL wants the Hamburg Rules or nothing at 
all and is virtually silent. The CMI has not wanted to offend any of its 
members on one side or the other and has produced a report of 
alternatives, concluding that nothing should be done at this time l20 . 
Tetley also comments on why at present the CMI and UNCITRAL do not take 
part in leading the international community to achieve international 
uniformity, where he states that: 
Part of the problem is perhaps that neither organisation is completely 
transparent, the new flavour of the times. UNCITRAL rarely takes an 
official position on its practices, while the CMI often gets its back up 
over public criticism or suggestions 121. 
Therefore, it could be argued that we need these international organisations to 
be powerful enough to guide carrier and shipper interests to achie\'c 
inten1ational uniformity. If every international organisation acts by its own, 
I~O Tetley, supra note 82. 
121 Tetley, supra note 82. 
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then we will probably have a new round of uncertainty. In other words, onl~ 
cooperation among these international organisations can bring international 
uniformity, otherwise, the history may repeat itself and a battle of conventions 
may appear as the present situation. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The efforts to promulgate international uniformity in the field of the 
law of carriage of goods by sea had led to the appearance of the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, which were created by the eM! and 
UNCITRAL. These conventions try to achieve the accession of all the 
countries of the world, but none has yet succeeded. Apart from these 
conventions, many countries created their own codes, which are a combination 
of various provisions of the above conventions including some domestic 
prOVISIOns. This situation plainly undermines international uniformity. As 
Sturley observes: "any informed observer should be able to see that there is no 
1 · . 1 'C' • d ,,122 rea mtenlatIOna unllonnity to ay . 
The above situation indicates that the international community has lost 
interest in achieving international uniformity in relation to the law of carriage 
of goods by sea. This situation, in fact, has made many commentators argue 
that international uniformity is still valuable, and that the international 
community should not hesitate in striving for such uniformity. Some argue 
that intenlational unifornl rules concerning carriage of goods by sea reduce 
overall costs of accidents. In other words, international uni fornl mles have an 
122 Sturlc~·. supra note ~5, at 564. 
effect on safety and accidents. This argument is hardly convincing since it 
lacks any empirical evidence. Others, on the other hand, argue that 
international unifonn rules reduce transaction costs and litigation. Although 
this argument lacks any direct evidence, it is more sensible than the previous 
argument. The Congressional testimony of Walter M. Kramer, President of the 
AIMU, is very valuable since he represents the majority of the American 
insurers. His testimony, as explained in the second part of this chapter, clearly 
indicates that a lack of international unifonn rules increases transaction costs. 
In addition, it is logical to say that the existence of international uniform niles 
meets the expectations of the parties of the contract of carriage of goods by 
sea. The predictability and certainty of the law that should apply on a contract 
of carriage of goods by sea can, therefore, reduce litigation. In other words, 
when conflicts arise among the parties on which law should be applied, this 
plainly increases litigation. Likewise, the extensive anxiety of many 
international organisations for achieving international uniformity in relation to 
the law of carriage of goods by sea is indirect evidence, which probably 
proves that such unifonnity reduces legal costs. 
In arguing that international unifonnity of the law of carriage of goods 
by sea is still valuable, we supposed that the Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg Rules are unifonnly interpreted among the various states. However, 
it should be admitted that without this supposition, it would not be hard for 
anyone to submit that international unifonnity is no more than a waste of time 
and money. In fact if the above unifornl rules are not uniforn1ly interpreted, 
then prohably they \\ill not lead to reduce transaction costs and litigation. The 
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next chapter, in consequence, attempts to pro\e the latter issue by focusing on 
the conflicts of interpretations of these unifonn rules brought on by 
containerisation. It is for this reason, this thesis is intending to clarify the 
importance of achieving unifonn interpretations of unifonn rules and how 
such uniformity could be achieved. 
CHAPTER IV: CONTAI:\,ERI~_\TIO:\' A:\,D I:\,TER,\-\.TIO,\AL 
UNIFORM INTERPRETA TIO'\S OF L'\IFORM RCLES 
4.1. Introduction 
The drafting of international conventions III relation to carnage of 
goods by sea is the first aspect of achieving international uniformity among 
the various countries. The second aspect is the international uni form 
application of such conventions. In the previous chapter, \ye argued that 
international uniform rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea are yaluable 
since they reduce transaction costs and litigation. In so doing, \\'e assumed that 
these rules are interpreted in an international uniform manner among the 
various countries. In practice, however, international uniform interpretations 
of these rules have not followed their enactment. In other \\'ords, conflicts 
arose among the various countries in interpreting these rules. This chapter, 
therefore, argues that since these rules were not interpreted in an international 
unifonn manner, then they would not produce reduction in transaction costs 
and litigation. In fact, the creation of the uniform rules in relation to carriage 
of goods by sea leads the citizens, lawyers. courts and e\ery interested person 
in every country to know what the la\y is. but such knowledge is not enough to 
meet the expectations of these parties if there are conflicts of interpretations 
regarding such law. 
Cocuses 011 the conflicts of This chapter, III consequence, 11 
interpretations of the uniform nIles in relation to carriage of goods hy sea 
brought on by containerisation. The first part of this chapter brielly c lari lies 
how containcrisation has brought many ad\'antages to shippers and earners 
~~ 
alike, and even to the whole shipping industry. The second part, on the other 
hand, defines the conflicts that have been brought on by containerisation, and 
analyses how such conflicts would produce increase in the transaction costs 
and litigation instead of reduction. The third part, however, examines the 
indirect influence of the advent of containerisation on several conflicts that 
already existed, and clarifies how the impact of such advent on these issues 
resulted in increasing litigation. Finally, this chapter concludes that as long as 
there is no mechanism for reducing these conflicts significantly, uniform rules 
will not produce reduction in transaction costs and litigation. 
4.2. The Advent of Containerisation 
The transition in the methods of carriage of goods by sea from break-
bulk to unitisation and now to containerisation has brought many advantages 
for the whole shipping industry. The term break-bulk is used to refer to 
traditional non-unitised or non-containerised cargo l . A break-bulk shipment is 
one "in which each item of cargo must be handled separately and stored 
individually in the hold of the ship as it waits in port,,2. This was not 
considered as an efficient solution for carriage of goods, and therefore, 
unitisation or palletisation was employed, so that several cartons can be 
stacked on a flat wooden tray and then moved by means of a forklift truck. 
I See Matsushita Electric Corporation of America v. SS Aegis Spirit, [1977] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 93 at 96. 
2 See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 53 L. Ed. 2d 320 at 336-37 
(1977). 76 
The consolidation of goods on pallets reduced labour costs, protected the 
goods and facilitated loading and discharging from the vessel3• 
In the 1960s, on the other hand, carriage of goods by containers was 
employed4• The United States Coast Guard, which is responsible for approving 
containers used for international transportation under Customs seal, proposes a 
detailed definition of "container" as: 
An article of transport equipment (liftvan, portable tank, or other 
similar structure including normal accessories and equipment when 
imported with the equipment), other than a vehicle or conventional 
packaging [which is] ... strong enough to be suitable for repeated 
use ... specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods by one or 
more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading ... [flitted with 
devices permitting its ready handling, particularly its transfer from one 
mode of transport to another; [and] ... so designed as to be easy to fill 
and empty5. 
This definition not only describes what the container is but also clarifies some 
of the advantages of containerisation in comparison with break-bulk carriage. 
Before containerisation, it would take, for example, 126 men working 84 
hours each in discharging and loading approximately 11,000 tons of goods 
3 See Bissell Tallman, "The Operational Realities of Containerisation and 
Their Effect on the 'Package' Limitation and the 'On-Deck' Prohibition: 
Review and Suggestions", (1970-1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 902 at 907. 
4 See George Denegre, "Admiralty-Carrier-Owned Shipping Container Found 
not to be COGSA Package", (1982) 56 Tul. L. Rev. 1409 at 1412. For a 
detailed discussion on the appearance of containerisation see, for example, 
Seymour Simon, "The Law of Shipping Containers: (Part I)", (1973-1974) 5 
J.M.L.C. 507; Matt Hannes, The Container Revolution, (1996); Gerhardt 
Muller Intermodal Freight Transportation, (3rd ed., 1995); Joseph A. 
Calam~ "The Container Revolution and the $500 Package Limitation-
Conflicti~g Approaches and Unrealistic Solutions: A Proposed Alternative", 
(1977) 51 St. John's L. Rev. 687. . 
5 Proposed Regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 420.3(3), publIshed at 34 Fed. Reg. 14054 
(Sept. 4, 1969). quoted in Edward Sc.hmeltzer an~ ~obert A. Peavy, 
"Prospects and Problems of the Contamer RevolutIon , (1969-1970) I 
J.M.L.C. 203 at 203. 77 
abroad a break-bulk vessel. While 42 men, working 13 hours each, could 
handle the same amount of containerised goods6 . Carriage of goods by 
containers also has many advantages over unitisation or palletisation carriage, 
especially in relation to the safety of the goods. Therefore, on many occasions, 
pallets are consolidated into containers. In general, the consolidation of goods 
on containers reduced the total costs of transport, increased protection, 
reduced pilferage and simplified every aspect of cargo movement 7 . These 
advantages of containerisation are considered as a great effect on 
globalisation. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, in their textbook, A 
Future Prefect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalisation8, observe 
that: 
Something that has had an even greater effect on globalisation is really 
no more than a twenty-foot-long metal box ... it [containerisation] has 
changed many manufacturers' perspectives on the world. Cheaper, 
quicker transportation opened up new markets, encouraging even small 
firms to go global, and allowed companies to "source" components 
from the other side of the world and to experiment with "just in time" 
manufacturing methods. No longer relying on huge factories and 
warehouses, manufacturing has become a leaner business, with 
companies outsourcing their supply systems to logistics specialists. 
The emergent use of containers marks a significant technological step 
within the shipping industry. Their use expanded through the years very fast 
6 This example is taken from Andrea R. Luciano, "\ luch Ado About 
Packages: Containers & the COGSA Limitation of Liability Provision", 
(1982) 48 Brooklyn L. Rev. 721 at 722. 
~ For a detailed discussion on the advantages of containerisation, see, for 
example, Carl E. McDowelL "Comment on Insurance and Liability", (1972) 3 
.I.M.L.C. 503: Samir Mankabady, "Some Legal Aspects of the Carriage of 
Goods by Container", (1974) 23 InfI. Compo L.Q. 317; Da\'id M. Sassoon, 
"Trade TenllS and the Container Revolution", (1969) I J.\1.L.C. 73 at 77-78; 
Henry :\. Tombari, "Trends in Oceanbome Containerisation and its 
Implications for the l l.S. I Iller Industry", (1979) 10 J. \ l.L.C. 311 at 311-12. 
~ (20()O) at 3"+. 
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because of the substantial advantages they provide over break-bulk and 
unitisation transport. Therefore, both earners and shippers enJoy 
corresponding economic benefits from containerised cargo carriage. 
4.3. The Conflicts That Have Been Brought By The Advent of 
Containerisation 
Although containerisation brought many benefits for shippers and 
carriers alike, it also brought noticeable problems. The appearance of 
containerisation has distorted the statutory framework that defines the 
liabilities and limitations of the carrier and the shipper. The limitation of the 
carrier's liability in the event of goods damaged or lost, under the Hague Rules 
1924, is based on the system of "per package or unit". Article 4(5) of the latter 
rules provides, in part, that: 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable 
for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount 
exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or unit or the equivalent of 
that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods 
have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the 
bill of lading. 
This declaration if embodied in the bill of lading shall be prima 
facie evidence but shall not be binding or conclusive on the carrier. 
By agreement another maximum amount than that mentioned in 
this paragraph may be fixed, provided that such maximum shall not be 
less than the figure above named ... 9. 
Article 4(5) and even the other provisions of the Hague Rules 192.+ do not deal 
with containers transport. In fact, since containerisation appeared in the 1960s, 
the framers of the Hague Rules 1924 cannot be blamed because such 
l) See John F. \\'ilson and Charles Debattista, Jr'orld Shipping Laws: 
International COI1\'(,lItions v. Carriage b\' Sea, \'/1 CO~V -V,() CO~V, 
(October 1980) at 3-4. 
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technology was not within their contemplation who had in mind break-bulk 
transport. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Hague Rules 192.+ were 
amended in 1968 by a Protocol, which was called the Hague-Visby Rules, in 
order to deal with containerisation and other issues 10. Although the latter rules 
deal with containerisation in relation to the carrier's limitation of liability, they 
do not deal with carriage of containers on-deck. The Hamburg Rules 1978, on 
the other hand, have dealt with containerisation, in relation to the carrier's 
limitation of liability, in nearly the same way as the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 
did 11. The Hamburg Rules, unlike the Hague-Visby Rules, deal with carriage 
of containers on-deck I2 . 
10 For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see the third chapter, supra, at 
44-45. Article 4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules provides, in part, that: 
"(a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the 
shipper before shipment and inserted in the Bill of Lading, neither the carrier 
nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or 
in connection with the goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of Frs. 
10,000 per package or unit or Frs. 30 per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost 
or damaged, whichever is the higher. 
(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of 
lading as packed in such article of transport shall be deemed the number of 
packages or units for the purposes of this paragraph as far as these packages or 
units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such article of transport shall be 
considered the package or unit. 
(g) By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the 
shipper other maximum amounts than those mentioned in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph may be fixed, provided that no maximum amount so fixed shall 
be less than thc appropriate maximum mentioned in that sub-paragraph." See 
Wilson & Debattista, It!, at 7-8. 
II Article 6 of the Hamburg Rules 1978 provides, in part, that: 
'"I. (a) The liability of the calTier for loss resulting from loss of or damage to 
goods according to the pro\'isions of article 5 is limited to an amount 
cqui\'alent to 835 units of account per package or other shipping unit or 2,) 
units of account per kilogramme of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, 
\\hichc\'cr is the higher ... 
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As explained in the previous chapter, the primary purpose of creating 
the Hague Rules 1924, and even the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, was to 
avoid certain eXCUlpatory clauses, which exonerated carriers from their 
liability of loss or damage to goods at sea13. To avoid such exculpatory 
clauses, the drafters of these rules have created limitation clauses for the 
carrier's liability, which are mentioned above l4 . Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules 1924, for example, prevents the carriers from limiting their liability to 
an amount less than £ 100 per package or unit. The limitation clauses not only 
protect shippers but also carriers. The concept of limitation of liability, for 
example, protects carriers from the risks associated with goods of high-
undisclosed value and, by establishing a standard level of liability, enables 
2. For purpose of calculating which amount is the higher in accordance with 
paragraph 1 (a) of this article, the following rules apply: 
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the package or other shipping units enumerated in the bill 
of lading, if issued, or otherwise in any other document evidencing the 
contract of carriage by sea, as packed in such article of transport are deemed 
packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid the goods in such article of 
transport are deemed one shipping unit. 
(b) In cases where the article of transport itself has been lost or damaged, that 
article of transport, if not owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier, is 
considered one separate shipping unit. 
4. By agreement between the carrier and the shipper, limits of liability 
exceeding those provided for in paragraph 1 may be fixed." See Wilson & 
Debattista, supra note 9, at 56-57. 
1 ~ Article 9 of the Hamburg Rules 1978 provides, in part, that: 
"The carrier is entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such carriage is in 
accordance with an agreement with the shipper or with the usage of the 
particular trade or is required by statutory rules or regulations." See \\'ilson 8: 
Debattista, supra note 9, at 58. 
13 See the third chapter, supra, at 36-38, 40. 45 and 50. 
14 Simon describes the limitation clauses as "an early consumer protection 
law". Se\1110Ur Simon, "Container Law: A Recent Reappraisal", (1976) 8 
J.1\1.L.C'. 4S9 at 489. 
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them to offer uniform and cheaper freight rates15 . HO\\'ever, although the 
limitation clauses provide a standard level of liability, the ad\Oent of 
containerisation has created conflicts to such standard of liability. Such 
conflicts increase transaction costs and litigation. These conflicts, and how 
they increase transaction costs and litigation, are explained below accordingly. 
4.3.1. The "Package Limitation" Conflict 
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 states that the carrier's liability is 
limited to a specific amount, being "per package or unit,,16. Article 4(5) does 
not define the term "package", and there is no other provision in the Hague 
Rules 1924 that define this term. In addition, there is nothing from the debates 
in the Hague Conference 1921, nor from those in the subsequent conferences 
that led to the creation of the Hague Rules 1924, to indicate the precise 
meaning of the term "package". In determining the meaning of the term 
"package" by referring to the legislative history of the Hague Rules 1924, the 
United States Second Circuit in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg 
Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft & Columbus Lines, Inc. 17 
observed that: 
No doubt the drafters [of the Hague Rules 1924] had in mind a unit 
that would be fairly uniform and predictable in size, and one that 
would provide a common-sense standard so that the parties could 
easily ascertain at the time of contract when additional coverage was 
needed, place the risk of additional loss upon one or the other, and thus 
avoid the pains of litigation 18. 
15 See John F. Wilson, Carriage of Goods In' Sea, (3rd ed., 1998) at 194. 
16 (emphasis added). See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 9. 
17 :'75 F.2d 9 .. U (2d Cir. 1967). 
18Id,at945. 
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However, what seemed a uniform, a predictable, and a common-sense 
standard in 1924 became outmoded by the advent of containerisation in the 
1960s. Such advent contributed to the obsolescence of "package" as a 
descriptive term. This can be explained by the following example: if 100 
boxes were placed into a container, and then this container was damaged or 
lost, what is the compensation that a shipper can get from a carrier? In other 
words, does the container constitute a "package" or does its contents (the 100 
boxes) constitute packages? The answer to this question is very important to 
the allocation of the risk of loss in ocean transportation. The problem of 
determining how the loss should be allocated in a liability situation has 
brought a debate between carriers and shippers. On the one hand, it is hard for 
shippers to accept that the whole container will be regarded as one package 
since almost in all cases the value of the container's contents are much more 
than £ 100, which is the amount of the carrier's liability per package under the 
Hague Rules 1924. On the other hand, it is hard for carriers to accept that the 
contents of the container will be regarded as packages especially in case where 
the container was placed and sealed by the shipper and the carrier does not 
have any clue what the contents of the container are. Thus, both shippers and 
carriers have a persuasive defence in their arguments. 
The United States' District Court for the Southern District of 1\ew 
19 
York, for example, in Marcraft Clothes, Inc. \'. AI. V. Kurobe ,Haru , 
acknowledged the practical effects of the package limitation pro\'ision, where 
it stated that: 
19 575 F. Supp. 2~9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
Q"'I 
c"lj 
This 1936 statute [The United States COGS A, which adopted the 
Hague Rules 1924] must now be applied in a universe of shipping 
technology significantly altered by the advent of containerisation. The 
risk of commercially unreasonable results has become substantial. In 
this case, for example depending on the meaning given to the term 
"package", the defendant might face maximum liability as low as S500 
or as high as $2.2 million2o. 
As will be seen in the next chapters, conflicts of interpretations of the Hague 
Rules 1924 arose, in different national courts, regarding whether to consider 
the container itself as a package, or its contents as packages21 . 
What then is the practical impact of such conflicts of interpretations on 
the transaction costs and litigation? Our argument, as stated in the pre\'ious 
chapter, is that uniform rules are important since they reduce transaction costs 
and litigation22 . We stated that the economic purpose of the carrier's limitation 
of liability under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 is to enable the carrier, 
on the ground of knowing that his liability is limited to a figure, to offer 
standard freight rates for all cases. Therefore, there will be no delay and cost 
to him and to the shippers, which will arise by valuating the shipment of each 
case individually and by changing the freight rate accordingly. However, the 
financial difference in determining the meaning of the term "package" does 
not serve the economic interests of shippers and carriers alike. In the j\!urcru(t 
case above, the carrier's liability could have been as high as $2.2 million or as 
low as $500. Logically, such financial difference does not lead the carrier to 
know at the time of the contract that his liability is limited to a specific figure, 
and in consequence, the economic purpose of Artic Ie .+( 5) will be defeated. In 
2ll ld, at 2'+0. 
':1 See the fifth chapter, infra, at 106-11.+; the si:xth chapter. i'~fra, at 135-'+6. 
':2 Sec the third chapter, supra, at 63-72. 
addition, such financial difference creates problems for the insurance 
companies who need to know at the time of the contract of carriage the extent 
of the carrier's liability on which the premium will be fixed. Insurers will 
quote different premiums, and in consequence, delay and expense will arise in 
examining the details of each individual contract of carriage or the liability of 
the carriers in relation to the goods, which they insure. Furthermore, this 
financial difference produces litigation. When the perceptions of both shippers 
and carriers of the likely outcome of a dispute vary by an amount, which is 
large enough to cover the expenses of litigation, then it is logical for both 
shippers and carriers to pursue a lawsuit. In supporting this argument, as will 
be seen in the next chapters, there are large amount of cases in the United 
States, for example, in relation to whether the container is a package, or its 
contents are packages23 . 
4.3.2. The "Unreasonable Deviation" Conflict 
Prior to the appearance of the Hague Rules 1924, carriage of goods on-
deck of the vessel has been treated as an unreasonable deviation24, where such 
act nullifies the contract of carriage including the protection of any limitation 
clauses in this contract. This act, in consequence, had the effect of making the 
carrier responsible for the cargo as an insurer25 • The advent of 
23 See the fifth chapter, infra, at 1 06-114~ the sixth chapter, infra, at 135-46. 
24 Unreasonable deviation means if the carrier unreasonably places the goods 
under a risk, which is not contemplated in the inte~ded voyage. See R. Glenn 
Bauer, "Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Vlsby v. Hamburg Rules-A 
Case By Case Analysis", (1993) 24 J .M.L.C. ~3 at 56. . . . 
25 See Laurence B. Alexander, "ContainerizatiOn, The Per Package Limitation, 
and the Concept of "Fair Opportunity"", (1986) 11 Mar. Law. 123 at 130; 
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containerisation, however, has brought difficulties to the application of the 
unreasonable deviation concept on carriage of goods on-deck. From the 
earliest days of containerisation, containerships were specially designed to 
carry containers on deck. Stacking systems minimise the risk of loss or 
damage to the goods overboard, and such goods are no longer at particular risk 
from on-deck carriage since they are containerised26 . Such advent requires an 
answer to the question of whether to consider carriage of containers on-deck 
as unreasonable deviation or not. 
The Hague Rules 1924 and the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 do not apply 
to carriage of goods on-deck. Article l(c) of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules provides that: 
In these Rules the following words are employed, with the meanings 
set out below:-
(c) "Goods" includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every 
kind whatsoever except live animals and cargo which by the contract 
of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried27. 
Two requirements need to be satisfied in order to avoid the operation of the 
Rules. First, the cargo must actually be carried on deck and, secondly, this fact 
must be expressly stated on the bill of lading. Unless both requirements are 
met, the Hague Rules or the Hague-Visby Rules will still control the contract 
of carriage. These two requirements are clear, but in most cases, the containers 
would be carried on-deck without a statement in the bill of lading that the 
containers were in fact so carried. This means that in most cases the Hague 
Patrick Griggs and Richard \\,illiams, Limitation of liability for J/dritimc 
Claims, (2d ed., 1991) at 125. 
2(1 Sec Mark D. Booker, Contuiners: Conditions, Law and Practice Ii! 
Carriage and Usc, (198~) \'01. 1, at 1'+'+. 
27 Sec \\'ilson 8: Dcbattista, supra note 9, 
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and Hague-Visby Rules would apply. This raises the question: Does this mean 
that carriage of containers on-deck would not constitute unreasonable 
deviation? There are conflicts among many national courts on whether 
carriage of containers on-deck is considered as unreasonable deviation under 
the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Article 4(5) of the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules provides that "in any event" the carrier's liability shall be limited 
to a stipulated amount. This means that in all events the carrier shall not be 
deprived from his right of limitation under Article 4(5). Despite this wording, 
as will be discussed in detail in the next chapters, different national courts 
divided over the meaning and effect of the words "in any event" in Article 
4(5)28. Some national courts acknowledged the wording of Article 4(5) and 
argued that the carrier should not be deprived from his limitation right if he 
committed an unreasonable deviation. Other national courts, however, were 
unwilling to attribute much significance to the wording of Article 4(5) and 
argued that carriage of containers on-deck deprives the carrier from the benefit 
of the limitation under the latter Article. 
The conflicts of interpretations in determining whether the carriage of 
containers on-deck constitutes unreasonable deviation do not serve the 
economic interests of shippers and carriers. As stated in relation to the term 
"package" in the previous section, the economic purpose of Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924 will be logically defeated if carriers cannot kno\\' at the 
time of the contract that their liability is limited to a specific figure. It follo\\ s 
that the lack of a standard level of limitation of liability because of the 
~~ Sl'e the fifth chapter. i1~fra. at 115-17; the sc\'Cnth chapter. infra. at 186-9(), 
\..'--' 
,"I I 
conflicts of interpretations regarding the carriage of containers on-deck creates 
delay and expense to insurance companies in examining every contract of 
carriage individually. In addition, the huge financial difference between 
paying a specific limited amount of liability and paying the whole amount of 
the damaged or lost cargo increases litigation. Such financial difference grants 
shippers the motive to pursue a lawsuit. 
4.4. The Indirect Impact of Containerisation on Conflicts of 
Interpretations 
The appearance of containerisation has an influence on some conflicts 
that have already existed, where this has resulted in creating more conflicts of 
interpretations. This, in consequence, increased litigation. In fact, these 
conflicts have only existed in the United States due to different factors: 
4.4.1. The "Unit Limitation" Conflict 
Under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924, the carrier's limitation of 
liability is per "package", and in case of goods not shipped in packages, per 
"unit,,2(). Neither Article 4(5) nor the other provisions of the Hague Rules 1924 
define the term "unit". In addition, there is no indication to the precise 
meaning of the term "unit" in the legislative history of the latter rules. As will 
be explained in detail in the next chapters, the United States Congress passed 
the Can-iage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 (COGSA)30, \vhich adopted the Hague 
29 See \Vilson & Debattista, supra note 9 . 
.'0 The l ;nited States Carria~e of Goods By Sea ,\ct (COGS.\ 193h L -+() L'nited 
States Code (U.S.C.) ~~ 1300-1) 15, from the Internet: 
http://\\,\\,\v.cargola\\,.colll cogsa.html (accessed: 20 5 2()()1). 
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Rules 1924 with minor alterations3!. One of these changes is that the term 
"unit" has been changed to "customary freight unit". The United States Circuit 
Courts construed the latter term as the unit of measurement used to calculate 
the freighe 2 . However, other countries, such as the Untied Kingdom and 
Canada, when incorporated the Hague Rules 1924, did not change the term 
"unit". These countries, therefore, construed the term "unit" as the "shipping 
unit", namely the physical unit as received by the carrier from the shipper, for 
example, an unboxed car, a crate, a container, a bale, or a sack. These conflicts 
of interpretations, of course, appeared before the existence of containerisation. 
The practical impact of the differences in construing the unit limitation 
leads to unreasonable results. If the term "unit" is construed to mean a 
"shipping unit", what may conceivably be called a package, equally 
constitutes a shipping unit, although some shipping units are not packages as 
defined and discussed above. In other words, all packages are shipping units, 
but not all shipping units are packages33 . On the other hand, if the term "unit" 
is construed to mean a "freight unit", the position will be significantly 
different, because the calculation based on the "freight unit" will be higher 
than that based on the "shipping unit". In other words, the maximum liability 
of the carrier will be greater than that based on the "shipping uniC-
q
. This can 
be explained as follows: Assume that a cargo of four unboxed large motors 
weighing 50 tons each was prepared for shipment. If \\e assume that the 
3! See the fifth chapter, infra, at 104; the sixth chapter, infra, at 1-+8. 
32 The "freight unit" is usually a weight or yolume of the goods, for e\ample, 
tons, cubic feet. 
33 See Tallman, supra note). at 90-+. 
-'4 Sec Samir 1\1ankabady, Interllational ,),fllpping La\\', (1991) \'01. II, at -+-+. 
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freight was calculated on the basis of weight, which here is the ton, and if the 
"unit" is construed to mean a "shipping unit", the carrier's liability \\ould be 
limited under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 to £400 (being £ 1 00 X -+). 
On the other hand, the carrier's liability would be limited under Article -+(5) of 
the Hague Rules 1924 to £20,000 (being £100 X 50 X 4) if the "unit" is 
construed to mean a "freight unit". The first calculation, in this example, can 
be said as in favour of carriers, while the second one in favour of shippers. 
The financial difference in determining the meaning of the term "unit" 
increases litigation. In every case, the carrier might have the chance to reduce 
his liability to as little as £ 100 per unit, and at the same time, the shipper might 
also have the chance to increase the carrier's liability to a much higher 
amount. 
The above discussion raises the following question: what is the impact 
of the appearance of containerisation on this issue? Within the appearance of 
containerisation, the conflicts of interpretations of defining the term 
"customary freight unit" in the United States became more complex. As will 
be discussed later in this thesis, in many cases, because containers carried the 
goods, the Circuit Courts found out that the term "customary freight unit" was 
di fficult to apply for the limitation purpose35 . In these cases, the Circuit Courts 
considered the contents of the containers as the freight units, but the freight 
charge was computed on a flat container rate. This resulted in creating a 
problem to know how to apply the freight unit on each unit in the containers. 
Therefore, these courts remanded this issue to be determined by their District 
35 Sec the sixth chapter. infra, at 1 ~~-55. 
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Courts. It could be argued, therefore, that the appearance of containerisation 
has lead, in many cases, to the inadequacy of applying the term "customary 
freight unit" on goods. Consequently, the inapplicability of the term 
"customary freight unit" on containers cases may lead the Circuit Courts to put 
different criteria in solving such issue, and this leads to more conflicts of 
interpretations. 
4.4.2. The "Fair Opportunity" Conflict 
The package and unit limitation of liability is one part of Article 4( 5) 
of the Hague Rules 1924. The other part is the declaration of value by which a 
shipper can adjust a carrier's negligence liability to his needs, and 
consequently avoid the application of the package and unit limitation36. The 
reason behind adding this second part is that it would permit the parties to 
ascertain at the time of the contract when additional coverage was needed, 
place the risk of additional loss upon one or the other, and thus avoid the pains 
of litigation37 . The United States Circuit Courts, however, developed a new 
requirement in relation to the second part of Article 4(5). These Circuit Courts 
argued that the package and unit limitation of liability of Article 4(5) may not 
become effective, unless the shipper is afforded a fair opportunity to declare a 
higher than $500 liability rate38 by paying a correspondingly greater charge. In 
other words, if the carrier did not give the shipper a fair opportunity to declare 
36 See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 9. 
37 Sec the United States case: JHitsui & Co. LId. v .. Imerican Export Lilies, 6~h 
F.2d 807 at 816 (2d Cif. 1981). 
-'x The United States COGSA 1936, under Article 1 ~()4(5), changed the 
liability rate from .£ 1 00 into S500. 91 
a higher value, he would lose the applicability of the SSc)() limitation. and 
accordingly would pay the whole amount of the damaged or lost cargo. This 
requirement is well known in the United States as the "fair opportunity" 
doctrine. 
As will be discussed in detail in the next chapters. the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine has rendered the United States Circuit Courts' decisions 
inconsistent with the international understanding of the Hague RUles39. 
Foreign courts do not even acknowledge that the "fair opportunity" doctrine 
exists in Article 4(5) or even in any other provisions of the Hague Rules 1924. 
Above all, the subsequent failure by the United States Circuit Courts to 
explain the origin of the "fair opportunity" doctrine has created inconsistent 
decisions among such Circuit Courts in determining what constitutes a "fair 
opportunity". 
Although the existence of the "fair opportunity" doctrine was not due 
to the appearance of containerisation, there were conflicts among many Circuit 
Courts in whether to apply this doctrine on the containers cases. As will be 
explained in the next chapters, the line of the inconsistent decisions among the 
Circuit Courts in applying this doctrine on containers cases has created more 
conflicts of interpretations40 . The conflicts among the United States Circuit 
Courts in applying the "fair opportunity" doctrine, therefore. increase 
litigation. Because of this conflict, in every case the shipper has the chance to 
argue that he has not been gi\'cn the opportunity to declare a higher \alue. In 
39 Sec the fifth chapter, i/~rr(/, at 98-102 and 126-28; the sixth chapter, illfra. at 
1(),f-72. 
40/d. 
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other words, in every case the shipper might has the chance to avoid the 
applicability of the $500 limitation, and in consequence, the carrier \\ould pay 
the whole amount of the damaged or lost cargo. Accordingly, since the 
shipper's perception of the likely outcome of the dispute regarding whether he 
has been given a fair opportunity or not vary by an amount large enough to 
cover the expenses of litigation, then it is logical for such shipper to pursue a 
lawsuit. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The appearance of containerisation has brought many advantages for 
shippers and carriers alike, and even for the whole international maritime 
industry. In spite of these advantages, conflicts of interpretations arose in the 
application of the uniform rules that relate to the carriage of goods by sea, 
especially the Hague Rules 1924, on the subject of containerisation. Conflicts 
of interpretations appeared as to whether the container is the package or its 
contents are the packages, and whether carriage of containers on-deck 
deprives the carrier from limiting his liability. The huge financial differences 
in determining the meaning of the term package, and the applicability of the 
limitation clauses on the on-deck carriage of containers, defeat the economic 
purpose of the limitation clauses in reducing the transaction costs. In addition, 
such differences increase conflicts of interpretations and therefore litigation 
increases. The existence of the "fair opportunity" doctrine and the "customary 
freight unit" concept, where containerisation has an indirect influence on 
them, also increase litigation. 
Consequently, having a mechanism for reducing conflicts of 
interpretations that relate to containerisation would achie\'e the purpose of 
creating the uni form rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea, which is an 
international uniform interpretation of such rules. Such an achievement \\'ould 
reduce the transaction costs and litigation. Therefore, by examining the above 
conflicts of interpretations that relate to containerisation, the next chapters of 
this thesis investigate and analyse how we can achieve international uniform 
interpretations of uniform rules. In so doing, as will be seen, different national 
courts have construed identical and non-identical provisions in different ways, 
and these conflicting interpretations have undermined the uni formity of the 
uniform rules. Accordingly, as Sturle/ I states: "although the resulting partial 
uniformity is preferable to total diversity, there is still considerable room for 
improvement". Consequently, as we shall see in the next chapters, it is the 
writer's belief that the importance of comparative law and its role in achieving 
international unifornl interpretations should be considered, since it is the way 
that conflicts of interpretations could be significantly reduced. 
41 1\1' had F. Stllrlcy. "International llnifornl Laws in '\ational Courts: The 
IC • . ' . .. (108~) ')~ \' I Influence of Domestic Law in ConflIcts 01 Intcrpretatll1ll. ." -, a .. , 
InfI. L. 729 at 729. 94 
CHAPTER V: WHY CONFLICTS 1:\ I:\TERPRETA TIO:\~ OF 
UNIFORM RULES ARISE 
5.1. Introduction 
The importance of international uniform interpretations of uniform 
rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea as an aid to reach substantiye 
international uniformity has been recognised by different national courts. In 
the United States, for example, the Supreme Court recognised that 
international uniform interpretations of the Hague Rules 1924 are valuable1. 
Lower American courts also recognised this issue2. In addition, United 
Kingdom courts recognised the value of international uniform interpretations 
in relation to both the Hague Rules 19243 and the Hague-Visby Rules 19684. 
Australian courts also recognised the issue in relation to unifonn rules 
generally, and especially the Hague Rules 19245. In general, these national 
courts recognised that conflicts of interpretations of unifonn rules impose real 
costs on the shipping industry and increase litigation, which the previous 
1 See Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297 at 301 and 
306-08, 1959, A.M.C. 879 at 882 and 885-88 (1959); Vimar Segurosy 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. MIl' Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 at 2328, 1995, A.M.C. 
1817 at 1823-24 (1995). 
2 See, for example, Mitsui & Co. Ltd. \'. American Export Lines, 636 F.2d 807 
at 815 and 820-21 (2d Cir. 1981). 
) Sec, for example, Foscolo ,,\fango and Co. \'. Stag Line Ltd.. [1932] A.C. 328 
at 332 and 334; Riverstone Afeat Co. \'. Lancashire Shipping Co. (The 
Muncaster Castle), [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at 67 and 86: The RiH'I" Glirara, 
l1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53 at 62. 
See, for example. The ;\forviken, [1 t)S3] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 at 5: Kenya 
Raih\'ays v. Antares Co. 1)(('. Ltd, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 633 at 637: The Rin'I' 
Gura/'a, [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53 at 62. 
5 Sec, for example, .",'hipping COIporatioll of India I-td \'. Gamlen Chemical 
Co. (.-' 'asia) Pty. Ltd, [1()SI] 147 C.L.R. 142 at 159. 
chapter examined in detail. Such recognition, howeyer, is not enough to sohe 
the problem of conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules. To solve this 
problem, we need first to understand why conflicts of interpretations arise. 
Consequently, this chapter explains the different suggestions that are proposed 
by different writers to understand why conflicts of interpretations arise. 
However, none of these different suggestions has a completely satisfactory 
explanation of why conflicts of interpretations arise, since they only explain 
some conflicts. 
In proving the inadequacy of these propositions, our method, in this 
chapter, is to examine the United States decisions in relation to the problem of 
containerisation, which mentioned in the previous chapter. As stated in the 
first chapter of this thesis, the reason of choosing the United States is that this 
country contains a large amount of cases regarding the subject of 
containerisation that are suitable for examining the cause of the inconsistent 
interpretations of uniform rules6. In addition, this chapter examines other 
countries decisions in relation to the same subject, but only specific cases for 
proving specific points. 
5.2. Why Conflicts of Interpretations of Uniform Rules Arise 
5.2.1. The Different Connotations of the Technical Terms of 
Uniform Rules 
International uniform laws are no better protected against the risk of 
haying ambiguity in their provisions than any other laws. The ternl "package", 
for example, is not defined under Article -l( 5) or the other pro\isions of the 
() Sec the first chapter. supra, at -l-5. 
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Hague Rules 1924. The lack of defining such tenn has lead to conflicts of 
interpretations among many national courts on whether to consider containers 
or their contents as packages 7 . Some commentators argue that conflicts of 
interpretations of unifonn rules arise because of the ambiguity in the 
provisions of such unifonn rules. Jacob W.F. Sundberg, for example, in his 
article "A Unifonn Interpretation of Unifonn Law,,8, suggests that the 
technical tenns, whether they are legal tenns, special tenns or any tenns, of 
the unifonn rules often have different connotations in the different legal 
systems, and this leads to conflicts of interpretations. He argues that the 
greater the degree of abstractness expressed by the technical tenns the more 
conflicts of interpretations arise. 
Sundberg'S suggestion implies that conflicts of interpretations anse 
through the imprecise drafting of the unifonn rules. This suggestion, however, 
is inadequate to explain why conflicts in interpretations arise. Although clear 
drafting of unifonn rules can reduce some conflicts of interpretations, 
providing clear unifonn rules does not necessarily mean that judicial results 
will be unifonn. Accordingly, Sundberg's suggestion does not explain why 
sti 11 there are conflicts of interpretations among the national courts when the 
provisions of the unifonn rules are clear. This is explained below in detail 
under the "fair opportunity" doctrine, which was created by the United States' 
Circuit Courts. 
7 Sec the fourth chapter, supra, at 82-83. 
x (19()6) 10 Scandinm'ian Stud. L. 219 at 221. 
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5.2.1.1. The Different Connotations of the Technical Terms of 
Uniform Rules: The "Fair Opportunity" Example 
It is unnecessary to say that the clarity of the provisions of the uniform 
rules would always lead to international unifonn interpretations of such rules. 
Whether the provisions were clear or ambiguous, conflicts of interpretations 
might arise in both situations. Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924, for 
example, states, in part, that: 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable 
for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount 
exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or unit or the equivalent of 
that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods 
have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the 
bill of lading. 
By agreement another maximum amount than that mentioned in 
this paragraph may be fixed, provided that such maximum shall not be 
less than the figure above named9. 
Article 4(5) provides in clear terms that the carrier shall not "in any event" be 
liable for more than £ 100 per package or unit. Nevertheless, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the United States Circuit courts have held that if the 
carrier did not give the shipper a "fair opportunity" to declare a higher value, 
the package and unit limitation would not applylO. In other words, the carrier 
would lose the applicability of the package and unit limitation and accordingly 
would pay the whole amount of the damaged cargo, unless the shipper is 
afforded a "fair opportunity" to declare a higher value. This requirement is 
well known in the United States as the "fair opportunity" doctrine. This 
doctrine contradicts with Article ...J.(5) since this Article undoubtedly 
9 (emphasis added). See John F. Wilson and Charles Debattista, World 
Shipping Lm\'s: International Conventions 1'. Carriage by ,Se([, V/IICOI\\'-
V ()CONV, (October 1980) at 3-4. 
10 Sec the fourth chapter, supra, at 91-92. 
detennines that in all events the carrier shall not lose his right of limiting his 
liability. 
The "fair opportunity" doctrine developed in the United States under 
the railroad I I and the Harter Act cases 12. After the doctrine had developed in 
this context, the Ninth Circuit adopted it for the first time in a COGSA case, 
Tessler Brothers (B. C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line13 . In this case, the Ninth Circuit 
decided that: 
A significant restnctIOn on a carrier's right to limit liability to an 
amount less than the actual loss sustained is that the carrier must give 
the shipper 'a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower 
liability by paying a corresponding greater or lesser charge' 14. 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that Article 4(5) limits the carrier's liability to a 
specific amount unless a higher amount is inserted in the bill of lading. The 
Ninth Circuit, however, ignored the fact that Article 4(5) provides that such 
higher amount can be arranged by agreement between the shipper and the 
carrier, and in consequence, there is no obligation on the carrier to notify the 
shipper of such arrangement. The Ninth Circuit also misinterpreted Article 
II See, for example, Hart 1'. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 112 U.S. 331 (1884): 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. 1'. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 
(1953). 
12 See, for example, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. v. United States of America. 
201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953) (COGS A did not apply since the case involved a 
shipment between two foreign ports); Sommer Corp. l'. Panama Canal Co .. 
.f 75 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1973) (COGSA did not apply since the case involved 
damage occurring after discharge). For a detailed discussion see: Michael F. 
Sturley, "The Fair Opportunity Requirement Under COGSA Section 4( 5): A 
Case Study in the Misinterpretation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", 
(Part "I") (1988) 19J.M.L.C. 1 at6-IJ. 
\J 494 F.2d 4J8 (9th Cir. 1974). 
14 It!, at 44J. Quoting 'vCI\' )"ork, ;\'C\\' HaW'1l & Har((ord Railroad Co. \', 
'vol/lI1ag/c, 34() IT.S. 128 (195J): Sommer Corp. \'. Panama Cana/ Co., 475 
F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1 l)7J). 
4(5), where this Article does not put a restriction on the carrier's limitation of 
liability, but instead provides that such limitation shall not be restricted in any 
event. In spite of this, the Ninth Circuit claimed the existence of the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine in Article 4(5), and therefore held that there were two 
clauses in the bill of lading in this case, which proved that the carrier gave the 
shipper a fair opportunity to avoid the package and unit limitation. One clause 
recited the language of Article 4(5) of COGSA, and the other was the 
"Paramount Clause", namely, a clause that stated that the bill of lading was 
subject to the provisions of COGSA. Although the Ninth Circuit's decision 
was erroneous in adopting the "fair opportunity" doctrine, this decision has 
been the basis for all of the current law on the subject. 
The Ninth Circuit Court and even the other Circuit Courts, which 
followed the Ninth Circuit Court in adopting the "fair opportunity" 
requirement15, claimed that Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 requires the 
carrier to notify the shipper of his right to declare a higher value. In other 
words, these Circuit Courts claimed that the "fair opportunity" doctrine does 
exist in Article 4(5). However, Article 4(5) and even the other provisions of 
the Hague Rules 1924 do not require the carrier to notify the shipper of his 
right to declare a higher value. Instead, Article 4(5) just mentions that the 
15 See, for example, Stolt Tank Containers, Inc. v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 
962 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1992); Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MIV 
Tourcoing, 167 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999); Gamma-JO Plastics v. American 
President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244 (8th Cir. 1994); All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. 
Vessel MIV Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1993); Insurance Co. of North 
America v. MIV Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934 (11 th Cir. 1990); Unimac Co. v. C. 
F. Ocean Service, 43 F.3d 1434 (11 th Cir. 1995). All of these cases involved 
containerised cargo. 
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£ 1 00 limitation applies, unless the shipper declares the nature and value of the 
goods. Thus, it is the shipper's choice to declare a higher value for the 
goodS l6. In addition, Article 4(5) states that "by agreement" another maximum 
amount than the £ 100 limitation may be fixed. The phrase "by agreement" 
confirms that it is the parties' choice to declare a higher value for the goods, 
and in consequence, there is no obligation or requirement on the carrier to 
notify the shipper of his right to declare a higher value. In fact, some judges in 
the Ninth Circuit and even other Circuit Courts admitted that the doctrine of 
"fair opportunity" is not found in the language of the Hague Rules 1924. For 
example, in Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines17 , Kozinski, 1. 
acknowledged that the doctrine of "fair opportunity" "is a judicial 
encrustation, designed to avoid what courts felt were harsh or unfair results,,18. 
It should be noted also that commentators, whether they agree with the 
adoption of the "fair opportunity" doctrine or not, acknowledge that this 
doctrine does not exist in the provisions of the Hague Rules 192419. Therefore, 
16 Sturley states that shipper's declaration of a higher value is a decision for 
the shipper alone. There is nothing suggest that the carrier has any duty to call 
the opportunity to the shipper's attention. Michael F. Sturley, "The Fair 
Opportunity Requirement Under COGSA Section 4(5): A Case Study in the 
Misinterpretation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", (Part "II") (1988) 19 
J.M.L.C. 157 at 170 and 175. 
17 871 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989). 
18 Id, at 900. See also Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143 at 147 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (CYR, J.). 
19 See Mary L. Moreland, "Comment: COGSA Section 1304(5): 'Fair 
Opportunity' Update", (1996) 20 Mar. Law. 423 at 423; Laurence B. 
Alexander, "Containerisation, The Per Package Limitation, and the Concept of 
"Fair Opportunity"", (1986) 11 Mar. Law. 123 at 139-140; Jerome C. 
Scowcroft, "Recent Developments Concerning the Package Limitation", 
(1989) 20 J.M.L.C. 403 at 416; Daniel A. Tadros, "COGS A Section 4(5)'s 
'Fair Opportunity' Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and Lack of 
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the "fair opportunity" doctrine does not exist in Article "+(5) or in any other 
provision in the Hague Rules 1924, and is, in fact. a United States judicial 
The "fair opportunity" doctrine, the "brain child" of the United States 
courts, has rendered the United States Circuit Courts' decisions inconsistent 
with the international understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. Foreign courts 
do not even acknowledge that such doctrine exists. In effect, several 
commentators observe that the "fair opportunity" doctrine undermines the 
uniformity of the Hague Rules 1924. Tadros21 , for example, argues that the 
United States Supreme Courts must reject the "fair opportunity" doctrine in 
order to align the United States judicial system with foreign judicial systems in 
their interpretations of the Hague Rules 1924. In addition, Sturley22 states that 
the "fair opportunity" doctrine interferes with the primary purpose of the 
Hague Rules 1924, which is achieving international uniformity, because other 
nations have not made the same mistake. 
From this point, Sundberg's argument that conflicts of interpretations 
arise through differences in the interpretation of the technical terms of uniform 
rules is inadequate since it does not go far enough to explain why still there 
International Uniformity: Will the United States Supreme Court E\'Cr Prmide 
Guidance", (1992) 17 Mar. Law. 17 at 34; Sturley, supra note 16, at 165; 
Mary T. Reilly, "COGS A $500 Package Limitation: Shipper's Opportunity to 
Declare a Higher Value", (1982) 13 J.M.L.C. 245 at 252. 
20 Sturley also explains that the legislative history of the United States 
COGSA did not contain any discussion of the shipper's right to declare a 
higher \'alue. Supra note 16, at 170. . . 
21 Supra note 19, at 36. Scc also Howard M. ~fcCormack, "Umformlty of 
~laritime Law, and Perspecti\'c From the U.S. Point of Vic\\", (1999) 73 Tul. 
I. Rev. 1..+81 at 1529. 
n Scc Sturlcy, supra note 12, at 20-23; Sturley, supra notc 1 (1, at 165. 
102 
are conflicts of interpretations when the provisions of the unifonn rules are 
clear. 
5.2.2. The Different Methods By Which Countries Incorporate 
Uniform Rules 
S . 23 . orne wnters suggest that the vanous methods by which countries 
incorporate uniform rules into their domestic law lead to conflicts of 
interpretations. Selvig24, for example, argues that in enacting unifonn rules, 
different countries follow different procedures. Some adopt a special statute, 
which is a plain translation of the unifonn rules, while others incorporate 
several provisions of the unifonn rules in their codes. The different provisions 
could be disconnected from their original context and would be incorporated 
in the systems of the codes. Thus, this change would lead to conflicts of 
interpretations. In other words, Selvig's argument suggests that the different 
methods by which the countries incorporate the unifonn rules create textual 
variations of such rules in the various countries, and this leads to conflicts of 
interpretations. It should be noted that Selvig's argument has a close 
relationship with the previous argument that says that conflicts of 
interpretations arise because the technical tenns of the unifonn rules often 
23 See Erling Selvig, Unit Limitation of Carrier's Liability, (1961 ) at .+: Giles, 
Uniform Commercial Lall', (1970) at 58; Sundberg, supra note 8, at 224: C.H. 
Schreuer, "The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts", (1971) .+5 Brit. 
Y.B. Infl. L. 255 at 257 and 2().+-()5; F.A. Mann, "The Interpretation of 
Unifonll Statutes", (19'+6) 62 L.Q.R. 278 at 289; F.:\. \lann, "L'nifonll 
Statutes in English Lm", (1983) 9 l ) L.Q.R. :'76 at :'89-90; 1.\1. Sinclair, "The 
Principles of Treaty Interpretation and Their .\pplication by the English 
Courts", (196:') 12 In1'1. Compo L.Q. 508 at 5:'0-:''+ and 5'+9-51: Athanassios 
Yiannopoulos, Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills o(Lading, ( 1l)()2) at I S 1-~2. 
24 1(/, at .+. 
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have different connotations in the different legal systems. The procedures of 
enacting the uniform rules could introduce new technical tenns that have 
different connotations in the different legal systems. For example, in 1936, the 
United States Congress passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)25, 
which adopted, with minor alterations, the Hague Rules 1924. One of these 
changes is that the "per package or unit" limitation under article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924 was changed into "per package or customary freight unit". 
Thus, the term "unit" has been changed to "customary freight unit". However, 
under the United Kingdom's Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, there is some 
authority in the English cases that the tenn "unit" in Article 4(5) is defined as 
a shipping unie6. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has the same 
position as the United Kingdom27. These changes in defining the tenn "unit" 
have created conflicts of interpretations28 . 
Giles29 also suggests that the various methods of implementing the 
uniform rules not only lead to textual variations but also to losing sight of the 
international character of such rules. He argues that divergence would appear 
if the substance of unifonn rules were embedded in a national code in which 
judges lose sight of their international character. Therefore, he states that the 
25 The United States Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGSA 1936), 46 United 
States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1300-1315, from the Internet: 
http://www.cargolaw.comlcogsa.html (accessed: 2015/2001).. . 
26 See Studebaker Distributors Ltd. v. Charlton Steam Sh,ppmg Company. 
Ltd., [1938] 1 K.B. 459 at 467. 
27 See Anticosti Shipping Company v. Viateur St- Amand, [1959] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 352 at 358; Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd., 
r1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469 at 475. ~8 This issue is discussed in detail in the next chapter, infra, at 148-61. 
2C) Supra note 23, at 58. 10~ 
best method in avoiding such divergence is to adopt the uniform rules as they 
stand, as the United Kingdom did when adopted the Hague Rules 1924. 
Selvig's and Giles's above suggestions, however, are inadequate to 
explain why conflicts in interpretations of uniform rules arise. In regard to 
Selvig's suggestion, although the adoption of the uniform rules in their 
original text contributes to uniformity of interpretation of such rules, conflicts 
of interpretations arise among the national courts of different countries and 
even of the same country in spite of the fact that the uniform rules are adopted 
in their original text. Francesco Berlingieri, in his Article "Uniformity in 
Maritime Law and Implementation of International Conventions,,3o, has the 
same argument. He states that the adoption of conventions in their original text 
could not by itself achieve international uniform interpretations of these 
conventions since courts frequently differ even in the same country. On the 
other hand, in regard to Giles's suggestion, there is no reason to suppose that if 
the unifonn rules were incorporated into the national code of a country, then 
the national courts of such country would always lose sight of the international 
character of such rules. When such national courts recognise the international 
character of the uniform rules, conflicts of interpretations may arise in spite of 
such recognition. In addition, we should not suppose that the national courts 
would always be more restrictive or less restrictive in their interpretations just 
because they did not recognise the international character of the uniform rules, 
and vice versa . 
. \ 0 ( 1 9 ~ 7) 1 8 J.;\ 1. L. C. 3 1 7 at 3 -+ 9 . 
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Consequently, the first part of this section clarifies the inadequacy of 
Selvig's argument in explaining why conflicts of interpretations arise by 
examining the term "package", where this term was adopted by the United 
States in its original text. The Second part, however, evaluates some of the 
United States' Carriage of Goods By Sea Act decisions for proving the 
inadequacy of Giles's suggestion in explaining why conflicts of interpretations 
anse. 
5.2.2.1. The Textual Variations of the Uniform Rules: The 
"Package" Example 
Adoption of the uniform rules in their original text would surely 
contribute in achieving international uniform interpretations of such rules, but 
would not completely guarantee such achievement. In many cases, conflicts of 
interpretations could arise when the uniform rules are adopted in their original 
text. Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 192..+, for example. states that the 
carrier's liability is limited to a specific amount "per package or uniC-' I. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Article 4(5) and even the other provisions 
of the Hague Rules 1924 do not define the term "package"·'~. In addition, there 
is no indication in the legislative history of the Hague Rules 1924 to the 
precise meaning of the tern1 "package". The term "package" under Article 4(5) 
has been adopted by the United States in its original text. Ne\crtheless, the 
United States Circuit Courts' decisions are inconsistent \\ith each other in 
relation to \yhether a container itself constitutes a "package", or its contents 
.II (emphasis added). See \\'ilson & Dchattista, supra note 9, at 3 . 
.12 Sec the fourth chapter, supru. at ~2. 
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constitute packages. This controversy has appeared mostly In the United 
States, but there is also case law in other jurisdictions. 
In the 1960s, after the appearance of containerisation, the United States 
Circuit Courts dealt on a case-by-case basis with the issue of containerisation 
in relation to the carrier's limitation of liabilitY3. By the 1970s, the United 
States Circuit Courts developed three separate and distinct tests to solve the 
problem of whether a container constitutes a package, or its contents constitute 
packages: 
1. In 1971, in the Leather's Best Inc. v. s.s. Mormaclynx case34, the Second 
Circuit created the "intention of the parties test". Under this test, the Second 
Circuit considered that the term "package" in COGSA was: 
More sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper packaged the 
goods and described them than to a large metal object, functionally a 
part of the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be contained35• 
The Second Circuit stated that the purpose of Article 4(5) of COGSA was to 
set a floor below which the carrier should not be permitted to limit his 
liability. To consider the container as a "package" would defeat that purpose. 
The Second Circuit stressed that when the number of packages is disclosed in 
33 See, for example, Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanisc~e 
Dampjschijfahrts-Gesellschajt & Columbus Lines, Inc.., 37.5 F.2.d 943 (2d Clr. 
1967) (this case relates to palletisation); Encyclopaedza Britannica, Inc. v. s.s. 
Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969) (this case relates to 
containerisation). 
34 451 F .2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). 
35Id.at815. 107 
the shipping documents and the container is carrier-owned, the container 
generally should never be considered as a package36. 
2. In 1973, however, in Royal Typewriter Co. v. M. V Kulmerland37 the 
Second Circuit created an alternative test, the "functional economics test", 
which contradicts with the "intention of the parties test" above. The crucial 
point in this test was that the contents of a container would be deemed 
packages only if they would have been capable of withstanding shipment as a 
conventional break-bulk cargo. If they would not, there would be a 
presumption that the container constituted the "package,,38. 
3. In 1979, on the other hand, in The Complaint of the Norfol12 9 the Eastern 
District of Virginia created the "each case to be taken on its merits test". 
Clark, J., the creator of this test, concentrated on a list of twelve factors, which 
he believed should be considered to determine whether a container is a 
package or not40 . 
The United States Circuit Courts did not regard the above three tests as 
mutually exclusive and frequently more than one test was invoked in a 
particular case41 • In the 1980s, however, the Circuit Courts examined and 
36 The "intention of the parties test" was followed in Du Pont de Nemours 
International SA. v. SS Mormacvega Etc., 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974). 
37 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). 
38 The "functional economics test" was followed in Cameco Inc. v. American 
Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (1974); Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen 
Lines Inc. 543 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976). 
39 Th~ Co:"plaint of the Norfolk Baltimore and Caroline Inc, Eastern District 
of Virginia, 478 F. Supp. 383 (1979). 
40 Id at 392. The "each case to be taken on its merits test" was followed in 
Croft & Skully Co. l'. MIV Skulptor Vuchetich, (The Southern District of 
Texas) 508 F. Supp. 670 (1981). 
41 See for example, Cameco Inc. v. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (1974). 
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analysed these tests and attempted to create some form of rationalisation. One 
of the most influential cases in the 1980s is Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. American 
Export Lines42 . In this case, the district court applied the "functional 
economics test" first announced in the Royal l)pewriter case above. The 
district court concluded that the contents of the containers, not the containers 
themselves, were the packages, since such contents could withstand as a 
conventional break-bulk cargo. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
result, but in a different way, and rejected and abandoned the "functional 
economics test,,43. Friendly, J. revised the "each case to be taken on its merits 
test" first announced in the Complaint of the Norfolk case above. In addition, 
Friendly, J. revised the "intention of the parties test" first announced by him in 
Leather's Best case above. In the majority opinion, in the :\!itsui case, 
Friendly, J. reaffirmed the position that he had taken in the Leather's Best 
case, that containers are "functionally part of the ship ,,44. The Alitsui case was 
decided in the context of carrier-furnished containers, and the panel expressly 
limited its decision on situations where the bill of lading show the number of 
packages included in the containers. Friendly, J. did not give a solution in 
relation to situations where the bill of lading provides no information of the 
contents of the container4:'. Thus, the "\litSlii court left the former situations 
open \\'ithout any solution. 
4:: 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981). 
4~ Id, at 818-19. It should be noted that on appeal, in this case, en~1l the creator 
of the "functional economics test" had abandoned it. At 825. 
44 ,)'lIpra, at 8 16. 
4'i , t Q") 1 
- ,\lIpra, a ('1- . 
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The Mitsui case influenced the subsequent cases. Some Circuit Courts 
answered the question, which was left open in the latter case, where they 
stated that where the contents of a container are not disclosed in the bill of 
lading, the container and not its contents is regarded as a package46 . In 
addition, some Circuit Courts expanded the scope of the Mitsui approach to 
cases where the container is not carrier supplied, if the bill of lading discloses 
the contents of the container47 , and to cases where the packages are listed on 
some other documents other than the bill of lading48 . 
Although many cases followed the Mitsui approach, there were 
conflicts of interpretations in relation to whether the Mitsui approach should 
apply to pallets or not. The Eleventh Circuit Court expanded the Mitsui 
approach to be applied on pallets49, while the Second Circuit Court refused to 
do S050. In addition, there were conflicts of interpretations in relation to the 
description of the container's contents in the bill of lading. The Eleventh 
Circuit Court held that the heading "Number of Packages" in the bill of lading 
4(l See, for example, Billiaden BSB Landscaping 1'. Af.l'. Ncdlloyd Rotterdam, 
759 F.2d 1006 at 1013 (2d Cir. 1985); Universal Leaf Tobacco 1'. Companhia 
De Navegacao, 993 F.2d 414 at 417 (4th Cir. 1993); Fishman & Tobin, Inc. ". 
Tropical Shipping & Construction Co., Ltd., (l1th Cir. 2001) from the Internet: 
http://laws.findlaw.comI11th/9943750pn.html (accessed: 20/6/2001). 
47 See, for example, SlIIythgreyholind \'. AI/V Eurygenes, 666 F.2d 746 at 749 
(2d Cir. 1981): Marcraft Clothes, Inc. \'. j\/. V. Kurobe Marl{, 575 F. Supp. 239 
at 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
4~ See, for example, .1l/state Insurancc Co. \'. 11ll'crsiones Savieras Imparca, 
C.'I., 64() F2d 169 at 172-7~ (5th Cir. 1981); Belize Trading, Ltd. \'. Sun Ins. 
CO. O/.\'CI\' rork, 993 F.2d 790 at 792 (11 th Cir. 199~). 
4() See "egos \', Compania .. lnonima l'enezolana, 72() F.2d 629 at 6~0-31 (11 th 
Cir. 1983). 
50 See .'ll1i('d Int 'I ,-1m. Eagle Trading Corp. \'. ss rang ,\ling, 672 F.2d 1055 
at 1061 (2d Cir. 19S2): ;\lolli('([ Textile Corporation \', SS Tana, 952 F,2d 636 
at ()40 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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is controlling in determining whether a container or its context constitute the 
packages51 , while other Circuit Courts held that the heading "Description of 
Packages and Goods" in the bill of lading is controlling52 . 
It seems obvious from the above discussion that the 1970s tests are 
inconsistent with each other. In fact, the Circuit Courts' method of 
interpretation differed, where this lead to inconsistent decisions. In the 
Leather's Best case above, although the Second Circuit's method of 
interpreting the term "package" depended on the intention of the parties, it was 
influenced by its argument that the purpose of the Hague Rules 1924 was not 
to consider the container itself as a package, since the container is functionally 
a part of the ship53. In effect, some commentators criticises the Leather's Best 
case by arguing that it is illogical that the container changes from a part of the 
ship into a package when the shipper fails to disclose the contents or when the 
container is owned or supplied by the shipper. The container is either a part of 
the ship or it is a package for purposes of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 
192454 . In the Royal Typewriter case above, however, although the Second 
Circuit stated that the statutory purpose of Hague Rules 1924 required a 
51 See, for example, Hayes-Leger Associates, Inc. v. MIV Oriental Knight, 765 
F.2d 1076 at 1082 (11th Cir. 1985); Sony Magnetic Products Inc. v. Merivienti 
DIY, 863 F.2d 1537 at 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1989); Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. 
Tropical Shipping & Construction Co., Ltd., (11 th Cir. 2001) from the Internet: 
http://laws.findlaw.comlllthl9943750pn.html (accessed: 20/6/2001). 
52 See, for example, Monica Textile Corporation v. s.s. Tana, 952 F.2d 636 at 
638 (2d Cir. 1991); Universal Leaf Tobacco v. Companhia De Navegacao, 
993 F.2d 414 at 416-17 (4th Cir. 1993); All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. Vessel MIV 
Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427 at 1433 (9th Cir. 1993). 
53 Supra note 34, at 815. 
54 See Mary Elizabeth Reisert, "A Container Should Never Be a Package: 
Going Beyond Mitsui \'. American E\port Lines, Inc. ", (1982) 2 Pace L. Rev. 
309. 
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"functional economics test", it did not point out precisely what this purpose 
would be55 . The "functional economics test" was widely criticized by both 
commentators56 and the United States Circuit Courts57 . The main criticism 
against this test is that it fosters economic waste. The shipper will always need 
to pack his goods as it was before the appearance of containerisation, instead 
of saving money in using economical packaging, in order to make them 
functional. Thus, this means that the shipper will no longer benefit from using 
containers. On the other hand, in the Complaint of the Norfolk case above, 
Clark, J. concluded that the detennination of whether a particular container is 
a package cannot be controlled by a talismanic fonnula but necessitates 
analysis of the facts of each case in the light of congressional polic/8. 
However, Clark, J. did not specify what the congressional policy would be. In 
Smythgreyhound v. MIl' Eurygenes59 , the Second Circuit argued that the list of 
the twelve factors in the fonner case are not a "common sense test" that would 
help to avoid the pains of litigation. The failure to state how much weight to 
accord to each of the criteria on the list invites inconsistent results. Thus, the 
fonner tests' methods of interpretation were vague, and therefore, instead of 
55 Supra note 37, at 648. 
5() See, for example, M.E. De Orchis, "The Container and the Package 
Limitation-The Search for Predictability", (1974) 5 J.M.L.C. 251 at 257~ 
George Denegre, "Admiralty-Carrier-Owned Shipping Container Found :'\ot 
to be COGSA Package", (1982) 56 Tul. L. Rev. 1409 at 1415~ John F. \Nilson, 
Carriage o.fCoods hy Sea, (3rd ed., 1998) at 197. 
57 See, for example, Croft & SClll(r Co. \'. MIV Skulptor "llchetich, 6()4 F.2d 
1277 at 1281 (5th Cir. 1982): Allstate Insurance Co. \'. Im'crsiones Nm'ieras 
Imparca. C.·I., 646 F.2d 169 at 172 (5th Cir. 1981): j\fatsllshita Electric 
Corporation o("/merica \'. SS Aegis Spirit, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 93 at 99-
101. 
58 Slipra note 39, at 392. 
51) 66h F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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bringing unifonn interpretation of the tenn "package", these tests have created 
more conflicts of interpretations regarding the definition of the term 
"package" . 
Many cases, on the other hand, followed the Mitsui case above, but 
still the interpretation of the term "package" in some circumstances is not 
unifonn, where the Circuit Courts also used different methods of 
. . 60 InterpretatIOn. In Vegas v. Compania Anonima Venezolana ,for example, the 
Eleventh Circuit's method of interpreting the tenn "package" depended on the 
purpose of Article 4(5), which is to set a reasonable figure below \\hich the 
carrier should not be pennitted to limit his liability. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit 
expanded the Mistui approach to be applied on pallets for the purpose of 
Article 4(5). The Eleventh Circuit also supported its conclusion by referring to 
Article 4(5)( c) of the Hague-Visby Rules, where this Article interchangeably 
uses the words "container, pallet or similar article of transport,,61. However, in 
Allied Int 'I Am. Eagle Trading Corp. v. SS Yang Ming62 , the Second Circuit 
refused to apply the Mitsui approach on pallets. The Second Circuit ignored 
the purpose of Article 4(5) and distinguished the Mitsui case on the basis that 
containers are to be treated differently than other shipping units because of 
their size and function in the shipping industry63. 
Whether the Hague Rules 1924 were adopted in their original text or 
with alterations to the original text, conflicts of interpretations could arise in 
60 7:2 0 F.:2 d 6:2 9 (1 I t h C i r. 1 98 J ) . 
61 It!, at 630-31. 
(12 672 F.2d 10)) (:2dCir.19S:2). 
63 Id, at 1 O() 1 . 
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both situations. It was not the textual variations that lead to conflicts of 
interpretations in defining the term "package" in relation to containers above. 
but the different methods of interpretation of the United States Circuit Courts. 
Accordingly, Selvig'S above suggestion that the textual yariations of uniform 
rules lead to conflicts of interpretations is inadequate to explain why such 
conflicts arise. 
5.2.2.2. The Ignorance of the International Character of the 
Uniform Rules: The "U.S. COGSA" Example 
A problem distinct from the above textual variations arises in the case 
where the uniform rules do not become directly applicable, but have to be re-
enacted in a domestic legislation. The United States, for example, adopted the 
Hague Rules 1924 by re-enacting them in a special legislation, the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) 193664 . According to Giles's suggestion65 , such 
re-enactment leads the United States Circuit Courts to lose sight that COGSA 
is an implementation of an international uniform rules, namely the Hague 
Rules 1924. This, in consequence, leads to conflicts of interpretations. Our 
argument in this context, however, is that Giles's suggestion is inadequate to 
explain why conflicts of interpretations arise since his proposition does not 
extend to the situation where the conflicts of interpretations appear in spite of 
the recognition of the international character of the uniform rules. 
(,..) The United States Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGS:\ 1936), .+() United 
States Code (U.S.C.) ~~ 1300-1315. from the Internet: 
http://www.cargola\\.comicogsa.htm1( accessed: 2()j/200 1 ). 
h:' Giles, supra note 2~, at 5S. 
1 1.+ 
It is unnecessary to assume that because of the re-enactment of the 
Hague Rules in the United States COGSA then the United States Circuit 
Courts would always lose sight of the international character of the Hague 
Rules. In many cases, the United States Circuit Courts did recognise the 
international character of the Hague Rules, but in spite of this recognition. 
conflicts of interpretations arose. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 provides that "in any event" the carrier 
shall not be deprived from the package and unit limitation66 . In spite of this 
wording, different national courts divided over the meaning and effect of the 
words "in any event" in relation to whether the carrier should be deprived 
from his limitation right if he committed an unreasonable deviation. The 
United States Circuit Courts, for example, divided over whether the phrase "in 
any event" under Article 4(5) should be applied on the unreasonable deviation 
doctrine. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. s.s. Hong Kong Producc/7, for 
example, the Second Circuit examined the question of whether carriage of 
containers on-deck constitutes an unreasonable deviation or not. Anderson, 1. 
stated that: 
The Hague Rules, which leaned heavily on the Harter Act, were 
promulgated in 1921 and amended by the Brussels Convention in 
1924, under the sponsorship of maritime nations and representatives of 
ocean shipping, to provide a set of uniform provisions for ocean bills 
of lading. This country [the United States] joined the Brussels 
convention in 1936, and, to make its adherence effective, passed 
COGSA, which duplicates the Hague Rules practically word by 
word ... The purpose behind the Harter, the Hague Rules and COGS:\ 
were to achieve a fair balancing of the interests of the carrier. on the 
one hand, and the shipper, on the other, and also to effectuate a 
Cl() See tl1L' fourth chapter, supra, at 87. 
67 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 19(9). 
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standard set of provisions for ocean bills of lading ... 'The legislative 
history of the Act shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the 
Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brussels Co~vention of 
1924 ... The effort of those Rules was to establish uniform ocean bills 
of lading to govern the rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers 
inter se in international trade,68. 
Although this statement clearly shows that Anderson, J. recognised the 
international character of the Hague Rules 1924, Anderson, J. ignored the 
purpose behind Article 4(5), where this Article clearly provides that in all 
events the carrier shall not be deprived from his right to limit his liability. 
Anderson, J. was unwilling to attribute much significance to the phrase "in any 
event" under Article 4(5), and argued that the Hague Rules 1924 were not 
intended to change the existing law on unreasonable deviation. Instead of 
concentrating on Article 4(5), Anderson, J. focused on the clauses of the bill of 
lading in reaching the latter argument. He stated that where the bill of lading 
provides that the carrier is permitted to carry the goods on-deck, such clause is 
intended to lessen the carrier's liability. Anderson, 1. pointed out that the 
carrier is not allowed to lessen his liability under Article 3(8) of the Hague 
Rules, where this Article provides that: 
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving 
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in 
connection with goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the 
duties and obligations provided in this article, or lessening such 
liability otherwise than as provided in this convention, shall be null and 
void and of no effect ... 
Therefore, the majority in Second Circuit concurred with the reasoning of 
Anderson, J. and held that carriage of containers on-deck deprived the carrier 
61' /d, at ll-I~. Quoting RoberT C. Herd & Co. l'. Krawill J/ach. COIp .. ~~q 
ll.S. ~(n, ~01, 79 S. Ct. 766, ~69, ~ L. Ed. 2d 820 (1l)~9). 
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of the benefit of the package and unit limitation under Article 4(5('1, Hays. J .. 
however, dissented the majority opinion and argued that the carrier should not 
be deprived from his limitation right if he committed unreasonable de\'iation. 
He stated that the majority sought to make much of the clause in the bill of 
lading and claimed that such clause is ineffective. He argued that even if we 
suppose that the majority was right, such clause would not serve to invalidate 
the entire bill of lading70. Hays, J. observed that Article 4(5) by its express 
tenns applies "in any event". He stated that: 
Perhaps if the stowage of the cargo on deck had constituted a breach of 
the contract of carriage, its provisions would be inapplicable. But it 
seems highly unlikely that without including some more specific 
statutory direction the draftsman of COGSA intended that a breach of 
contract should relieve the carrier and the shipper of their rights and 
duties under the Act71 . 
Consequently, the implication from this case suggests that when the United 
States Circuit Courts recognise the international character of the Hague Rules 
1924, conflicts of interpretations may arise in spite of such recognition. 
The recognition of the international character of the Hague Rules 1924 
also may in no way influence the methods of interpretations of the Circuit 
Courts. In other words, whether the United States Circuit Courts recognised or 
did not recognise the international character of the Hague Rules, this might not 
effect their methods of interpretations. As explained in the previous part of 
this section, conflicts of interpretations arose among the United States Circuit 
69 Supra, at 18. 
70 l' . ,t 19 
.. ) ulJl a. a . 
71 l' t ')0 dupra. a - . 
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Courts in defining the tenn "package" in relation to containers 72. In l'viollica 
Textile Corporation v. SS Tana73 , for example, the Second Circuit examined 
the question of whether the container itself constitutes a package or its 
contents constitute packages. The Second Circuit stated that: 
Long before COGSA was enacted, industrialized nations recognised 
the need to reconcile the desire of carriers to limit their potential 
liability with their vastly superior bargaining power over 
shippers ... The nations at the Brussels Convention of 1924 balanced 
these competing concerns with a per-package limitation on 
liability ... The principles established by the Brussels Convention 
became the template for COGSA ... 'The legislative history of the Act 
shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the Hague Rules of 1921, 
as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924' ... Unhappily, neither 
the statute nor its legislative history provides any clue as to the 
meaning of "package" in the Act 74. 
The Second Circuit in the above statement recognised the international 
character of the Hague Rules 1924, but such recognition did not help this 
Circuit Court to solve the problem of defining the tenn "package" in relation 
to containers. The Second Circuit acknowledged that these unifonn nIles do 
not provide any clue as to the definition of the tenn "package". Therefore, the 
Second Circuit followed its own precedents in defining the term "package". 
The Second Circuit held that the contents of the container, not the container 
itself, are the packages. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, the 
Second Circuit's decision is inconsistent with other Circuit Courts' 
decisions7:'. At this stage, hO"'e\'er, it needs only be said that the recognition of 
the inten1ational character of the Hague Rules did not influence the Second 
72 Supra, at 106-1 1'+. 
n 952 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991). 
74 ld, at 6.18. Quoting Roher! C. Herd & Co. \'. KraH'ill.\/ach. Corp., 3Y) U.S 
2 l )7, JOl, 79 S C1. 766. i()l). 3 L. I:d. 2d 820 (1959). 
75 Sl'l' the sixth chapter. i,~rra, at 139-'+3. 
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Circuit in reaching its decision. Consequently, in many cases, conflicts of 
interpretations may arise despite the recognition of the international character 
of the uniform rules. 
5.2.3. The Impact of Domestic Law 
A noticeable problem arises in relation to the achieyement of 
international uniform interpretations of uniform rules where the national rules 
and techniques, which have escaped unification, effect the interpretation of the 
uniform rules. In many cases, international uniform rules are applied very 
differently in the various countries, depending upon certain domestic laws 
followed by the judges in practice. Some writers, therefore, suggest that 
conflicts of interpretations arise due to the influence of domestic law in 
interpreting uniform rules, which differ from one country to another. Sturle/6, 
for example, argues that conflicts of interpretations arise because of the impact 
of substantive domestic law on the process of interpreting uniform rules. He 
states that, "when a national court must interpret a uniform law ... a court will 
try to reconcile the uniform law with the domestic law"n. Similarly, 
Schrcuer78 argues that every country tends to apply the concepts and methods 
of its own municipal law. He states that intentionally or unintentionally 
national courts ha\'e a tendency to follo\\' their own precedents and concepts 
c\'cn in situations where they are required to interpret and apply law that does 
76 Michael F. SturIn', "International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The 
Influencc of Domestic La\\' in Conflicts of Interpretation", (l (87) 27 \'a. J. 
Int'l. L. 729 at 7"+3. 
17 Ill, at 7"+"+. 
"7S Supra note 23, at 26"+. 
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not exist In their own domestic laws. Accordingly, Peacock79 argues that 
national courts must be willing to disregard prior domestic law. He observes 
that reliance on prior domestic law is a frequent problem in, for example, 
common law courts because they greatly stress on the importance of 
precedents. 
Interpreting international uniform rules, however, is not simply a 
matter of looking to the provisions and construing such provisions according 
to the domestic principles or rules. The problem goes deeper than that. In 
many cases, national courts try to reconcile the interpretation of the uniform 
rules with the international understanding of such rules. In spite of this 
reconciliation, conflicts of interpretations arise. Thus, the weakness in the 
impact of domestic law argument is that it does not explain why there are 
conflicts of interpretations when the national courts interpret the uniform rules 
by depending on the international character of such rules. This is explained 
below under the "River Gurara" case. 
5.2.3.1. The Impact of Domestic Law: The "River Gurara" 
Example 
The "River Gurara" case80, which was decided by the English courts, 
relates to the application of the Hague Rules 1924 to containers81 • In fact, it 
79 J. Hoke Peacock, "Note: Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague 
Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: An Alternative Approach to the 
Interpretation of International Uniform Acts", (1990) 68 Texas L. Rev. 977 at 
1000. 
80 [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53. . . . 
81 It should be clarified that the Umted Kmgdom has adopted the Hague-Vlsby 
Rules 1968. However, the English courts in the River Gurara case applied the 
Hague Rules 1924 since the cargo was mostly shipped under bills of lading in 
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was the first time, under the "River Gurara" case, that the English courts dealt 
with the problem of defining the term "package" in relation to containers82 . 
Under this case, although the domestic law did not influence the judges in the 
original trial and on appeal, conflicts of interpretation appeared. 
In this case, vessel River Gurara suffered an engine breakdown, and 
subsequently the vessel broke up and sank with a total loss of cargo. Much of 
that cargo was containerised. The issue, in this case, was whether each 
container constitutes a package or the contents of each container constitute 
packages. Since there is no provision in the Hague Rules 1924 that deals with 
the issue of defining the term "package" in relation to containers83 , Colman, J. 
traced the development of this issue in the United States, and also referred to 
Canadian, Australian, French, and Netherlands cases. In examining these 
countries' decisions, the issue that Colman, J. was concerned of is that the 
conclusions of that if the bill of lading disclosed the contents of the container, 
then the contents and not the container are the packages. If, on the other hand, 
the bill of lading only described the number of the containers, then the 
container itself should be considered the package, and not its contents84. 
Colman, J. decided that: 
the same form, where under that form the carriage of goods was subject to 
legislation at the ports of shipment incorporating th~ ~ague Rules ! 924. 
82 Colman, J., in this case, acknowledged that thIS IS the first tIme that the 
English courts have to deal with the problem of defining ~~e term "package" 
on containers in relation to the Hague Rules 1924. In addItIon, he stated that 
up till now there has been no judgment of t~e English courts which has dealt 
with this problem in relation to the Hague-VIsby Rules 1968. Supra, at 54 and 
55. 
83 See the fourth chapter, supra, at 82. 
84 Supra, at 59-61. 
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Where, however, the meaning and application of the rules [Hague 
Rules 1924] is unclear, as it is in the present case due to the 
development of new modes of international transport, the English 
Courts confronted with competing constructions neither of which is 
inconsistent with the wording of the Convention, should, in the 
interests of the harmonisation of international jurisprudence on the 
subject, regard as a paramount consideration the fact that the Courts of 
other jurisdictions, particularly of the great trading nations, have giyen 
the Convention one particular meaning and rejected the other. Unless 
the language of the Convention is capable only of one meaning our 
Courts should reach that conclusion which achieves international 
uniformity. To adopt a eccentric construction without compelling 
linguistic justification would be wrong in principle85 . 
Accordingly, Colman, J. concluded that the construction of Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924 which the English courts should now adopt is that \yhich 
have been reached by the American, Canadian, Australian, French and 
Netherlands courts, in order to achieve international uniformity. Colman, 1. 
held that since the contents of the container, in the River Gurara case, were 
described in the bill of lading, then every item described in the bill of lading 
must be considered as a package. He observed that the particulars in the bill of 
lading were to be treated as conclusive, and so each container itself should not 
be considered as a package. In reaching this decision, Colman, 1. 
acknowledged that the interpretation of the Hague Rules 1924 should not be 
controlled by domestic precedents, where he quoted what Lord Macmillan 
said in Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo Mango & Co. Ltd., [1932] A.C. 328 at 350: 
It is important to remember that the Act of 1924 was the outcome of an 
International Conference and that the rules in the Schedule have an 
international currency. As these rules must come under the 
consideration of foreign Courts it is desirable in the interests of 
uniformity that their interpretation should not be rigidly controlled by 
domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that the language of 
X5 Supra, at ()2. 
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the rules should be construed on broad principles of general 
acceptation86. 
On appea1 87 , however, Phillips, L.J. declined to follow the United 
States and Canadian decisions, as Colman, J. did. Phillips, LJ. stated that: 
While I appreciate the desirability of international uniformity. I am 
unable to accept that the basis of limitation under the unamended 
Hague Rules depends upon the agreement of the parties as to what 
constitute the relevant 'packages', as represented by the description of 
the cargo on the face of the bill of lading88 . 
He was persuaded by the submission that the Hague Rules 1924 were designed 
to prevent carriers imposing unrealistically low limits of liability. If the parties 
are allowed to agree as to their own definition of packages through the bill of 
lading, carriers could succeed in escaping the minimum limit of liability 
intended by the Hague Rules 192489. Philips, L.J. recognised that this 
submission is in conflict with Article 4(5)( c) of the Hague-Visby Rules, where 
this Article provides that: 
Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the 
bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be deemed the 
number of packages or units for the purposes of this paragraph as far as 
these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such article 
• • l)() 
of transport shall be consIdered the package or umt . 
Nevertheless, he argued that the description in the bill of lading is not 
conclusive as to the contents of the containers. Phillips, L.J. admitted that his 
86 Colman, J. also acknowledged that the interpretation of the Hague-\'isby 
Rules should not be controlled by domestic precedents (quoting \\hat Lord 
Diplock said in The Hollandia, [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1). Supra, at 62. 
87 Thc Ri\'cr Gurar([, [1997] \V.L.R. 1128. The appeal against Colman, 1. \\'as 
dismissed. 
S8 Id, at 1139. 
)\9 
, Supra, at 1139. 
l)O Supra, at 1135. 
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ruling is inconvenient and can lead to uncertainty, but that cannot justify an 
interpretation, which the Hague Rules 1924 cannot bear. Therefore, he felt 
obliged to stick to the original purpose and structure of the Hague Rules 
192491 . 
Mummery, L.J., concurred with the result of Phillips, L.J .. In addition, 
Hirst, LJ. concurred that this appeal should be dismissed, but would do so on 
precisely the same grounds as those adopted by Colman, J., namely, applying 
the approach now adopted by the American, Canadian, Australian, French and 
Dutch courts, and in effect treating the Hague Rules 1924 as having the same 
effect as the Hague-Visby Rules 196892. Consequently, the majority in the 
Court of Appeal did not agree with the reasoning of Colman, J. in the original 
trial. 
The court in the original trial reached its decision by following other 
foreign decisions since the Hague Rules 1924 do not deal with the subject of 
containerisation. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal refused to follow the 
court in the original trial and stuck with the original purpose of the Hague 
Rules 1924. Consequently, it seems obvious that although the English 
domestic law did not influence the judges in the original trial and on appeal, 
91 Supra, at 114l. Chuah criticized the ruling of Phillips, L.J. by stating that: 
"In a world of documentary sales, this ruling seems somewhat constructive. It 
might be suggested that the court's insistence on proof of contents in 
containers detracts from the sanctity of the bill of lading. After all 
intenlational commercial nomlS are such that a document \\hich is confom1ing 
on its face should be accepted with no questions asked". Jason C.T. Chuah, 
"Carriage of Goods By Sea-Hague Rules-Meaning of 'Package' or 'Unit''', 
(1997) 22 Student L. Re\'. 57. 
<)2 Supra, at 1142-43. Hirst. L.J. also stated that he fully recogni/es the 
shortcomings of this approach as demonstrated by Phillips, L.J., but in his 
jU<.igmcnt, these arc outwcighed by thc need for intemationalunifonnity. 
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conflicts of interpretation arose. Thus, the influence of domestic law in 
interpreting uniform rules might explain some conflicts of interpretations, but 
it does not go far enough to justify various conflicts, which appear in spite of 
the recognition of the international character of the uniform rules. 
5.2.4. The Difference Between Common Law Courts and Civil 
Law Courts 
The legal technique of the civil law courts differs radically from that of 
the common law courts. When a civil law judge is faced with deciding a case, 
he or she may tum immediately to the code, and then to the authoritative 
interpretations, which have been placed thereon by different commentators. 
The courts' decisions are usually of little or no weight to such judge. A 
common law judge, on the other hand, usually gives more weight to 
precedents, and ignores the opinion of the commentators. In other words, a 
common law court gives more weight to precedents when interpreting the law 
before it, while a civil law court gives more weight to academic literature. 
Some writers93 , in consequence, suggest that conflicts of interpretations in 
international uniform rules arise because common law courts approach a 
problem in a different way than civil law courts94 . Beutel95 , for example, 
93 See Frederick K. Beutel, "The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting 
the N.I.L.-The Civil Law Analogy", (1931) 6 Tul. L. Rev. 1; Mann, supra note 
23, at 278-91; Robert F. Blomquist, "The Proposed Uniform Law on 
International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes: A Discussion of Some 
Special and General Problems Reflected in the Form and Content, Choice of 
Law, and Judicial Interpretation Articles", (1979) 9 Cal. W. In1'l. L.J. 30 at 67; 
RJ .C. Munday, "The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions", 
(1978) 27 In1'I. Compo L.Q. 450 at 458; Peacock, supra note 7~, at 1000. . 
94 It should be noted that this argument and the argument In the prevIous 
section, which says that conflicts of interpretations arise because of the impact 
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explains the conflicts between common law courts and civil law courts in 
detail. On the one hand, common law courts decide a case by depending on 
precedents, ignoring the plain meaning and purpose of the uniform rules as a 
whole, and this leads to conflicts of interpretations96. On the other hand, civil 
law courts decide a case by using the provisions of the uniform rules as a 
starting point. In this situation, some civil law courts adopt strict legal 
constructions of the terms of the uniform rules, while other civil law courts 
adopt a broad dictionary meaning of the terms of the uniform rules, and this 
leads to conflicts of interpretations. 
The difference in interpreting the uniform rules between common law 
courts and civil law courts, however, is an inadequate argument to explain 
why conflicts of interpretations arise. This argument does not explain why 
there are conflicts of interpretations among the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, for example, although these are common law countries, or 
between France and Germany, for example, although the latter are civil law 
countries. This is explained below under the "fair opportunity" doctrine. 
of domestic law, could be categorised under one point, w~ich is ~onflicts of 
interpretations arise because of the different methods by whIch natIonal courts 
interpret uniform rules. 
95 Supra, at 6-9. . . 
96 See also Gutteridge, Comparative Law, (1946) at 109; WIlham M. Hargest, 
"Keeping the Uniform State Laws Uniform", (1927) 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 178 at 
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5.2.4.1. The Difference Between Common La,,, Courts and 
Civil Law Courts: The "Fair Opportunity" Example 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the "fair opportunity" doctrine is 
the creation of the United States Circuit Courts97 • This doctrine has ne\'er been 
adopted in any other common law country. For example, the Australian court 
in P.s. Chellaram & Co. Ltd. v. China Ocean Shipping Co. 98 refused to follow 
the fair opportunity doctrine99 . Carruthers, J. did not find it necessary to make 
any decision about it. The doctrine also was not considered on appeal loo. 
Davies and DickeylOI argued that as the doctrine is a "judicial invention", 
there is no reason to suppose that it should be adopted in Australia. 
In addition, in 1959, the Canadian Supreme Court in Anticosti Shipping 
Company v. Via/c[{r St- Amand l02 addressed the possibility of requiring the 
carrier to notify the shipper of the opportunity to make excess value 
declaration. The bill oflading, in this case, had given the shipper no clue of his 
right to declare a higher value. In fact, the carrier had lost the bill of lading, 
and never delivered it to the shipper. The Court nevertheless applied the 
package and unit limitation of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924. where it 
stated that: 
The limitation is clearly for the benefit of carriers by water, dictated by 
considerations of important policy. I see no ground for implying any 
duty on the part of the carrier to bring the fact of li~itation .to the 
notice of a shipper or in any other respect to concern hImself WIth the 
requirement which the statute makes equally apparent to both 
97 Supra, at 98. 
98 [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 413. 
99 Id, at ..+28. 
100 [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. "+93. _ 
101 Martin Dayies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law, (2d ed., 1(9)) at :W I. 
102 [1959] 1 Lloyd's Rep, .~52 at ~58, 
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pa~ies .... The responsibi~ity for seeing that the value of the thing 
shIpped IS declared and Inserted on the bill is on the shipper and any 
consequential hardship must be charged against his own failure to 
respect that requirement 103. 
Although this case was before the appearance of the fair opportunity doctrine 
in the United States COGSA cases, it indicates that the Canadian courts 
refused to apply the fair opportunity doctrine. 
Several commentators also assert that the "fair opportunity" doctrine is 
not followed in any other country. Tadros, for example, states that foreign 
courts do not even acknowledge that such a doctrine exists l04 . Likewise, 
Tetley observes that the "fair opportunity" doctrine has not been raised in 
nations which have adopted the Hague-Visby Rules or in countries (usually 
civil law jurisdictions) where the courts are bound by statute interpretation 
first and are much more reluctant to legislate judiciallylO5. 
The "fair opportunity" doctrine is just one example of the conflicts of 
interpretations among the common law countries. There are many other 
conflicts among such countries, such as defining the term "package" in 
relation to containers 106. The different methods of interpretation between 
common law courts and civil law courts might explain some conflicts of 
interpretations of uniform rules, but still there are conflicts of interpretations 
among common law courts themselves, or among civil law courts themselves. 
Therefore, the idea that common law courts approach a problem in a different 
103 This rule was followed in Sept lles Express Inc. v. Tremblay, [1964] Ex. 
C.R. 213 at 219. 
104 Tadros, supra note 19, at 36. See also McCormack, supra note 21, at 1529. 
105 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (3rd ed., 1988) at 887. 
106 Compare, for example, the ~ng"ish case: Th~ ~iver Gurara, [1997] W.L.R. 
1128, with the United States ClrcUlt Courts decIsIons. 
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way than a civil law court is not a completely satisfactory argument to explain 
why conflicts of interpretations arise. 
5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to identify, in the field of uniform rules that 
relate to carriage of goods by sea, why conflicts of interpretations arise. The 
existence of conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules regarding carriage of 
goods by sea and in general is well recognised by many writers, "'here they 
offer different suggestions in relation to the question of why conflicts of 
interpretations arise. Some suggest that the imprecise drafting of uniform rules 
creates the conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules. Such imprecise 
drafting would surely contribute in creating conflicts of interpretations among 
the national courts, but would not cover all kinds of conflicts. This suggestion 
offers no help in identifying the conflicts of interpretations that appear when 
the provisions of the uniform rules are clear. On the other hand, others suggest 
that conflicts of interpretations arise because of the various methods by which 
countries implement the uniforn1 rules. Such methods not only create textual 
variations but also lead the judges to lose sight of the international character of 
the uniform rules. However. conflicts may arise in spite of adopting the 
uniform nIles in their original text. and in spite of recognising the international 
character of the uniforn1 rules. Of those who suggest howe,'er, that the impact 
of domestic law create conflicts of interpretations, do not explain why 
conflicts of interpretations arise when the national courts interpret the uni f01111 
rules by depending on the intcmational character of the unif01111 rules. E\en 
those \\'ho suggest that common-law countries would interpret the unif01111 
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rules in a different manner than civil-law countries do not recognise that there 
are also conflicts among the common-law countries themselves, or among the 
civil-law countries themselves. Reviewing the various suggestions and looking 
at how these suggestions identify the problem of conflicts of interpretations 
reveals that each suggestion plays its part in explaining why conflicts of 
interpretations arise. Accordingly, none of these suggestions has a completely 
satisfactory explanation of why conflicts of interpretations arise. 
The list of instances, which illustrate why conflicts of interpretations 
anse, could be continued for many pages and with reference to various 
subjects other than the subject of containerisation in the field of caniage of 
goods by sea. A further enumeration of examples would add nothing to the 
clarification of the real problem: Could conflicts of interpretations by handled? 
The next chapter of this thesis clarifies that the failure to study foreign law is a 
significant factor in conflicts of interpretations because courts interpret 
uniform rules independently, without regarding foreign decisions. 
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CHAPTER VI: ARE CO:\FLICTS OF I:\TERPRETA TIO:\S OF 
UNIFORM RULES AVOIDABLE? 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined and eyaluated the suggestions of 
different writers on why conflicts of interpretations arise in relation to 
international uniform rules. In general, these writers imply that conflicts of 
interpretations are avoidable, but only Mann I argues that such conflicts are 
unavoidable. Mann argues that conflicts of interpretations of unifonn rules are 
almost certain to arise. He states that the longer unifonn rules are in force the 
more conflicts of interpretations arise. He supports his argument by two 
points, which he believes are significant in conflicts of interpretations: First, 
the text of uni form rules may differ from one country to another, and this leads 
to conflicts of interpretations. In other words, conflicts of interpretations arise 
because of the different methods by which countries incorporate unifonn rules 
into their domestic law. Second, conflicts of interpretations arise due to the 
method of interpreting uniforn1 rules, which differ from one country to 
another. Mann's argument implies a rational point: it is unrealistic for anyone 
to argue that conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules could be eliminated 
completely2. Nevertheless, that does not mean that conflicts of interpretations 
could not be reduced signi ficantly. Our argument, therefore, is that the abmc 
I F.A. l\lann, "Unifonn Statutes in Fnglish Law", (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 376 at 
~()O-91. ~ It should be noted that in 19-16, \ lann stated that reducing conflicts of 
interpretations should be welcomed. F .A. \ lann, "The Interpretation of 
Uni fOlln Statutes". (l9-l()) ()~ L. Q. R. 2 ~8 at ~91 . 
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two conflicts that Mann suggests and even other kinds of conflicts could be 
handled. 
The writers that argue that conflicts of interpretations are avoidable do 
not provide a detailed discussion on how such conflicts could be handled. 
Instead, they only provide a brief proposition on how such conflicts could be 
handled3. This chapter, on the other hand, examines and analyses how 
conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules could be handled. In so doing, this 
chapter clarifies that conflicts of interpretations can be reduced significantly if 
the national courts are obliged to consider foreign decisions. In fact, several 
writers recognise the value of considering foreign decisions in handling 
conflicts of interpretations4• However, these writers do not provide a detailed 
discussion on how such consideration is significant in reducing conflicts of 
interpretations. 
The methodology of this chapter is to examine the suggestions of the 
different writers, which mentioned in the previous chapter, on why conflicts of 
interpretations of uniform rules arise. By this means, this chapter explains how 
such conflicts could be avoided. It examines the United States Circuit Courts' 
3 These propositions are going to be discussed in the next chapter, infra, at 
177-204. 
4 See Jacob W.F. Sundberg, "A Uniform Interpretation of Uniform Law", 
(1966) 10 Scandinavian Stud. L. 219 at 237; Francesco Berlingieri, 
"Uniformity in Maritime Law and Implementation of International 
Conventions", (1987) 18 J.M.L.C. 317 at 317, 346 and 350; R.J.C. Munday, 
"The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions", (1978) 27 Int'I. 
Compo L.Q. 450 at 458-59; Giles, Uniform Commercial La}\', (1970) at 194; 
Erling Selvig, Unit Limitation of Carrier's Liability, (1961) at 4; Honnold, 
Uniform Law For International Sales ,~nder the 1980 U.nited Nations 
Convention, (1999) at 95-98; F.A. Mann, Documentary CredIts and Bretton 
Woods", (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 526 at 528; Mann, supra note 1, at 384-5. 
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decisions and some other countries' decisions, in relation to the problem of 
containerisation, for proving the significance of considering foreign decisions 
in reducing conflicts of interpretations. In doing so, this chapter clarifies how 
the national courts should consider foreign decisions. It also explains the 
methods and principles of interpretations, which were considered by these 
cases. 
6.2. Are Conflicts of Interpretations Avoidable? 
6.2.1. Are Conflicts of Interpretations That Arise Through the 
Differences in the Interpretation of the Terms of the Uniform 
Rules Avoidable? 
Although adroit drafting of international uniform rules can, to some 
extent, reduce conflicts of interpretations, it surely cannot be a comprehensive 
solution for achieving international uniform interpretations of such rules. In 
reality, drafting international uniform rules may contain ambiguous and 
confusing terms and even sentences, and it sometimes may not contain of 
provisions that deal with a specific problemS. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Sundberg suggests that conflicts of interpretations arise because the 
tenlls of uniform rules often have different connotations in the different legal 
systems6. Sundberg observes that we need to find a solution to check and 
balance such conflicts of interpretations. While this observation clearly shows 
that Sundberg suggests that such conflicts are avoidable, he does not pro\'ide a 
5 The best example is the Hague Rules 192 .. L \\'hich do not contain any 
provisions that deal with containerisation. 
(1 See the fifth chapkr, supr(/, at 97. Jacob \V.F. Sundherg. ".\ Uniform 
Interpretation of Unifonn Law", (I <)(16) 1 () Scandinavian Stud. L. 21 <) at 221. 
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detailed discussion on how the divergence could be handled. This section. 
therefore, considers the conflicts that arise through the interpretations of the 
terms of the uniform rules, and how they could be handled. 
Any term in the unifonn rules could be construed in different \\ays in 
the different legal systems, and this would lead to conflicts of interpretations. 
The term "package", for example, under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 
was construed in different ways in different legal systems, and this has lead to 
conflicts of interpretations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United 
States Circuit Courts decisions are inconsistent with each other in relation to 
whether a container constitutes a package or its contents constitute packages7. 
In the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the United States Circuit Courts followed the 
United States Second Circuit's decision, Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. AlIlerican Export 
Lines8, in defining the tenn "package" in relation to containers. Although the 
United States Circuit Courts followed the latter decision, there are still 
conflicts of interpretations in some specific points. For example. conflicts of 
interpretations arose in relation to the description of the container's contents in 
the bill of lading. In many cases, the Circuit Courts did not consider each other 
decisions since they are not obliged to do so, and therefore, the result was 
inconsistent decisions. This section argues that these conflicts of 
interpretations could be reduced significantly if the United States Circuit 
Courts \\'ere obliged to consider each other's decisions. In considering other 
Circuit Courts' decisions, the Circuit Courts should put an effort in examining 
7 Sec the fifth chapter. supra. at 106-1 I·+. 
~ ()36 I .2d 807 {~d Cif. 1981). 
and evaluating these decisions carefully. The brief and the careless citation of 
such decisions might lead, in many cases, to a new round of conflicts of 
interpretations, and in consequence, to inconsistent decisions. Thus, the key 
point in this context is that the consideration of other Circuit Courts' decisions 
might not reduce conflicts of interpretations if the Circuit Courts did not 
examine other Circuit Courts' decisions carefully. 
6.2.1.1. The Differences in the Interpretation of the Terms of 
the Uniform Rules: The "Package" Example 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the United States Circuit 
Courts are not obliged to consider each other's decisions9 . This impliedly 
suggests that each Circuit Court considers other Circuit Courts decisions as 
being foreign decisions. In many cases, however, the Circuit Courts did 
consider each other's decisions. The careful and the detailed examination of 
other Circuit Courts' decisions was a crucial point in achieving consistent 
decisions among these Circuit Courts. For example, in 1985, in Hayes-Leger 
Associates, Inc. )'. MIV Oriental Knight JO , five containers worth of woven 
baskets and rattan goods, which were v .. Tapped and tied into various bundles 
before packing them into the containers, were damaged. The district court held 
that the contents of the containers were packages rather than the containers 
themselves 11. On appeaL the Eleventh Circuit, in considering other Circuit 
Court's decision, Allstale Insurance Co. v. II/\'crsiollcs S(I1'ieras /mpa rC(l , 
l) See the seventh chapter. infra. at 225. 
10 765 F.2d 1 076 (11th Cir. 1985). 
II Id, at 1078. 
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C.A. 12, noted that the task of defining the term "package" falls on the courts 
since there is no legislative definition of such term 13. In defining the term 
"package" in relation to containers, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Fifth 
Circuit in the latter case followed the rule of the Second Circuit in Mitsui & 
Co. Ltd. v. American Export Lines l4 • In the latter case, the Second Circuit 
argued that the container would not be considered as a package as long as the 
bill of lading disclosed the number of packages inside such container. The 
Eleventh Circuit's consideration of the former Circuit Courts' decisions lead it 
to question the fact that if the bill of lading did not disclose the number of 
packages inside the container, then would the container itself be the package. 
The Eleventh Circuit evaluated the rule of the Second Circuit in Bin/aden BSB 
Landscaping v. M. V. Nedlloyd Rotterdam 15 in answering the latter question. In 
so doing, the Eleventh Circuit summarised the principles of the latter case in 
defining the term "package", where it stated that: 
(1) when a bill of lading discloses the number of COGSA packages in 
a container, the liability limitation of section 4(5) applies to those 
packages; but (2) when a bill of lading lists the number of containers as 
the number of packages, and fails to disclose the number of COGSA 
packages within each container, the liability limitation of section 4(5) 
applies to the containers themselves l6 . 
12 646 F.2d 169 (5th Cif. 1981). 
\3 Supra, at 1079. 
14 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981). 
15 759 F.2d 1006 (2d Cif. 1985). 
16 Supra, at 1080. 
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The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the latter two rules of the Second 
Circuit represent a reasonable method for applying Article -+( 5) to 
containerisation 17. 
The Eleventh Circuit examined the five bills of lading in the Hayes-
Leger case. The first bill of lading listed the number of packages as "T\\o 
Thousand Six Hundred Forty One Packages". The goods were described as 
"2,641 Packages Woven Baskets and Rattan Furniture". The second bill of 
lading listed the number of packages as "One Container Only". The goods 
were described as "One Container Said to Contain: 3,542 Packages Woven 
Baskets and Rattan Furniture". The other three bills of lading contained 
listings and descriptions identical to those in the first bill of lading, except for 
the numbers. The Eleventh Circuit argued that the second bill of lading listed 
"One Container Only", and did not disclose to the carrier the number of 
packages within the container. The description of goods in the bill of lading as 
3542 packages of baskets and furniture was insufficient to indicate to the 
carrier that the goods were packaged. The Eleventh Circuit followed the rule 
of the Bill/adell case above. The Second Circuit in the latter case stated that if 
the shipper intends to rely on the description of goods in the bill of lading to 
disclose to the carrier the number of packages in a container, such description 
must indicate the number of items qualified as packages, such as bundles 
cartons or the like l8 . Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit held that the shipment 
must he treated as one of goods not shipped in packages. It stated that the 
17 Supra, at 1080. 
I ~ Supra, at 1081. 
"customary freight unit" limitation, not the package limitation, applies on such 
shipment, and in consequence remanded the case to the district court to decide 
what is the "customary freight unit" for such shipment l9 . On the other hand. 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the other bills of lading did disclose the number 
of packages, and consequently the contents, not the containers, were packages. 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the decision of the district court in the 
first, third, fourth and fifth bills of lading, and reversed the decision in relation 
to the second bill of lading20 . 
The Eleventh Circuit above depended on other Circuit Courts' 
decisions in reaching its decision. It examined and analysed other Circuit 
Courts' decisions carefully. This careful examination helped the Eleventh 
Circuit to formulate questions in relation to how to provide a gcneral rule for 
solving the problem of defining the term "package" in regard to containers. 
The Eleventh Circuit was cautious in adopting a general rule, which was not in 
conflict with other Circuit Courts' decisions. The Eleventh Circuit's sensible 
way of considering other Circuit Courts' decisions lead it to be consistent with 
these courts. It could be argued, therefore, that such consideration impl iedly 
suggests that the Eleventh Circuit was concerned with reaching a decision that 
was consistent with other Circuit Courts' decisions. In fact, the Eleventh 
Circuit was concerned with achic\ing uniform decisions, where it stated that: 
As the Second Circuit noted, the rules comport with the 1968 Brussels 
Protocol and provide much-needed certainty ... Uniformity is also an 
important consideration. since vessels often tra\'('1 between different 
19 :,,'''pro, at 1 081. 
~() Supra, at 1 08~. 
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jurisdictions. We therefore adopt the rules announced by the Sc:cond 
Circuit in Binladen BSB Landscaping21 • 
The conclusion of the Hayes-Leger case above is that the United States 
Circuit Courts might reach uniform decisions if every Circuit Court considered 
other Circuit Courts' decisions. In many cases, however, the Circuit Courts 
considered other Circuit Courts' decisions, but did not reach a unifonn 
interpretation in defining the term "package" in relation to containers. In many 
cases, indeed, the Circuit Courts failed to understand and misinterpreted other 
Circuit Courts' decisions. Even, in some situations, the Circuit Courts 
misinterpreted their own precedents. The main reason behind this might be the 
poor and the brief examination or evaluation of such decisions. In 1992, for 
example, in Monica Textile Corporation v. SS Tana 22 , the Second Circuit 
misinterpreted its own precedents and even other Circuit Courts' decisions, 
where sllch misinterpretation has lead to inconsistent decisions. In this case, a 
shipment of 76 bales of cotton cloth, loaded into a container, which was 
stuffed and sealed by the shipper, was damaged. The "Description of Goods" 
column of the bill of lading stated that the shipment consisted of 76 bales. The 
"Number of Packages" column contained the number "1". The line labelled 
"Total Number of Packages or Units in \\' ords" contained the word "One". 
The district court ["Monica I"] initially held that where the bill of lading 
discloses the number of units as the contents of the container, those units 
21 Supra. at 1 OSO. 
22 l»)~ F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 19(2). 
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constitute packages23. However, the district court ["Monica II"] reversed itself 
and held that the container rather than its contents was the package24. The 
district court reversed itself on the basis of the Second Circuit decision in 
Seguros Illimani S.A. v. MIV Popi p25, which held that for COGSA purposes 
the number of packages specified in the "Number of Packages" column of the 
bill of lading is generally controlling. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed 
its own precedents in relation to the development of defining the term 
"package" regarding containers. In so doing, the Second Circuit acknowledged 
that the definition of the term package in relation to containers depends on 
what the bill of lading discloses. Thus, its method of defining the term 
"package" is similar to the Eleventh Circuit's method in the Hayes-Leger case 
above. In fact, the Second Circuit went on to state that its rule in the Mitsui 
case, which mentioned above, has been followed by other Circuit Courts. It 
even went further and quoted the Hayes-Leger case, where the Eleventh 
Circuit in the latter case stated that, "the Mitsui-Bin/aden approach seems to 
be gaining favour in the rest of the country [the United States],,26. 
The Second Circuit, in the Monica case, followed its own rule in the 
Mitsui case, which states that where the bill of lading discloses the contents of 
the container, the container is not the package. The Second Circuit also 
23 Monica Textile C01poration v. s.s. Tana, 731 F. Supp. 124 at 127 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) [ "Monica I"]. 
24 Monica Textile Corporation v. s.s. Tana, 765 F. Supp. 1194 at 1195-96 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ["Monica II"]. 
25 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991). This case involved 600 separate steel strapped 
bundles, each containing 15 tin ingots. The issue therefore was whether there 
were 600 packages or 9000 (600 X 15) packages. 
26 Supra, at 639. 
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considered its own precedent rule in Smythgreyhound \', .\! l' Eurygenesr . 
where it stated that when the bill of lading refers to both containers and other 
unites susceptible of being COGSA packages, it is inherently ambiguous. Such 
ambiguity should be resolved against the carrier, and in consequence, the 
container would not be considered as a package28 . Therefore, the Second 
Circuit noted that the bill of lading, in the Monica case, is ambiguous since 
such bill refers to both container and the 76 bales as being packages. The 
Second Circuit, accordingly, held that the decision of the district court in 
"Monica I" was correct, and hence, "Monica II" was reversed. 
Superficially, it might appear from the above discussion that the 
Second Circuit, in the Monica case, was concerned with achieving uniform 
interpretation in defining the term "package" in relation to containers among 
the United States Circuit Courts, but this was not the case. The Second Circuit, 
in the Monica case, argued that the Seguros case above did not purport to 
apply to containers, and the district court's application of the Seguros case rule 
to the container context was erroneous29 . The Second Circuit decided that: 
Notwithstanding the insertion in the number-of-packages column(s) of 
the bill of lading of a number reflecting the number of containers, 
where the bill of lading discloses on its face what is inside the 
container(s) and those contents may reasonably be considered COGSA 
packages, the latter, not the container( s). are the COGSA packagesJo . 
This means that the Second Circuit in this case refused to consider the 
"Number of Packages" column as a starting point in determining the number 
27 666 F,~d 7..f6 at 75~ l~d Cir. 1981). 
2R Slipra. at ()..f2, 
19 ' 6'J1' 
- ,\111'1'(/. at _h'l, 
_'0 Slipra. at ()..f 1, 
1..f 1 
of packages as the Eleventh Circuit in the Hayes-Leger case did. The Second 
Circuit argued that its precedent, the Binladen case, accorded little or no 
weight to the number in the "Number of Packages" column31 . Howe\er, in the 
latter case, the Second Circuit, in fact, did depend on the "Number of 
Packages" column, as discussed above in the Hayes-Leger case. The Second 
Circuit, in the Monica case, only quoted references showing the benefit of the 
Mitsui-Binladen approach. It did not examine the Binladen case at all32 . It 
seems obvious, therefore, that the Second Circuit misunderstood the rule of its 
own precedent in the Binladen case. The Second Circuit not only 
misinterpreted its own precedent but also other Circuit Courts' decisions. It 
quoted the Hayes-Leger case, for example, without evaluating it, where the 
Eleventh Circuit in the latter case reached a decision that was inconsistent with 
the decision of the present case. 
The Second Circuit, in the Monica case, cited and quoted its own 
precedent and other Circuit Courts' decisions without e\'aluating such 
decisions carefully. Its brief reference to such decisions, lead it to reach a 
sloppy decision, which was in conflict with these decisions. It is interesting to 
note, on the other hand, that the Second Circuit, in the Monica case, stated 
that, "the Mitsui-Binladen approach is consistent with the position of the 
intenlational communit\,,,~3. \\'hile this statement impliedly suggests that the 
Second Circuit \\'as concerned with reaching international uniform decisions, 
~ I Supra, at ()4(), 
32 Supra, at 6Jl)-40. 
33 Supra, at ()40. Quoting E. Fl~lm 8: 
(7th cd. 1991) ~ 167, at 16-34. 
G. Raduaz/o. Bel/ce/ict 01/ Admiral(v , 
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such statement could not by itself assist the Second Circuit to reach a decision 
that does not conflict with other Circuit Courts' decisions. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the above Hayes-Leger case and the .\Ionica 
case were followed by various Circuit Courts. Although these Circuit Courts 
were concerned with reaching a uniform interpretation in defining the term 
"package" in relation to containers, their brief citation of other Circuit Courts' 
decisions and their unawareness of the conflicts of interpretations among these 
decisions, has lead them to reach inconsistent decisions. In 1993, for example, 
in Universal Leaf Tobacco v. Companhia De Navegacao 34 , six containers, 
each held 90-99 cases of tobacco, were damaged and the tobacco cases in five 
other containers were partially damaged. There were eight separate forms of 
bills of lading in all. The "Number of Packages" column in each bill of lading 
listed the number of the containers. The "Description of Goods" column, 
however, in each bill of lading listed the total number of the tobacco cases. 
Furthennore, in the same section in each bill of lading, the identification 
numbers of each container were followed by the number of the tobacco cases 
in each. The Fourth Circuit followed the Second Circuit decision in the 
Afonica case above, and held that each case of tobacco constitutes a package, 
rather than the containers themselves. The Fourth Circuit did not consider any 
other Circuit Court's decisions other than the Second Circuit's decisions. The 
Fourth Circuit examined the Second Circuit's decisions, but did not mention 
the Second Circuit's decision in the Binladen case, which mentioned above, 
J4 993 F.2d -l1.+ at -l16-1 7 {-lth Cir. 1993). See also the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in .-lll p(J('~fic Trading. fllc. v. 1'essel ,\I r Hanjin }'OSIl, 7 F.3d 1427 at 1433 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
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where the latter case contradicts with the Monica decision. It seems that the 
Fourth Circuit assumed that there are no conflicts of interpretations among the 
Second Circuit's decisions. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, decided that: 
In adopting the Second Circuit's rule [the Mitsui-Monica approach] in 
its entirety, we are influenced in no small part by a desire to fashion a 
unifonn body of law in this area35 . 
While the effort of the Fourth Circuit in finding a general rule by itself 
constituted a good step towards achieving unifonn decisions, the above 
statement would surely lead to another round of uncertainty in the area of 
defining the tenn "package" in relation to containers. 
On the other hand, in 2001, in Fishman & Tobin, Inc. 1'. Tropical 
Shipping & Construction Co., Ltd. 36 , the "Number of Packages" column in the 
bill of lading listed the container size "1 X 40". The "Description of Goods" 
column stated that the shipment consisted of "5000 Units Men's Suits". The 
Eleventh Circuit followed its own precedent, the Hayes-Leger case above, and 
argued that the number of packages specified in the "Number of Packages" 
column of the bill of lading is the starting point in determining the number of 
packages. Since the "Number of Packages" column only listed the size of the 
container, the Eleventh Circuit looked beyond the bill of lading to the 
documents provided by the shipper to detennine the number of packages. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that such documents \\'ere insufficient to determine that 
the 5000 suits were the packages, and therefore the container itself was the 
package. The Eleventh Circuit evaluated the development of defining the term 
,-
-:-- Supra, at .+ 1 7. 
,I() (11th Cif. 2001). from the Internet: 
http://a\\s.find/aw.comlJ 1 th 99'+37)opn.html (accessed: :0/6/2001). 
"package" in relation to containers. In so doing, it referred to other Circuit 
Courts' decisions. The Eleventh Circuit considered the decision of the Second 
Circuit in the Monica case above, but such consideration \\as so brief that it 
added very little to its argument. The Eleventh Circuit did not recognise that 
the Monica decision was inconsistent with its own precedent in the Hayes-
Leger case above. In other words, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider that 
the Monica case refused to consider the "Number of Packages" column as a 
starting point in determining the number of packages as the Eleventh Circuit in 
the Hayes-Leger case did. In its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that: 
It is also our hope that by providing a bright-line rule now, such 
conflicts [the conflicts of defining the term "package in relation to 
containers] may be avoided in the future and shippers and carriers alike 
will be on notice as to how to proceed. 
Although the above statement is so sensible if it applies in relation to the 
Eleventh Circuit's decision in the Monica case, such statement is not adequate 
to apply to its decision in the present case since it did not examine and analyse 
other Circuit Courts' decisions carefully. 
The above Eleventh Circuit in the Fishman case and the Fourth Circuit 
in the Universal Leaf case were concerned with reaching uniform decisions 
among the Circuit Courts, and in consequence, to put an end to the conflicts of 
interpretations in the area of defining the term "package" in relation to 
containers. These Circuit Courts were convinced that their ruling was adequate 
for fashioning a unifornl body of law in this area. Each of them, however, did 
not recognise that their ruling was in conflict with other Circuit Courts' 
decisions. Their ruling, therefore, added very little to the conflicts of 
intcrprl'tations of defining the term "package" in relation to containers. 
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Consequently, it could be argued that these Circuit Courts' consideration of 
reaching unifonn decisions may not be achieved as long as thev do not 
examine and evaluate each other's decisions sensibly. 
The effort of the United States Circuit Courts of achieving unifonn 
decisions in defining the tenn "package" in relation to containers is the first 
step toward reaching such unifonnity. The next step is to consider each other's 
decisions in order to reach such unifonnity. While the consideration of each 
other's decisions was achieved in different levels, such consideration was, in 
many cases, very brief and careless, where this has lead to more conflicts of 
interpretations. However, obliging these Circuit Courts to consider each 
other's decisions may, at least, guide these courts to be careful and sensible in 
considering other decisions. This careful and sensible consideration may lead 
these courts to reach unifonn interpretation of the definition of the tenn 
"package" in relation to containers. Consequently, the obligation of 
considering foreign decisions might make the national courts reach the same 
results in spite of the fact that the tenns of the unifonn rules have different 
connotations in the different legal systems. Thus, conflicts of interpretations 
could be reduced significantly. 
6.2.2. Are Conflicts of Interpretations That Arise Through the 
Different Methods By \Yhich Countries Incorporate l'niform 
Rules Avoidable? 
The method of implementing international unifonn mles differs from 
one country to another. \\,hile some countries adopt the unifornl rules as they 
stand, others rc-cnact them in a special domestic legislation. :\s mentioned in 
1-+6 
the previous chapter, some writers suggest that conflicts of interpretations 
arise because of the various methods by which countries incorporate unifonn 
rules into their domestic law37• Some of these writers suggest that these 
different methods lead to textual variations of the unifonn rules among the 
. . 38 h·l h vanous countnes ,w 1 e ot ers suggest that such methods lead to losing sight 
of the international character of the uniform rules39. Although some of these 
writers argue that these conflicts of interpretations are avoidable 40, others do 
not explain whether such conflicts are avoidable or not41 • However, those who 
argue that such conflicts are avoidable do not provide any detailed explanation 
on how the divergence could be avoided. The question of how these conflicts 
could be handled, therefore, requires more than a brief explanation. 
An example of the conflicts of interpretations that arise when the 
uniform rules are incorporated by various methods into the countries' 
domestic law is the incorporation of the term "unit" under Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924. Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 states that: 
37 See the fifth chapter, supra at 103. 
38 See Erling Selvig, Unit Limitation of Carrier's Liability, (1961) at 4; 
Sundberg, supra note 6, at 224; C.H. Schreuer, "The Interpretation of Treaties 
by Domestic Courts", (1971) 45 Brit. Y.B. Int'I. L. 255 at 257. and. 2~4-5; 
Mann, supra note 2, at 289; Mann, supra note 1, at 389-90; I.M. SmclaIr, ~he 
Principles of Treaty Interpretation and Their Application by the EnglIsh 
Courts", (1963) 12 Int'I. Compo L.Q. 508 at 530-4, 549-51; Athanassios 
Yiannopoulos, Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading, (1962) at 181-2. 
39 See Giles, Uniform Commercial Law, (1970) at 58. 
40 See Giles, Id, at 193-94. See also Selvig and Sundberg, supra note 38. 
41 See Sinclair. Schreuer and Yiannopoulos, supra note 38. 
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Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable 
for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount 
exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or unit . .. 42. 
As mentioned in the fourth chapter, Article 4(5) does not define the term 
"unit", and there is no provision in these Rules that define the latter term43. 
The term "unit" is somewhat ambiguous since it may be construed as 
'shipping unit', or it may mean the 'freight unit'. In 1936, the United States 
Congress passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)44, which 
adopted, with minor alterations, the Hague Rules 1924. The following year, 
29th of June 1937, the United States ratified the Hague Rules 192445. One of 
the minor alterations that have been made by the United States is that the term 
"unit" under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 was changed into 
"customary freight unit". On the other hand, other countries, such as the 
United Kingdom and Canada, when adopted the Hague Rules 1924, did not 
change the term "unit" under Article 4(5). These latter countries defined the 
term "unit" as being a shipping unit. The change in defining the term "unit" by 
which the United States incorporate the Hague Rules 1924, therefore, has 
created conflicts of interpretations since other countries incorporated the latter 
Rules without changing the term "unit". 
42 (emphasis added). See John F. Wilson and Charles Debattista, World 
Shipping Laws: International Conventions v. Carriage by Sea, V/l/CONV-
V/6/CONV, (October 1980) at 3. 
43 See the fourth chapter, supra, at 88. 
44 The United States Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGSA 1936), 46 United 
States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1300-1315, from the Internet: 
http://www.cargolaw.comlco.gsa.html (accessed: 20/5/200.1). , 
45 For a full detailed diSCUSSIOn on the appearance of Umted States COGS A, 
see Joseph C. Sweeney, "'The Prism of COGS A", (1999) 30 1.M.L.e. 543. 
148 
The alteration of defining the tenn "unit" by the United States is not 
only an example to the conflicts of interpretations that arise through the textual 
variations but also to the conflicts that arise through losing sight of the 
international character of the unifonn rules. When the United States re-enacted 
the Hague Rules 1924 in COGSA, the United States Department of State 
explained that the differences between the Hague Rules 1924 and COGSA 
were: 
.. .intended primarily (l) to clarify provisions in the [Hague Rules] 
which may be of uncertain meaning thereby avoiding expensive 
litigation in the United States for purposes of interpretation and (2) to 
co-ordinate [COGSA] with other legislation of the United States46. 
In addition, the Congress viewed most of the changes as clarifications47. The 
United States attached an "understanding" to its ratification of the Hague 
Rules 1924, which requires any conflicts between the Hague Rules and 
COGSA to be resolved in favour of the latter48. Therefore, although the Hague 
Rules 1924 are the "supreme law of the land,,49 under the Constitution, it has 
no effect when it conflicts with COGSA. Consequently, this means that the 
United States courts should construe the term "unit" as a "customary freight 
unit". In fact, in many cases, the United States Circuit Courts did not recognise 
that the term "customary freight unit" was an alteration to the term "unit" 
under the Hague Rules 1924. These Circuit Courts, therefore, have lost sight 
46 See State Department Memorandum (1937) note 88, 51 Stat. at 274. . 
47 See 1925 Hearings, at 84-85, 115-17, 178-80 (discussing "customary freIght 
unit" as clarification for the Hague Rules' "unit"). 
48 Supra note 46, State Department Memorandum note 30. 
49 Constitution of the United States of America, Art. VI, c1.2, from the 
Internet: http://www.law.comell.edulconstitutionlconstitution.overview.html 
(accessed: 20/5/2001). 
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that COGSA was a re-enactment of international uniform rules, namely the 
Hague Rules 1924. Thus, not even once have ever these Circuit Courts 
mentioned how other countries have construed the term "unit". 
Our argument, in this section, is that conflicts of interpretations that 
arise through the various methods by which countries incorporate uniform 
rules into their domestic law can be reduced significantly if the national courts 
are obliged to look at foreign decisions. In considering foreign decisions, it 
would be better if the national courts put an effort to examine and evaluate 
several countries' decisions. When the national courts, however, examine only 
one country's decisions, the risk of reaching inconsistent decisions with other 
countries' decisions is greater. Thus, the more examination of other countries' 
decisions the better uniformity would be served. 
6.2.2.1. The Different Methods By Which Countries 
Incorporate Uniform Rules: The "Customary Freight Unit" 
Example 
A comparison between how the United States Circuit Courts' decisions 
and the Canadian com1s' decisions defined the term "unit" goes directly to 
prove that the consideration of foreign decisions is a significant factor in 
reducing conflicts of interpretations. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine 
and evaluate both countries' decisions. 
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Although the tenn "unit" \\'as changed to "customary freight unif', 
there is no definition for the latter tenn under the enited States COGSA. In 
1944, in Brazil Oiticica, Ltd. v. MIS. BiUso , Chestnut, J. stated that: 
The history of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 is a very 
interesting one in the field of admiralty law. It \\'as finally passed by 
Congress to promote unifonnity in ocean bills of lading. For many 
years prior thereto efforts had been made in this and other countries to 
achieve such unifonnity .. .In 1924 certain rules (the Hague Rules) 
were adopted by an international convention for the unification of 
certain rules relating to "Ocean Bills of Lading". In them (Art. 4. s.5) 
the parallel limitation of liability clause read: "In an amount exceeding 
100 pounds sterling per package or unit". These Hague mles have 
subsequently been adopted in a number of other countries including 
Great Britain (1925) and the United States (1936). The phraseology of 
the British statute followed the Hague rules with respect to the wording 
of the limitation clause. But it will be noted that in the United States 
Act the phrase "per unit" has been expanded or changed to read "per 
customary freight unit" ... the phraseology finally adopted was intended 
to be more definite than the shorter phrase "per unit" contained in the 
"1 Hague Rules- . 
This statement clearly shows that Chestnut, 1. acknowledged that the United 
States COGS A was the result of an international convention, namely the 
Hague Rules 1924, and that the aim behind COGSA was to promote 
intenlational unifonnity. In other words, Chestnut, 1. recognised the 
intenlational character of the Hague Rules 1924. Although Chestnut, 1. 
acknowledged, in the above statement, that other countries did not change the 
ternl "unit" under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924, he insisted that the 
alteration of the latter telll1 in the llnited States was only for the purpose of 
clarification. Consequently, Chestnut. J. defined the tenn "customary freight 
unit", where he stated that: 
,~() 5) F, Supp. 7St) (1944), 
51 It!, at 782. Quoting K11auth. (}cclIn Bills o.(Lading. (l9~ 7) at 99-110, 
1 ) 1 
... I conclude that the phrase 'customary freight unit' in this context in 
the light of its legislative history, refers to the unit of quantity, weight 
or measurement of the cargo customarily used as the basis for the 
calculation of the freight rate to be charged. Generally in marine 
contracts the word 'freight' is used to denote remuneration or reward 
for carriage of goods by ship, rather than the goods themselves ... 52. 
Thus, according to Chestnut, J., the term "customary freight unit" refers to the 
unit upon which the charge for freight is customarily computed and not to the 
physical shipping unit. 
Most of the United States Circuit Courts followed the above 
definition53, but some Circuit Courts refused to consider such definition, and 
therefore, this has lead to inconsistent decisions. For example, in Isbrandtsen 
Company, Inc. v. United States of America54 , the Second Circuit found that the 
term "customary freight unit" could lead to unreasonable results. In this case, 
the unit was a locomotive and tender which was likewise the unit for the 
freight charge in the flat sum of 1000000 U.S. dollars. There were ten in all of 
these units. The Second Circuit stated that: 
This interpretation may lead to a strange result, for freight on small 
locomotives under twenty-five tons is computed per ton and 
consequently would involve a larger liability than is imposed for the 
more expensive locomotives involved here. But the language of the 
limitation is controlling and applies to the locomotives and tenders 
here by its express terms. Our conclusion accordingly is that 
Isbrandtsen's liability is limited to $500 per unit of locomotive and 
tender, or $5000 in a1l55 . 
52 Supra, at 783. 
53 See, for example, Waterman s.s. Corp. v. U.s. Smelting Refining & Mining, 
155 F.2d 687 at 693 (1946); Freedman and Slater v. M. V. Tofevo, A.M.e. 
1525 at 1538 (1963). 
54 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953). 
55Id, at 286. 
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Consequently, since the Second Circuit applied the S500 limitation on every 
locomotive and tender without calculating the charge for freight, then it seems 
that the court found that it is more appropriate to consider the goods as being 
shipping units. This means that the Second Circuit impliedly refused to apply 
the "customary freight unit"S6, and in consequence, its decision is inconsistent 
with other Circuit Courts decisions, which applied the "customary freight 
unit" as defined in the Brazil case above. 
Several American Circuit Courts also found that the term "customary 
freight unit" is difficult to apply for the limitation purpose. For example, in 
Croft & Scully Co. v. MIV Skulptor Vuchetich S7 , a container loaded with 1755 
cases of soft drinks was damaged. The bill of lading described the container 
and the number of the soft drinks cases. The district court held that the 
container is the package for limitation purpose. On appeal, the Fi fth Circuit 
reversed the district court and held that the contents and not the container must 
be considered for the limitation purpose, but held that the soft drinks were 
goods not shipped in packages and accordingly applied the customary freight 
unit)8. The Fifth Circuit followed the definition of the term "customary freight 
unit" in the Bra::il case above, and stated that the authorities in the United 
States are conclusive that such term refers to the unit upon which the charge 
"(l See also, for example, Catelpillar Overseas, S.A. l'. ,\!arine Transport Inc., 
900 F.~d 714 at 723-4 (4th Cir. 1990). 
57 ()()4 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1(82). 
,,~ II 11 Q 1 
. (. at _l") . 
for freight is computed and not to the physical shipping unit59 . The Fifth 
Circuit stated that: 
From these cases, we deduce that 'customary freight unit' is a question 
of fact that will vary from contract to contract. Of particular 
importance in this as in any contractual dispute, then, is the parties' 
intent, as expressed in the Bill of Lading, applicable tariff, and perhaps 
elsewhere6o . 
In other words, to determine the customary freight unit, we look to the parties' 
intent, applicable tariff, or even elsewhere61 . Thus, the Fifth Circuit stated that 
although the shipper admitted that the freight charge was $2200, computed on 
a flat container rate, we do not know how the parties arrived at that rate. Does 
it depend on the contents, value, weight. custom of the trade, applicable tariffs 
or any other factor? Therefore, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court to determine what the customary freight unit was for the 
shipment of the 1755 cases of soft drinks62 • Consequently, the Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged the difficulty of applying the term "customary freight unit" for 
the limitation purpose63 . It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit was erroneous 
in stating that the United States courts are conclusive in defining the term 
"customary freight unit" as being the unit upon which the charge for freight is 
computed. According to the Isbrandtsen case above and other cases, some 
59 Supra, at 1281-2. 
60 Supra, at 1282. 
61 See also, for example, FiHC Corporation 1'. s.s. Alarjoric Lykes, 851 F.2d 
78 at 80 (2d Cir. 1988); Aetna Ins. Co. 1' . . \liF Lash Italia, 858 F.2d 190 at 193 
(4th Cir. 1988). 
(l~ Supra. at 1282. 
(I.' See also Bin/aden BSB Landscaping \' .. \/. fT. Xcdlloyd Rotterdam, 759 F.2d 
1006 at 101 ()-17 {2d Cir. 1985) (the court held that the container was not a 
packagl" but remanded for a factual determination of \vhether it \\as the 
cllstomary freight unit). 
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American courts have considered the term "customary freight unit" as being 
the physical shipping unit. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision is inconsistent 
with the Second Circuit's decision in the Isbrandtsen case, where the Second 
Circuit applied the term "customary freight unit" as being a shipping unit. 
Since there are inconsistencies and difficulties in applying the term 
"customary freight unit" under the United States cases for the limitation 
purpose, the Canadian cases show how such inconsistencies and difficulties 
could be avoided, and consequently reduce conflicts of interpretations in 
relation to the application of such term. 
Unlike most of the United States Circuit Courts' decisions, the 
Canadian Supreme Court held that the term "unit" under Article -+( 5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924 should be construed as being a shipping unit. In 1959, in 
Anticosti Shipping Company v. Viateur St- AmancfA, the Canadian Supreme 
Court decided that: 
The word 'unit' would, I think, normally applies only to a shipping 
unit, that is a unit of goods, the word 'package' and the context 
generally seem so to limit it. 
The Supreme Court recognised that some cases considered the term "unit" as 
being the unit of the charge for freight. The Supreme Court, however, 
explained that in the present case the bill of lading did not provide any clue as 
to the freight rate unit. The Supreme Court noted that there was no indication, 
for example, of a rate based on tonnage or any other \\cight quantity. The 
Supreme Court. therefore, argued that although the \\"Cight of the truck in this 
case was indicated, but to assume that the charge \\'as calculated on a rate for 
Cl4 [19)9] 1 LltJ~'(.rs Rep. 352 at 358. 
100 lb. would bring fractional figure, which would most unlikely to represent 
the actual basis. In other words, the Supreme Court argued that applying the 
term "unit" as being the "customary freight unit" would lead to unreasonable 
results. The Supreme Court decided that the absence of any reasonable ground 
for extending the term "unit" to that type of measure excludes its application 
in the present case65 . The Supreme Court, in reaching this decision, explained 
that its conclusion was analogous to the United States Second Circuit's 
decision in the Isbrandtsen case, which mentioned above66. The Supreme 
Court considered the latter foreign decision to justify that its decision was 
consistent with decisions in foreign legal systems. This impliedly suggests that 
the Supreme Court was concerned with achieving international uniform 
interpretation in relation to defining the term "unit" of Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924. 
While the Canadian Supreme Court in the Anticosti case above only 
considered American cases, in 1973, in Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. 
Chimo Shipping Ltd. 67, the Canadian Supreme Court provided a 
comprehensive analysis on defining the term "unit" in different legal systems. 
In the latter case, the Supreme Court, at first, considered its previous decision 
in the Anticosti case. The Supreme Court noted that Rand, J., in the Anticosti 
case, limited the scope of his judgment to situations where the bill of lading 
does not provide any clue as to the freight rate unit. However, in the present 
case, the bill of lading specified the freight rate unit as $34 per ton of 2000 lb. 
65 Id, at 358. 
M Supra, at 359. 
67 [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469. 
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or 40 cubic feet whichever is the higher. The Supreme Court, therefore. 
questioned whether such specification would lead to a different result. The 
Supreme Court, in consequence, evaluated whether the tenn "customary 
.I 
freight unit", which is applied by the United States cases, is suitable for 
defining the tenn "unit" under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 192.+. The 
Supreme Court's comparative analysis lead it to question the reason behind 
the difference between Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 and Article 4(5) 
of the United States COGSA 1936. As mentioned above in this section, the 
United States Department of State explained that the differences between the 
Hague Rules 1924 and COGSA were intended to clarify the provisions in the 
Hague Rules, which may be of uncertain meaning. However, the Supreme 
Court, in the Falconbridge case, argued that the alteration of the tenn "unit" of 
the Hague Rules 1924 into the tenn "customary freight unit" in the United 
States COGSA was not intended to clarify the meaning of the tenn "unit". The 
Supreme Court stated that: 
I am satisfied that the words 'per package or, in case of goods not 
shipped in packages, per customary freight unit' do constitute a change 
from the Hague Rules as adopted in Great Britain and in Canada6s . 
In reaching the latter conclusion, the Supreme Court supported its argument by 
refelTing to the United States Brazil case, which mentioned above, where the 
court acknowledged that the United States COGSA "expanded or changed" 
the telm "unit" into "customary freight uniC(l'l. After inspecting the teml 
"customary freight unit", the Supreme Court decided that the United States 
(lX Supra, at .+76 (Ritchie . .T.). 
69 l' t 17" ,}upra, a .... -. 
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cases' definition could not be considered as a persuasive authority to follow. 
The Supreme Court stated that: 
I do not think that they [the words "customary freight unit"] afforded 
any substantial guidance in the solution of the problem as to the 
meaning of the phrase 'per package or unit' as it occurs in art. IV, r. 5 
[Article 4(5) of the Hague RUlesfo. 
The Supreme Court criticised the term "customary freight unit" on the ground 
that the unpackaged units of less careful shippers should not merit greater 
legal protection than that which prudently prepared packages received71 . Thus, 
the United States decisions did not help the Canadian Supreme Court to define 
the term "unit", nevertheless, the United States decisions helped the Canadian 
Supreme Court to rule out that the term "unit" should not be defined as being a 
"customary freight unit". 
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of the term 
"unit" as it occurs in the phrase "package or unit" in Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules is a shipping unit, which is a unit of goods 72. The Supreme Court 
supported its decision by referring to the United Kingdom decision, 
Studebaker Distributors Ltd. v. Charlton Steam Shipping Company, Ltd. 73, 
where the court indicated that the term "unit" means a shipping unit, which is 
any individual piece of carg074 . Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court decided 
70 Supra, at 476 (Ritchie, J.). 
71 Supra, at 477. 
72 Supra, at 475. 
73 [1938] 1 K.B. 459 at 467. 
74 Supra, at 476-77. It should be noted also tha~ t?e Canadian Sup.reme ~ourt 
supported its decision by referring to the OpInIOn of the EnglIsh wnters, 
Temperley and Vaughen in their text book The Carriage a/Goods by Sea Act 
1924, (1932) at 81-82, where they indicate that the term "unit" means a 
shipping unit. Supra, at 476. 
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that its own precedent in the Anticosti case and the Cnited Kingdom 
Studebaker case above are more persuasive authorities to foIl 0\\ than the 
United States Circuit Courts' decisions in defining the term "unit" of Article 
4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924. 
The United States Circuit Courts' decisions are not only inconsistent 
with each other but also inconsistent with other countries' decisions. The 
method by which the United States Circuit Courts interpreted the term 
"customary freight unit" was by considering the Brazil case's definition above 
as guidance. The United States Circuit Courts did not consider other countries' 
decisions, and this had lead to inconsistencies and difficulties in defining such 
tenn. Quite apart from the fact that in 1944 the court in the Bra::il case 
recognised the wording of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 and was 
aware of their international character, the court gave an interpretation at 
variance with the international understanding of these rules. In recent days, 
some Circuit Courts also acknowledged that the term "customary freight unit" 
is unique to the United States' COGSA, nevertheless, they looked to COGSA 
cases for guidance in interpreting that term 75. Most of the Circuit Courts, 
however, did not realise that the term "customary freight unit" is a departure 
from the wording of Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924. In the Isbrandtsell 
case above, for example, while the Second Circuit did not recognise that 
COGSA is the result of international uniforn1 rules, the Second Circuit 
coincidently reached a decision that was consistent \\·ith the international 
75 Sec, for examp \c, Craddock Ilcrn. fne. v. W.K. P. n'ilsoll & SOli. Inc .. 116 
f.Jd 1 ()()5 at 1108-09 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. Such coincidence is not enough for 
reaching international uniform interpretations since the Second Circuit in the 
latter case was not concerned with uniformity. In the Croft & SCll/~v case 
above, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit did not recognise that COGSA is 
the result of an international convention, and therefore, reached a decision that 
was inconsistent with other Circuit Courts' decisions. 
The Canadian courts' decisions, on the other hand, are consistent with 
the international understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. In the Anticosti case 
above, the Canadian Supreme Court was concerned with uniformity and in 
consequence, reached a decision that was consistent with the international 
understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. It should be admitted that the 
Supreme Court's decision, in the latter case, coincidently was consistent with 
the United Kingdom decisions. The Supreme Court did not mention any 
United Kingdom cases and only cited one American case to support its 
judgment. Although such citation helped the Supreme Court to be consistent 
with the international understanding of the Hague Rules 1924, our argument 
here is that when the national courts examine and evaluate more than one 
country's decisions then the more conflicts of interpretations would be 
reduced significantly. The Falconbridge case above, on the other hand, 
represents an ideal example of how the national courts can reach uni fonn 
interpretations of unifornl rules. The Canadian Supreme court, in the latter 
case, not only' recognised the shortcoming of the application of the tenn 
"customary fi'eight unit", as the .Inticosti case and somc of the United States 
cases did, but also considered other countries' decisions in justifying its 
decision. If the United States Circuit Courts were obliged to consider foreign 
decisions, such as the Canadian Falconbridge decision, then they might, at 
least, recognised that their interpretation of the term "unit" was inconsistent 
with other countries' interpretation of such term. Accordingly, they might 
have, but not necessarily, considered that their interpretation should be 
consistent with other countries' decisions. Consequently, although the various 
methods by which countries incorporate the uniform rules contribute in 
conflicts of interpretations, obliging the national courts to consider foreign 
decisions could reduce such conflicts significantly. 
6.2.3. Are Conflicts of Interpretations That Arise Through the 
Impact of Domestic Law Avoidable? 
Once the international uniform rules are adopted by a country they are 
exposed to the impact of the general law of the country concerned. The 
reported cases on subjects such as the carriage of goods by sea suggest that in 
practice this issue produces divergence among the national courts of the 
various countries. In effect, as mentioned in the previous chapter, some writers 
suggest that conflicts of interpretations arise because of the influence of 
domestic law on the process of interpreting uniform rules, which differ from 
one country to another76. Some of these writers do not explain whether 
76 See the fifth chapter, supra, at 119, Michael F. Sturley, "International 
Unifonn Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in 
Conflicts of Interpretation", (1987) 27 Va. J. In1'1. L. 729; Schreuer, supra 
note 38, at 264; 1. Hoke Peacock, "Note: Deviation and the Package 
Limitation in the Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: An 
Alternative Approach to the Interpretation of International Uniform Acts", 
(1990) 68 Texas L. Rev. 977. 
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conflicts of interpretations are avoidable or not77 , \\·hile others do. Sturle/8, in 
his conclusion, argues that the impact of domestic law on interpretation plays 
a major role in explaining why conflicts of interpretations arise. He states that 
if we consider measures to reduce the impact of domestic law on interpreting 
uniform rules, then we can achieve international uniform interpretations of 
such rules. In other words, Sturley suggests that conflicts of interpretations are 
avoidable. In addition, Peacock 79 states that: 
The best way to achieve actual international uniformity is for the 
courts of all countries to base their interpretations of uni form statutes 
on the intent of the international framers. 
This implies that Peacock also suggests that conflicts of interpretations are 
avoidable. The size of the problem of the impact of domestic law, however, as 
it affects the achievement of international uniform interpretations of uniform 
rules can only be gauged by a detailed examination of case law. \Vithout this, 
no one can say with certainty, as the above writers did, to what extent conflicts 
of interpretations may be reduced. 
The "fair opportunity" doctrine, which mentioned in the prevlOUS 
chapter, is an example to how the domestic law would influence the national 
courts in interpreting uniform rules, and in consequence would lead to 
conflicts of interpretations8o• This doctrine is the creation of the l:nited States 
77 See Schreuer, Id. 
]X Supra, at 800-0 I . 
79 Supra, at 1000. 
80 Sl.'C the fifth chapter, sup,.a, at 98. 
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courts. The doctrine developed under the United States railroads1 and Harter 
Act82 cases. In 1974, the United States Ninth Circuit adopted it for the first 
time in relation to a carriage of goods by sea caseS3 . From that moment, the 
doctrine has developed under the carriage of goods by sea cases. This doctrine 
does not exist in any provision in the Hague Rules 1924 or even the Hague-
Visby Rules 1968 and the Hamburg Rules 1978. It is a judicial creations,+, and 
therefore the United States Circuit Courts followed their own precedents in 
adopting such doctrine. Thus, the United States domestic law has influenced 
the United States Circuit Courts, and this lead to the creation of the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine. Since it is a judicial creation, the "fair opportunity" 
doctrine has never been adopted in any other countryS5, and in consequence, 
conflicts of interpretations arose between the United States decisions and other 
countries' decisions. By examining the "fair opportunity" doctrine, our aim, in 
81 See for example, Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 112 U.S. 331 (1884); 
New York, New Hm'en & Hartford Railroad Co. v, Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 
(1953). 
X2 See for example, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc. v. United States of America, 
201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953); Sommer CO/po v, Panama Canal Co., 475 F.2d 
292 (5th Cir. 1973). 
83 Tessler Brothers (B. C) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cif. 
1974). 
8.+ In Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc, \', Evergreen Lines, 871 F.2d 897 at 900 
(9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit admitted that the "fair opportunity" doctrine 
does not exist in the language of the Hague Rules 1924, "it is a judicial 
encrustation, designed to avoid what courts felt were harsh or unfair results", 
See also Henley Drilling Co. \', .McGee, 36 F.3d 143 at 147 (1st Cir. 19(4). 
8:' See Howard M. McCom1ack, "Uniformity of Maritime La\\', and 
Perspecti\'c From the Ll.S. Point of View", (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rc\', 14S 1 at 
1529~ Daniel A. Tadros, "COGS A Section 4(S)'s 'Fair Opportunity' 
Requirement: U.S. Circuit Court Conflict and Lack of International 
llnifo1l11it\'; \\,ill the l:nited States Supremc Court E\cr Pro\'ide Guidancc", 
(1992) 17' f'vlar. Law. 17 at 36: \\'illiam Tctley, ,\/lIrine ('argo Claims, (3rd 
cd .. 1988) at 8S7, 
this section, is to prove that the influence of domestic la\\- on the process of 
interpreting uniform rules can be reduced significantly if the national courts 
are obliged to consider foreign decisions. In so doing, \ye recognise that the 
national courts should not use other foreign decisions as a ready-made solution 
for solving the issue before them. These national courts should finally' reach 
their decisions on a basis elsewhere. 
6.2.3.1. The Impact of Domestic Law: The "Fair Opportunity" 
Example 
Most of the United States Circuits Courts addressed the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine. These Circuit Courts claimed that such doctrine exist in 
Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 and did not realise that it is a judicial 
invention, where the domestic law influenced such courts. Some Circuit 
Courts, on the other hand, recognised the shortcoming and the uncertainty that 
such doctrine brought. 
In many cases, the Circuit Courts followed each other's decisions in 
addressing the "fair opportunity" requirement, but, especially the Ninth 
Circuit, failed to examine and evaluate these decisions carefully. The result 
was, therefore, conflicts of interpretations among these Circuit Courts. In the 
United States . .tI1 Pacific Trading, Inc. ". Vessel MIV Hanjin YOSLI case86 , for 
example, small shipments from multiple shippers consolidated into containers 
were damaged. The carrier gave nine different bills of lading, and all of them 
\\'ere identical in all material respects. The bills of lading in the "Number of 
Packages or Containers" columns listed the number of packages within each 
Sb 7 F.Jd 1427 (9th Cir. P)9.3). 
container delivered to the carner. The issue in this case was whether the 
containers constitute packages, or the containers' context constitutes packages. 
The Ninth Circuit, at first, clarified that the carrier limitation under Article 
4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924 is not absolute, since the shipper must be gi\'en 
the opportunity to declare a higher value of his shipment, and create a higher 
limitation of liabilitl7 , In other words, the Ninth Circuit addressed the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine, In so doing, the Ninth Circuit followed its precedent in 
Komatsu, Ltd v. States s.s. CO. 88 , The Ninth Circuit stated that by listing the 
number of packages and containers, the shipper availed himself of the 
opportunity to clarify the liability limits, Thus, since the carrier, in this case, 
met the standard of what constitutes a "fair opportunity" and consequently was 
able to limit his liability under Article 4(5), the Ninth Circuit followed other 
Circuit Courts' decisions89 in deciding whether the containers constitute 
packages, or the containers' context constitutes packages, Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit held that "listing the number of packages within each container 
determined the number of packages for the purpose of the limitation 
I, b'l't ,,90 la 1 1 Y , 
The Ninth Circuit by following its own precedent in addressing the 
"fair opportunity" doctrine established a new standard for what constitutes a 
"fair opportunity", other than the standards that were established in the earlier 
87 1d, at 1'+33, 
KK 674 F.2d 806 at 808-09 (9th Cir. 1982). 
K() [lnil'crsal Leaf Tohacco l', Companhia De ,V([l'cgacao, 993 F.2d .+ 1.+ (.+th 
Cir. 199~): ,\Ioll'ica Textile Corporation \'. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 
1 ()91), 
90 ' t 1 "1 
.\upra,a -t.' .. 
165 
Ninth Circuit decisions and even other Circuits decisions. The Ninth Circuit 
only cited its own precedent, the Komatsu case, without realising that the latter 
case and even cases of other Circuit Courts have diverged in the standard they 
required, and therefore, the result was conflicts of interpretations of what 
constitutes a "fair opportunity,,91. Even when it considered other Circuit 
Courts' decisions in reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit only cited the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in the Universal Leaf case and the Second Circuit's 
decision in the Monica case without even providing a brief explanation to the 
facts of these cases. The latter two cases, however, did not address the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine. These two cases only addressed the issue of whether the 
containers constitute packages, or the containers' context constitutes packages. 
Since the facts of the All Pacific, Universal Leaf, and Monica cases 
were similar, then it could be argued that it is not understandable why the All 
Pacific case addressed the "fair opportunity" doctrine while the other two 
cases did not. In fact, Alexander92 states that, "whether the carrier should be 
held to the standards of the "fair opportunity" doctrine in all cases is not 
known". In many cases, however, different Circuit Courts examined the 
problem of defining the term "package" in relation to containerisation, but did 
91 The United States Circuit Courts are divided over what constitutes a "fair 
opportunity". These Circuit Courts have not put a uniform standard of what 
constitutes a "fair opportunity". See, for example, Insurance Co. of North 
America v. MIV Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934 (1Ith Cir. 1990); Unimac Co. v. C. 
F. Ocean Service, 43 F.3d 1434 (11 th Cir. 1995); Stolt Tank Containers, Inc. 
v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 962 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1992); Nippon Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. MIV Tourcoing, 167 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999); Gamma-10 
Plastics v. American President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244 (8th Cir. 1994). All 
of these cases involved containerised cargo. 
92 Laurence B. Alexander, "Containerisation, The Per Package Limitation, and 
The Concept of Fair Opportunity", (1986) 11 Mar. Law. 123 at 138. 
166 
not address the "fair opportunity" doctrine93 . As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the United States Circuit Courts followed the Second Circuit's 
decision in Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. American Export Lines94 to solve the latter 
problem95 . The Second Circuit in the latter case impliedly rejected the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine. The Second Circuit stated that the option to declare a 
higher value is practically never exercised, where it stated that: 
We find scant force in the argument that there is no need for a fairly 
strict construction of the package provision since a shipper can always 
protect himself by declaring a higher value and paying a higher rate96 . 
The Second Circuit explained why shippers refused to declare the nature and 
value of their goods. It noted that the additional carrier-provided insurance, 
which a shipper purchases by declaring a higher value, covers only damage 
caused by carrier negligence. The Second Circuit observed that because of this 
limited coverage the cost of the additional insurance (in the form of an 
increase in the freight rate) is generally not matched by a comparable savings 
in the premium for cargo insurance, which must protect against all risks of 
shipment. Thus, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the carrier-supplied 
insurance of value is not commercially competitive97 . In addition, it could be 
93 See, for example, Vegas v. Compania Anonima Venezolana, 720 F.2d 629 
(11 th Cir. 1983); Binladen BSB Landscaping v. M. V. Nedlloyd Rotterdam, 759 
F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1985); Sony Magnetic Products Inc. v. Merivienti DIY, 863 
F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989); Belize Trading, Ltd. v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 
993 F.2d 790 (l1th Cir. 1993). 
94 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981). 
95 See the fifth chapter, supra, at 110. 
96 Supra, at 815. 
97 Some commentators also have the same argument. See, for example, 
Kenneth Diplock, "Conventions and Morals-Limitation Clauses in 
International Maritime Conventions", (1969-1970) 1 J .M.L.C. 525 at 529-30; 
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argued that in many cases shippers usually do not declare the value of their 
goods since they consider it as a trade secret. For example, in Sony Magnetic 
Products Inc. v. Merivienti O/y98, an employee of the shipper's freight 
forwarder testified that Sony (the shipper) rarely declared the value of ocean 
going cargo on the bill of lading. The value was considered a trade secret and 
the bill of lading is usually widely distributed. One can argue, therefore, that it 
is not logical for the United States Circuit Courts to require the carrier to 
notify the shipper of his right to declare a higher value and, at the same time, 
this declaration is not a general practice that is used in shipping goods. In 
supporting this argument, many cases show that the shippers from the 
beginning chose to insure their cargo by an independent insurance company99. 
Returning to the All Pacific case above, the Ninth Circuit followed 
other Circuit Courts decisions, where these Circuit Courts followed the Mitsui 
case above, which impliedly rejected the "fair opportunity" doctrine. It seems 
that the Ninth Circuit failed to understand and interpret such Circuit Courts' 
decisions properly. The Ninth Circuit, in fact, has used these Circuit Courts' 
decisions as a ready-made solution of the problem of defining the term 
"package" in relation to containers. Thus, the Ninth Circuit citation of such 
Sean Harrington, "Legal Problems Arising From Containerisation and 
Intermodal Transport", (1982) 17 Euro. Trans. L. 3 at 19. 
98 863 F.2d 1537 at 1541 (1Ith Cir. 1989). 
99 The Ninth Circuit has held that "a shipper who chooses to insure its cargo 
through an independent insurance company has made a conscious decision not 
to opt out of COGSA's liability limitation", Vision Airfreight Service Inc. v. 
M/V National Pride, 155 F.3d 1165 at 1169 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Yang 
Machine Tool Co. v. Sea-land Services Inc., 58 F.3d 1350 at 1355 (9th Cir. 
1995); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vessel Sam Houston, 26 F.3d 895 at 900 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
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Circuit Courts' decisions adds very little to its argument in addressing the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine. If the Ninth Circuit, when it followed other Circuit 
Courts decisions, examined them properly, it might, at least, recognise that 
such Circuit Courts did not address the "fair opportunity" doctrine. 
Accordingly, if the Ninth Circuit was obliged to consider other Circuit Courts' 
decisions, which are considered as being foreign decisions, then it might, but 
not necessarily, have examined the other Circuit Courts' decisions properly in 
order to be consistent with them in not addressing the "fair opportunity" 
doctrine. 
Few Circuit Courts who addressed the "fair opportunity" requirement, 
on the other hand, realised that such requirement was inconsistent with the 
international understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. These Circuit Courts 
depended on other Circuit Courts' decisions in realising this issue. In Henley 
Drilling Co. v. McGee 100, for example, the First Circuit refused to adopt the 
"fair opportunity" doctrine. The First Circuit, at first, noted that in its own 
precedent, Granite State Insurance Company v. MIV Caraibe 101 , the District 
Court of Puerto Rico refused to adopt the "fair opportunity" doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the First Circuit provided a detailed examination on the 
existence of this doctrine among the Circuit Courts, and in consequence, noted 
that these Circuit Courts required the carrier to provide the shipper adequate 
notice of Article's 4(5) limitation of liability. The First Circuit also noted that 
I 00 J () F. 3 d 1 4 _~ ( 1 s t C i r. 1 <) 9 4 ) . 
101 ~C) F. StiPp. 1113 (D.P.R. 199)). 
these Circuit Courts divided over the type of notice l02 . In other words. these 
Circuit Courts divided over what constitutes a "fair opportunity". The shipper 
in this case, however, claimed that the carrier is not only required to gi\'e 
notice but also to show that published tariffs were available. These published 
tariffs would give the shipper a choice of valuations of the cargo by a choice 
of precisely definable freight rates. The shipper relied primarily in his claim 
on the Fifth Circuit decision, Brown & Root Inc. v. ,H/V Peisander l03 . The 
First Circuit, on the other hand, argued that careful examination of the 
authorities discloses that no appellate case required both a valid tariff and a 
notice as an element of what constitutes a "fair opportunity". The First Circuit 
also argued that the Brown & Root case above, which the shipper depended on 
in his claim, was reversed on this matter. In addition, the First Circuit 
recognised that many Circuit Courts directly and impliedly held that a tariff is 
not required ifnotice of Article's 4(5) limitation of liability has been given104. 
In conclusion, the First Circuit, in rejecting the "fair opportunity" doctrine, 
quoted the Ninth Circuit's observation in Carman Tool & Abrasi\'es, Inc. \'. 
17 L' lOS J: \'crgrccll znes -: 
We decline to expand the fair opportunity requirement as suggested by 
[ shipper]. The requirement is not found in the language of COGSA; it 
is a judicial encrustation, designed to avoid what courts felt were harsh 
or unfair results. The requirement has been criticised for introducing 
10' -
- Supra, at 14). 
IOJ 648 F.2d 415 at 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
104 Citing Insurance Co. of North America \'. ,\IF Ocean Lynx, 90 I F.2d 934 
at 939 (lIth Cir. 1990); .Ietna Ins. Co. \'. ,\I'T Lash Italia, 858 F.2J 190 at 193 
(4th Cir. 1988)~ Carman Tool & .·Ibrasin's, Inc. \'. En'rgreen Lines. 871 F.2d 
Sl)7 at 901 (9th Cif. 1989). 
105 S71 1-',2d 89"""' at l)OO (9th Cir. 1989). 
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uncertainty into commercial transactions that should be goyerned by 
certain and uniform rules l06 . 
The First Circuit also stated that: 
COGSA was ... intended to reduce uncertainty concerning the 
responsibilities and liabilities of carriers, responsibilities and rights of 
shippers, and liabilities of insurers 107. 
The First Circuit did not use other Circuit Courts' decisions as a ready-
made solution for the issue before it, as the Ninth Circuit did in the All Pacific 
case above. Instead, the First Circuit's careful and sensible examination and 
evaluation of the existence of the "fair opportunity" doctrine among the 
Circuit Courts lead to recognise that such doctrine conflicts with the 
international understanding of the Hague Rules 1924. These Circuit Courts' 
decisions not only helped the First Circuit to recognise that shortcoming of the 
application of the "fair opportunity" doctrine but also to rule out that such 
doctrine should entirely be rejected. Consequently, obliging the United States 
Circuit Courts to consider foreign decisions could reduce conflicts of 
interpretations significantly. In other words, obliging the national courts to 
look at foreign decisions in deciding their cases could significantly reduce the 
conflicts of interpretations that arise through the impact of domestic law. 
106 Supra, at 1'+7. 
107 Supra, at 1.+....,. Quoting its 0\\'11 precedent, l'imar Scgurosy Reascgliros, 
S.1. v .. \1 J' Sky Rt't'/{T, 29 F.3d :27 at 72S (1 st Cir. 1 ()t)'+). 
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6.2.4. Are Conflicts of Interpretations That Arise Because of 
the Different Methods of Interpretation Between Common Law 
Courts and Civil Law Courts Avoidable? 
The method of interpretation of the common law courts differs from 
that of the civil law courts. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some writers 
suggest that conflicts of interpretations arise because of the different methods 
of interpretation between common law courts and civil law courtslO8. Some of 
these writers clarify that such conflicts are avoidable. Beutel l09, for example, 
argues that conflicts of interpretations cannot be accomplished without 
developing a new technique of handling legal materials. This means that he 
suggests that conflicts of interpretations are avoidable. In addition, 
Bl . 110 d M d III h h . . I . . I 'b I omqUlst an un ay state t at avmg a specla mternatlOna tn una 
could reduce conflicts of interpretation. Thus, they suggest that conflicts of 
interpretations are avoidable. The important question that arises in this 
context, however, is what is the best mechanism that should be used in order 
to avoid the conflicts of interpretations that arise through the different methods 
of interpretation between common law courts and civil law courts. The 
answer, as this thesis argues, is: such conflicts could be reduced significantly 
lOX See the fifth chapter, supra, at 125, Frederick K. BeuteL "The Necessity of 
a New Technique of Interpreting the N.I.L.-The Civil Law Anology", (1931) 6 
TuI. L. Rev. 1; Mann, supra note 2, at 278-91; Robert F. Blomquist, "The 
Proposed Unifornl Law on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory 
Notes: A Discussion of Some Special and General Problems Reflected in the 
FOIlll and Content, Choice of Law, and Judicial Interpretation Articles", 
(1979) 9 Cal. \\'. In1'I. L.J. .l0 at 67: R.J.C. :\lunday, "The Unifoffil 
Interpretation of International Conyentions", (1978) 2 7 In1' 1. Compo L.Q. 4)() 
at -+)8: Peacock, supra note 76, at 1000. 
109 Supra, at 18. 
I 1 (l ,)'lIpra, at 68. 
III Slipra, at -+)8. 
1 ~.., I ... 
if we obliged the national courts of both the common law countries and the 
civil law countries to consider each other's decisions. However, as mentioned 
in the first chapter of this thesis, this thesis examines only the common-law 
systems' decisions 112. Thus, this thesis is not intending to compare common 
law and civil law cases in order to prove how the consideration of foreign 
decisions could significantly reduce the conflicts between the two systems. 
Even though, there are some specific points that are worth to be mentioned. 
The idea of considering foreign decisions is not a general practice that 
IS used among the common law and the civil law courts in interpreting 
international uniform rules. As discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter, many common law courts interpreted the uniform rules without 
considering foreign decisions, and this has lead to conflicts of interpretations. 
Although many of these courts gave considerable weight to their own 
precedents, their method of interpretation differed in many situations. Some 
followed the plain meaning of the uniform rules I 13, while others followed the 
purpose of such rules 114. Even, on the other hand, when civil law courts 
interpret international uniform rules, some may follow the plain meaning and 
others may follow the purpose of such rules, but usually these national courts 
ignore to follow their own precedents. This, in consequence, suggests that both 
of the common law courts and the civil law courts may coincidently reach the 
112 See the first chapter, supra, at 4. 
113 For example, the Canadian and the United Kingdom courts followed the 
plain meaning of defining the term "unit" under Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules 1924, where they interpreted such term as a shipping unit. 
114 For example, many United States Circuit Courts claimed that the purpose 
of the Hague Rules 1924 is to interpret the term "unit" under Article 4(5) as 
"customary freight unit". 
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same result by following the plain meaning or the purposive meaning of the 
uni form rules, and vice versa. Accordingly, it is logical to argue that 
sometimes both systems may use the same method of interpretation. 
Nevertheless, this cannot by itself guarantee the achievement of uniform 
interpretations among these systems. This raises the question: could the 
methods of interpretations of both systems be narrowed so these national 
courts could reach the same result? Theoretically, it could be argued that 
considering foreign decisions may, but of course not necessarily, make the 
national courts of common-law countries and civil-law countries consider the 
international character of the uniform rules in order to achieve international 
uniform interpretations of such rules rather than considering their legal 
systems in deciding cases. Consequently, obliging the national courts, \vhether 
common-law courts or civil-law courts, to look at foreign decisions in 
deciding their cases could significantly reduce the conflicts of interpretations 
that arise through the different methods by which common law courts and civil 
law courts decide their cases. 
6.3. Conclusion 
When a case is goven1ed by international uniform rules, the national 
court should, as this chapter argues, investigate the international understanding 
of such rules. In so doing, this court should consider the interpretation of the 
uni fonn rules by foreign decisions. The main purpose behind such 
consideration is that it leads to a significant reduction in conflicts of 
interpretations. Such consideration, in fact. reveals many advantages for the 
national courts in their interpretations. The examination of the cases in this 
1--+ 
chapter reveals that the consideration of foreign decisions helps the national 
courts to fonnulate questions in relation to the reasons behind the differences 
between domestic interpretations and foreign interpretations of the issue in 
question. This consideration also gives the national courts source of possible 
solutions to the issue in question. In the process of evaluating these solutions, 
the national courts may decide whether the domestic interpretations or the 
foreign interpretations are suitable for the issue before them. The national 
courts may also use foreign decisions in justifying their own decisions. 
The consideration of foreign decisions, on the other hand, needs more 
than a brief citation of foreign decisions. The brief and the careless 
examination and evaluation of foreign decisions may not help the national 
court to recognise the international understanding of the uniform rules, and 
accordingly, this leads to more conflicts of interpretations. In addition, the use 
of foreign decisions as a ready-made solution for solving the issue before the 
national court may, in many cases, lead to inconsistent decisions, and in 
consequence, adds little or nothing to the recognition of the international 
understanding of the unifonn rules. The detailed, the careful, and the sensible 
examination and evaluation of foreign decisions, however, are crucial points in 
helping the national court to understand how foreign decisions dealt with the 
issue before it. In using these crucial points, it is better for the national court to 
examine and evaluate more than one country's decisions. When the national 
court examines and analyses several countries' decisions, then the risk of 
reaching inconsistent decision with other countries' decisions is lower. 
Consequently, many conflicts of interpretations of unifornl rules could 
17.5 
undoubtedly be avoided if the national courts made the extra effort required in 
considering foreign decisions. 
Perhaps the identification and explanation of the consideration of 
foreign decisions and its role in achieving international uniform interpretations 
will begin a process of increasing judicial awareness so that conflicts of 
interpretations can be reduced significantly. A more realistic prediction is that 
the national courts of the various countries will continue to giye little weight 
to foreign decisions in shaping their interpretations of international uniform 
rules. Even if the national courts consider foreign decisions, the brief and the 
careless examination and evaluation of such decisions constitute a problem, 
which is probably too great to overcome. If this latter prediction is correct, 
then the next step should be finding measures to overcome such prediction. 
Accordingly, the next chapter of this thesis clarifies and analyses different 
measures for reaching international uniform interpretations of uniform rules. 
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CHAPTER VII: SLGGESTIO:\S FOR ACHIEVI:\G 
INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM I~TERPRETATIO:\S 
7.1. Introduction 
The ideal solution of reaching international unifonnity in the la\\' that 
relates to carriage of goods by sea is that the same provisions should exist in 
every country and that such provisions should be interpreted in the same 
manner in all countries in which they are in force. To be realistic, one must be 
resigned to the fact that in the international sphere, there will always be a 
tendency for national courts to put differing interpretations upon international 
unifonn rules. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce the scope for such 
divergence. Considering foreign decisions is indeed a significant factor in 
reducing such divergence. The previous chapter examined and analysed the 
significance of considering foreign decisions in reducing conflicts of 
interpretations of unifonn rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea. This 
chapter, on the other hand, concerns with how the national courts can achieve 
international unifonn interpretations of unifonn rules in relation to carriage of 
goods by sea. 
The first part of this chapter deals with the different suggestions, which 
are offered by different commentators and courts, of achieving international 
unifonll interpretations of unifonn rules 1. It examines the contributions of 
I It should be noted that some writers provide proposals for achie\'ing uni remll 
drafting of a convention. Howevcr, these proposals are unrealistic, Sec 
Francesco Bcrlingieri. "LTnifornlity in \ laritime Law and Implemelltation or 
International COIl\'cntions". (19~C') 18 J. \ I, L.C, 31 - at J I 7 and )49; \Vi Iliam 
TetIc\'. "The Lack of Unifollllit:, and the \'ery L'nrortunatc SLite or \laritimc 
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these commentators and courts, and argues that some of these contributions 
are not complete satisfactory solutions to achieve international unifonn 
interpretations of uniform rules. The second part of this chapter. howevcr, 
deals with the importance of comparative law in achie\ing international 
uniform interpretations of uniform rules. Some commentators and courts 
recognise this issue, while others argue that the consideration of foreign 
decisions will create difficulties in the process. In consequence, the first 
section of this part clarifies the problems or the difficulties that might face the 
consideration of foreign decisions, and how such difficulties could be handled. 
While the second section proposes different ideas on the question of. how 
should the national courts consider foreign decisions? 
7.2. Suggestions for Achieving International Uniform 
Interpretations 
7.2.1. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 
National courts In every country are accustomed to use particular 
methods of interpretation for their national laws. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, such divergence of methods leads to conflicts of interpretations of 
uniform rules 2• It is possible to suggest that such conflicts could be handled if 
these national courts were required to use specific and special unifonn 
methods for the interpretation of unifonn rules. The Vienna Con\'ention on the 
Law in Canada, the United States, the lTnited Kingdom and Francl?'·. [1987] 
L.l\t.C.L.Q. 340 at 34~- .. U: Gordon \V. Paulsen. ":\n Historical O\cn ic\\ of 
thc DC\'L~lopmcnt of Uni fOlll1ity in International l\ 1aritime Law", (1982-1 ()SJ) 
57 Tul. L Re\', lO()) at 1 066 . 
.: SC~ the si\th chapter. supra, at 17~-74. 
Law of Treaties (1969) (Cmnd. 4140), for example, regulates specific methods 
for the interpretation of uniform rules. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention provide that: 
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance \\ith the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended. 
Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
inc luding the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable3. 
Under these Articles, the text, the context and the purpose of a treaty and 
treaty rules play the most prominent roles in interpreting a treaty. Additional 
rules, such as the preparatory work of a treaty (i.e. tral'UIIX pn!paratoires), can 
pnwide further guidance in the process of treaty interpretation, but in general, 
3 Quoted in Rudolf Bernhardt, "Interpretation in International Law", ( 19S-l) ~ 
Ene. P. In1'I. L. 318 at 3:21. 
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they are only used as supplementary means. According to Bernhardt. the 
above Articles are applicable to all categories of uniform rules, and are broad 
enough to take account of the great variety of uniform rules in present-day 
international law4 . 
The English case Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines5 called for 
interpreting an Act of Parliament that gave effect to the \Varsaw Convention 
on the liability of air carriers. Under Article 26(2) of that Convention. notice 
must be given within seven days of "damage". while no notice need to be 
given for "loss" with respect to baggage. The plaintiff. in this case, failed to 
give the notice of the loss of part of the contents of his bag. Kerr. 1. and the 
Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's claim that the notice requirement 
should apply in this case. The House of Lords reversed. All of the Lords' 
opinions conceded that "damage" would not normally include partial loss of 
contents of baggage, but ruled that the word "damage" should be gIven a 
wider meaning6 . Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman suggested that in 
interpreting the uniform rules, which were incorporated into the British law, 
British courts should follow Articles 31 and 32 above of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 7. According to both Lords, the statutes that 
implement international uniform rules should be interpreted without 
considering domestic law, but on broad principles of general acceptation. Lord 
Diplock, for example, stated that: 
4 Ill. at 32-l. 
5 [1 98 I] :\. C. 25 1. 
6 Iii, at 251-53. 
7 Supra, at 2S2 and 290. 
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The language of an international convention has not been chosen by an 
English parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the 
conventional English legislative idiom nor designed to be construed 
exclusively by English jUdges. It is addressed to a much wider and 
more varied judicial audience than is an Act of Parliament that deals 
with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted, as Lord Wilberforce 
put it in James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping 
(U.K.) Ltd. [1978] A.C. 141, 152, 'unconstrained by technical rules of 
English law, or by legal precedent, but on broad principles of general 
acceptation' 8. 
In fact, such idea is not new. In 1932, in the English case Foscolo Mango and 
Co. v. Stag Line Ltd. 9, Lord Macmillan argued that: 
It is desirable in the interests of uniformity that their [the Hague Rules 
1924] interpretation should not be rigidly controlled by domestic 
precedents of antecedent date but rather that the language of the rules 
should be construed on broad principles of general acceptation lO • 
The suggestion of Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman impliedly 
recommends that Articles 31 and 32 should control the interpretation of 
uniform rules, which were incorporated into the national laws of different 
countries. Of course, our concern here is the uniform rules that relate to 
carriage of goods by sea. In England, the Parliament incorporated the Hague-
Visby Rules 1968, for example, into the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. 
This raises the question: do Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
provide a sufficient solution for handling the conflicts of interpretations in 
relation to the Hague-Visby Rules? This question impliedly raises another 
broad question: do Articles 31 and 32 provide a sufficient solution to achieve 
8 Supra, at 281-82. See also Lord Scarman, at 293. 
9 [1932] A.C. 328 at 334. . 
10 In addition, in 1946, F.A. Mann, in his article "The Interpretation of 
Uniform Statutes", (1946) 62 L.Q.R. 278 at 290-91, suggested that unifonn 
statutes should be interpreted according to the principles of public 
international law. 
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international uniform interpretations of all uniform rules that relate to carriage 
of goods by sea? Whether the national courts construe the uniform rules, or the 
statutes incorporating such rules, according to "the broad principles of general 
acceptation", or according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, 
this adds little to avoid the conflicts of interpretations. In other words, if we 
suppose that the national courts were willing to attempt to use these 
recommended methods of interpretation, it is uncertain that these methods 
would lead to international uniform results. These methods may, to some 
extent, reduce conflicts of interpretations, but they face several problems: 
1. Under Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention, the method of interpretation 
should be "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms" 
of the uniform rules, and in accordance with the purpose of such rules. There 
are, however, conflicts among the national courts in whether to interpret the 
terms of the Hague Rules 1924 in accordance with the ordinary meaning or in 
accordance with the purposive meaning of such rules. In the United States, for 
example, where the Hague Rules 1924 are incorporated into the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1936, there are conflicts in whether to define the term 
"package", under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules, in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning or the purposive meaning. Such conflicts have lead to 
divergent decisions. In Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & 
Construction Co., Ltd. ll , which mentioned in the previous chapterl2 , the United 
States' Eleventh Circuit Court stated that a package is: 
II (11 th Cir. 2001). from the 
http://laws.findlaw.comIl1thl9943750pn.html (accessed: 20/6/2001). 
Internet: 
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A class of cargo, irrespective of size, shape or weight to which some 
packaging preparation for transportation has been made which facilitates 
handling, but which does not necessarily conceal or completely enclose 
the goods 13 • 
In this case, the "Number of Packages" column in the bill of lading listed the 
container size "} X 40", while the "Description of Goods" column stated that 
the shipment consisted of "5000 Units Men's Suits". The Eleventh Circuit 
argued that in defining the term "package" under Article '+(5) of the Hague 
Rules in relation to containerised shipments, the number of packages specified 
in the "Number of Packages" column of the bill of lading is the starting point 
in determining such definition. After examining the bill of lading and other 
shipping documents, the Eleventh Circuit held that the container itself, not its 
contents, was the package. The Eleventh Circuit, in its method of 
interpretation, IS consistent with Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention 
above. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the term "package" in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning of such term in its context, which is consistent with 
Article 31 (1). The Eleventh Circuit considered the parties' agreement in the 
bill of lading in defining the term "package", which is also consistent with 
Article 31 (3)(a). 
14 On the other hand, in Marcraft Clothes Inc. v. M. V Kurobe i\laru , 
the District COUli for the Southern District of New York, in defining the term 
"package" under Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules, stated that: 
12 See the sixth chapter, supra, at 1'+'+. 
13 Citing Alulllinios Po:: [(c/o, Ltd. v. s.s. ,V([)'igator, .+07 F.2d 152 at 155 (2d 
Cir. 19(8); Hayes-Leger .1ssociates, fnc. v .. \1 l' Oriental !\nighr, 765 F.2d 
1076 at lOS2 (11th Cir. 1985). 
14 575 F. Supp. 2~9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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The tenn 'package' must be interpreted in light of the dual purposes of 
Article 4(5), which not only limits liability by fixing an irreducible 
minimum of immunity, but also voids any agreement designed to 
reduce the carrier's liability below that level 15. 
In this case, the "Description of Goods" column of the bill of lading listed 
"4400 Sets of Men's Suits With Vest"16. The District Court argued that the 
definition of the tenn "package" in relation to containerised shipments is more 
sensibly related to the units in which the shipper packed the goods and 
described them than to the container itself in which the carrier caused them to 
be contained. The District Court stated that where the bill of lading discloses 
the contents of the container; such contents are the packages. Accordingly, 
since the bill of lading described the contents of the container, the District 
Court held that the contents of the container, not the container itself, were the 
packages. The method of interpretation of the District Court in this case is also 
consistent with Article 31 (l) of the Vienna Convention above. The District 
Court interpreted the tenn "package" in accordance with the purpose of the 
unifonn rules, namely the Hague Rules. Consequently, although the facts of 
the latter case and the Fishman case above are similar, the decisions are 
inconsistent with each other. In both cases, the contents of the container were 
men's suits. The Marcraft District Court relied on the purpose of the Hague 
Rules and considered the men's suits as the packages, while the Fishman 
Eleventh Circuit depended on the ordinary meaning of the tenn "package" in 
its context and considered the container itself as the package. The method of 
15Id, at 242 (citing Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v. American Export Lines, 636 F.2d 807 
at814(2dCir.1981). 
16 It is not clear from the case what was inserted in the "Number of Packages" 
column of the bill of lading. 
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interpretation of both cases is consistent with Article 31 (1) of the Vienna 
Convention. Thus, it is clear that the United States courts had reached different 
decisions in using the ordinary meaning of the term "package" in its context 
and the purpose of the Hague Rules themselves. 
2. Under Article 31 (1), in the process of interpretation one must look at the 
treaty in the light of its object and purpose. Mann l7 states that perhaps the 
Vienna Convention aims to state two aspects of interpretation: the object or 
purpose of unification, and the object or purpose of the particular provisions l8 . 
In regard to the first aspect, namely the object or purpose of unification, Mann 
explains that, in practice, this means that the courts should follow, for 
example, the practice of foreign courts. Thus, he states that this is subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which Article 31(3)(b) makes an aid to 
construction 19. Mann, however, notices that following foreign decisions leads 
to confusion. He explains that in Ulster-Swift Ltd. v. Taunton Meat Haulage 
Ltd. 20, Megaw LJ. pointed out that in six member States of a convention 
twelve different interpretations of the same words might be produced. Thus, 
which interpretation should the national court follow? It is for this reason our 
proposition in this thesis is that national courts should be obliged to consider, 
but not obliged to follow, foreign decisions in order to reach international 
17 F.A. Mann, "Uniform Statutes in English Law", (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 376 at 
383. 
18 Mann argues that irrespective of whether or not this is the intention of the 
Vienna Convention, for the purpose of interpretation the object or purpose of 
unification, and the object or purpose of the particular provisions are material 
and significant. Id. 
19 Supra, at 384. 
20 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 625 at 646 (This case relates to carriage by air). 
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unifonn interpretations of uniform rules. This issue is discussed in detail later 
. h· h 21 
In t IS C apter . It should be noted, however, that although Mann recognises 
the importance of foreign decisions in achieving uniform interpretations of 
unifonn rules, nonetheless, he states that English courts declined to follow 
foreign decisions. He acknowledges, for example, that both Lord Wilberforce 
and Lord Diplock, in the Fothergill case above, preferred to ignore foreign 
decisions because: 
They were not always decisions of the highest courts; they were not 
binding; the process of the law reporting varies; the facts are not 
always clearly discemible22 . 
Therefore, Mann proposes another solution for avoiding conflicts of 
interpretations. He suggests that courts and arbitrators should apply the lex 
causae (the proper law of the contract) to avoid conflicts of interpretations 
among the countries in order to meet the expectations of the parties. His 
suggestion is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter23 . 
In regard to the second aspect, namely the object or purpose of the 
particular provisions, Mann argues that the problem is that the purpose of a 
provision may not always be obvious24 . In addition, it could be argued that 
even if the purpose of a provision is clear, conflicts may arise in 
misunderstanding such purpose. Article 4(5) of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules, for example, provides that "in any event" the carrier's liability shall be 
limited to a stipulated amount. As mentioned in the fourth chapter, it is clear 
21 Infra, at 218-21. 
22 Mann, supra note 17, at 384. 
23 Infra, at 193-99. 
24 Mann, supra note 17, at 385. 
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that the purpose of adding the words "in any event" in Article 4(5) is that the 
carrier shall not be deprived from his right of limiting his liability in all 
events
25
. In spite of this clarity, different national courts divided over the 
meaning and effect of the words "in any event" in relation to whether the 
carrier should be deprived from his limitation right if he committed an 
unreasonable deviation. In the United States, for example, the Circuit Courts 
differed on whether the words "in any event" under Article 4(5) of the Hague 
Rules 1924 referred to situations where an unreasonable deviation existed. 
Some Circuit Courts were unwilling to attribute much significance to the "in 
any event" language and held that the Hague Rules 1924 were not intended to 
change the existing law on unreasonable deviation, and therefore carriage of 
goods on-deck deprives the carrier from the benefit of the limitation under 
Article 4(5). For example, in Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v. s.s. Hong Kong 
Producer26, which mentioned in the fifth chapter27, the majority in this case 
recognised that the purpose behind the provisions of the Hague Rules 1924 
was to achieve uniformity28. The majority, however, did not recognise that the 
purpose behind the words "in any event" of Article 4(5) was to give the carrier 
the opportunity to limit his liability in all events29 • The majority examined the 
clauses of the bill of lading, and in consequence, clarified that such clauses, 
which permit the carrier to carry the containers on-deck, intended to lessen the 
25 See the fourth chapter, supra, at 87. 
26 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. Denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970). See also 
Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 
(1966). 
27 See the fifth chapter, supra, at 115. 
28 Supra, at 11-12. 
29 Only Hays, J. dissented and recognised this issue. Supra, at 20. 
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liability of the carrier. The majority, therefore, held that carriage of the six 
containers, in this case, on-deck was an unreasonable deviation. and 
accordingly, the carrier was liable for the full amount of damages sustained 
without the benefit of his limitation right under Article 4( 5). In reaching this 
decision, the majority also argued that it is not disputed that the damage to the 
goods in the containers was caused by seawater to which they \\'ere exposed 
by being stowed on-deck. 
Other Circuit Courts, on the other hand, held that the words "in any 
event" demonstrate that the Hague Rules 1924 intended to change the law that 
existed prior to the existence of these rules in relation to unreasonable 
deviation. Thus, these Circuit Courts held that carriage of containers on-deck 
would not deprive the carrier from his right to limit his liability under Article 
4(5). In Du Pont de Nemours International SA. v. SS Mornzacvega Etc. 3o, for 
example, the Second Circuit recognised the absolute terms of Article 4( 5). 
which provides that the carrier in all events has the right to limit his liabilit/ I. 
The Second Circuit noted that under Article 4(4) of the Hague Rules 1924 the 
carrier is protected if he committed any reasonable deviation. The Second 
Circuit also noted that the latter Article does not define what is and is not 
reasonable32 . In deciding whether carriage of containers on-deck constitutes 
reasonable deviation under Article 4(4), the Second Circuit, unlike the 
30 4(n F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Rosenhruch \' . . Imerican Export 
Ishrandtsen rines, Inc .. 543 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976): HOlllden and Co. Ltd. 
alld Others \'. SS. Red Jacket. ([1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 300; Electro-Tee Corp. 
v. SS Dart ,·/tlantica. 598 F. Supp. 929 (D. Md. 1984). 
31 1£1, at 90. 
32 Supra, at 100. 
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majority in the Encyclopaedia case above, argued that the containers on-deck 
of the vessel, in this case, were not necessarily subject to greater risks than 
those stowed under deck. The vessel, according to the Second Circuit, was 
specially reconstructed to permit safe carriage of containers on-deck. Thus. 
carriage of containers differs from carriage of break-bulk cargo on-deck since 
the latter could be at greater risk. In addition, the Second Circuit argued that 
deck stowage was required by the realities and exigencies of the vessel's cargo 
terminal and the ship loading procedures33 . This suggests that it is almost 
impossible for the carrier to state whether the containers of a specific shipper, 
for example, are going to be on-deck or under deck, and in consequence it is 
difficult for the carrier to state on the bill of lading that the carriage is on-deck 
or under deck. Tallman·1.+ explains this issue in detail, where he observes that: 
A successful containership operation presupposes ... that approximately 
30 percent of the containers will be carried on deck. Anyone who has 
witnessed the sight of a fully loaded containership underway will 
appreciate the requirement that the containers stowed on deck must 
carry a substantially lighter load than those carried below deck. In 
addition, the cargo, whether it be containers or break-bulk cargo, must 
be stowed so as to insure the proper trim of the vessel. 
The location of a particular container on a fully containerised vessel is 
determined by its weight and size in relation to the \veight and size of 
the other containers to be carried on the same voyage. As the weight of 
the other containers must be known before the position of a particular 
container can be ascertained, the voyage location of a container is 
unknown until all the containers have been delivered to the carrier and 
weighed. It is, therefore, impractical to endorse an "on-deck" provision 
on the bill of lading at the time the individual containers are deli\Tred 
to the vessel. 
.n ,\'11171'0, at 100. . 
J4 Bissell Tallman, "The Operational Realities of Containerisation and Their 
Effect on the "Packagc" Limitation and the "On-Deck" Prohibition: Revic\\· 
and Suggestions", (1971) 4) Tul. I. Rc\. ()()~ at 918. 
Consequently, it is unrealistic to blame the carrier of unreasonable deviation 
and at the same time it is out of his control to decide whether the containers 
are going to be carried on-deck or under deck. This means that the Second 
Circuit, in the Du Pont case above, suggested that the applicability of the 
doctrine of unreasonable deviation is inadequate in relation to carriage of 
containers on-deck. Accordingly, the decision of the Second Circuit was 
correct in stressing that in all events the carrier must not lose his limitation 
right under Article 4(5). 
The fact that there are conflicts among national courts in recognising 
the purposes of the uniform rules' provisions proves that requiring the courts 
to interpret the uniform rules in the light of their object and purpose, as stated 
in Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention, adds nothing to solve the problem 
of conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules. It is not our intention here to 
argue that national courts shall not refer to the purposes of the provisions of 
uniform rules in their interpretation, since in many occasions such 
interpretation does help the national courts in guiding them to interpret such 
rules properly. Instead, our intention here is to argue that requiring the national 
courts to consider the purposes of the provisions of the uniform rules is not an 
efficient solution to solve the problem of conflicts of interpretations of such 
rules as a whole. 
3. According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, preparatory work 
(travaux preparatoires) and the circumstances of its conclusion are only 
supplementary means of interpretation under special circumstances, namely 
an1biguity of the text or unreasonable results. Although Article 32 addresses 
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the preparatory work of uniform rules as only subsidiary means of 
. . 35 
mterpretatIOn, Peacock argues that the best way to achieve actual 
international uniformity is for the national courts of all countries to base their 
interpretations of uniform rules on the intent of the international framers. This 
raises the question: does the reference to the preparatory work of the uniform 
rules by the national courts in their interpretation solve the conflicts of 
interpretations of such rules? Of course, our concern here is to apply this 
question on the uniform rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea. The real 
problem of referring to the preparatory work of the uniform rules is that in 
many circumstances the intention of the drafters in regard to a provision or a 
term in these rules is not clear or even does not exist. As mentioned in the 
third chapter, Article 4(5) of the Hague Rules 1924, for example, does not 
define the terms "package" and "unit" and neither the debates in the Hague 
Conference 1921 nor the subsequent conferences that led to the creation of the 
Hague Rules 1924 indicate the precise meaning of such terms36. The problem 
of containerisation also, which is our subject in this thesis, was not within the 
framers' of the Hague Rules 1924 contemplation since such issue appeared in 
the 1960s. Another problem that may arise is that the meaning of the terms of 
the uniform rules can change with time. For example, as mentioned in the 
prevIous part of this section, there are conflicts among national courts on 
whether to consider carriage of containers on-deck as unreasonable 
35 1. Hoke Peacock, "Note: Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague 
Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: An ;\lternative Approach to the 
Interpretation of Intenlational Unifornl .\cts", (1990) 68 Texas L. Rev. 977 at 
1000. 
3() Sl'C the fourth chapter, supra, at 82. 
191 
deviation37• Article 4(4) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules provides that 
the carrier is protected in respect of "any reasonable deviation". However. 
these rules do not define what is and is not reasonable. Therefore, what is 
reasonable will always be a matter of fact and, as shipping practices change, 
what is reasonable will change also. Consequently, what was unreasonable in 
break-bulk carriage may well be reasonable in containers carriage. In other 
words, carriage of containers on-deck may well be reasonable. The United 
States case, Eleetro-Tee Corp. v. s.s. Dart Atlantiea38, for example, supports 
this argument. In this case, the court held that on-deck stowage of containers is 
not unreasonable deviation. In dicta, the court noted that it was willing to 
consider the effect of technological innovation and changing vessel design, 
namely the appearance of containerships, on the Hague Rules and maritime 
law. Consequently, the court implied that the word "reasonable" would have 
to be analysed with flexibility in light of changes in the maritime industry. In 
addition, the court indicated that a factual inquiry might be made into the type 
of cargo carried and the type of the ship used for determining 
reasonableness39. Accordingly, it appears that the preparatory work of the 
Hague Rules may not help the national courts to determine what is reasonable 
in regard to carriage of containers on-deck. 
37 Supra, at 186-89. See also the fourth chapter, supra, at 86-87. 
38 598 F. Supp. 929 (D. Md. 1984). See also DuPont de Nemours International 
v. Mormaevega (The Morma evega) , 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974), which 
mentioned in the previous part of this section, supra, at 188. 
39 Id, at 934. 
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7.2.2. The lex causae: the Proper Law of the Contract 
As mentioned in the fourth chapter, the creation of uniform rules in 
relation to carriage of goods by sea helps both shippers and carriers to be 
certain what the law is in every country40. However, such knowledge is not 
enough if there are conflicts of interpretations regarding these rules since such 
conflicts undermine the expectations of the parties if a dispute appears among 
them on, for example, whether a container is a package or its contents are 
packages. If the law is internationally uniform in its text and application, both 
carriers and shippers can predict the outcome of litigation wherever this 
litigation is. Mann4\ however, argues that the best solution for avoiding the 
conflicts of interpretations, which undermine the expectations of the parties, is 
to apply the lex causae42 : as the proper law of the contract. He states that the 
forum should apply the lex causae even if the lex causae has adopted or failed 
to adopt the uniform rules or has accepted them subject to variations or has 
interpreted them in a specific sense. The forum, however, is required to take 
the lex fori43 as a guide only when neither party alleges a divergence. He 
argues that ignoring the proper law of the contract would lead, in most cases, 
to the exclusive control of the lex fori. In consequence, this would lead to 
unsatisfactory results since the exclusive control of the lex fori, in many cases, 
40 See the fourth chapter, supra, at 75. 
41 Supra note 17, at 392. 
42 The lex causae means: In private international law, the system of law 
(usually foreign) applicable to the case in dispute as opposed to the lex fori. 
See "A Dictionary of Law", (3ed. 1994) Oxford University Express. 
43 The lex fori means: The law of the forum. In private international law, the 
law of the forum governs matters of procedure, the mode of trial, most matters 
relating to evidence, the nature of the remedy available, and most matters of 
limitation of actions based on time bars. 1d. 
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undermines the expectations of the parties. This can be explained by the 
following example44 : A bill of lading issued for a shipment of containers from 
London to Hamburg on a German vessel and provided for jurisdiction of the 
German courts or for arbitration in Hamburg. The German carrier calculated 
the freight and covered himself by insurance on the ground of his potential 
liability under the German law. The containers were damaged and a dispute 
appeared on whether the containers or their contents are the packages. The 
case was brought in the German courts. Suppose that the German judicial 
practice take the view that the contents of the containers are the packages, 
while the English judicial practice take the opposite view. An English law 
shall not suddenly confront the German carrier who contracts under German 
law, assesses his freight, and covers himself by insurance on the basis of 
German judicial practice. The German carrier who expects to be liable for the 
contents of the containers, which is DM I million for example, shall not profit 
from applying the English law, where his liability will be £100 per container 
for example. Applying the lex fori in this case, which is the German law, is the 
proper law of the contract. The converse conclusion is equally true: If the 
carrier was English, then the lex fori, which is the German law, shall not 
suddenly confront an English carrier who contracts under the English law, 
assesses his freight, and covers himself by insurance on the ground of the 
English judicial practice. This English carrier shall not be liable for OM 1 
million, while he expects to be liable for £ 100 per container. According to 
44 This example is taken from Mann's Article, but with some modifications. 
Supra note 17, at 391. 
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Mann, the conflict of laws was developed for protecting the contractual or 
other rights and obligations as created by the proper law45 . Mann 
acknowledges that the existence of unifonn rules renders the conflict of laws 
unnecessary. However, he states that when the unifonn rules are created all 
problems of private international law disappear unless these rules are variously 
interpreted in different countries. Therefore, he argues that there is no reason 
to suppose that the process of the conflict of laws should not apply on the 
unifonn rules46• 
Mann's suggestion, however, ignores the importance of international 
unifonnity of law. His argument suggests that the predictability of the 
outcome of litigation could be achieved irrespective of whether there are 
unifonn rules. In fact, Mann states that unification of law is: 
.. .inadequate, illusory and elusive .. .In other words unification is an 
abstract ideal. In the concrete case what is or purports to be done in its 
name may often contribute to the intensification of diversity47. 
Thus, Mann's argument runs against our argument in this thesis, which is that 
international unifonn rules in relation to carriage of goods by sea are 
valuable48 . It is worthwhile to examine and analyse his suggestion since it 
assumes that applying the proper law of the contract would avoid the conflicts 
of interpretations of unifonn rules, where such conflicts undennine the 
45 Mann, supra note 17, at 392. 
46 Mann, supra note 17, at 393. Mann supports his argument by citing: Wolff, 
Private International Law, (1950) at s. 6; Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, Hague Rec. 
143 at 193 (1974 iii). 
47 Mann, supra note 17, at 399. 
48 See the third chapter. supra, at 57. 
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expectations of the parties. Our argument, however, is that Mann's argument 
would not, in many cases, lead the parties to predict the outcome of litigation: 
1. The difficulty in Mann's proposition is that it cannot be applied when the 
uniform rules or the statutes incorporating them lay down their own conflict 
rule, which eliminates or restricts the parties' choice 49. Although the Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules do not take this course explicitly, it is 
common for statutes, which incorporate such rules, to specify the compulsory 
application of these uniform rules in certain circumstances. For example, the 
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, which incorporates the 
Hague Rules 1924, provides that "every bill of lading ... for the carriage of 
goods by sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade, shall have 
effect subject to the provisions of this Act,,50. In addition, in England, 
Parliament provided that the Hague-Visby Rules, "shall have the force of 
law", and shall apply to all shipments from the British ports51 . These statutes 
are compulsory choice of law provisions. In effect, these statutes apply to all 
disputes within their scope regardless of the proper law of the contract. In 
other words, these statutes prohibit attempts to deny jurisdiction of the local 
courts. 
49 In fact, Mann admits this difficulty, where he states that this is an exception 
to his proposition. Supra note 17, at 394. 
50 The United States Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGSA 1936), 46 United 
States Code (U.S.C.) § 1300, from the Internet: 
http://www.cargolaw.com!cogsa.html (accessed: 2015/2001). 
51 See The United Kingdom Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1971, Halshury's 
Statutes of England and Wales, (Vol. 39, 1995), Art. 1(2) and 1 (3), at 370. 
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2. Mann argues that his proposition IS m harmony with the demands of 
justice52 . His proposition, as he argues, leads both shippers and carriers to 
predict the outcome of litigation. This argument, however, lacks 
persuasiveness. A vessel usually carries various shipments for different 
shippers from different countries. In addition, the consignees who shall recei\'c 
these shipments are also usually from different countries. For saving time and 
expense, the shippers usually receive a uniform standard form of a bill of 
lading from the carrier by which it shall be sent to the consignees. Carriers 
usually provide in such bill a clause stating that the United States COGS A, for 
example, only governs the contract, or provide a clause stating that all actions 
shall be brought only before the United States courts. Thus, usually the carrier 
inserts these clauses without discussing or negotiating them with the shippers. 
It is, therefore, recognised by many national courts that bills of lading are 
contracts of adhesion. For example, the United States District Court of 
Western District of Washington, in Matsushita Electric Corporation of 
America 1'. SS Aegis SpiritS3 , stated that: 
Bills of lading, though, are hardly appropriate vehicles for such 
expressions of mutual intent, because their contractual terms are 
commonly the product of unilateral draftsmanship by the carrier 
incorporating largely self-serving provisions. 
This leads us to the point that in many cases shippers and consignees will not 
be familiar with the choice of law or forum that was chosen by the carrier in 
the bill of lading. In Wm. H. i.\fuller & Co. 1'. SII'Cllish American Lilles.!!, for 
52 Mann, supra note 17, at ~92. 
5J [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 9~ at 100. 
5.!! ::'::'.+ F.2d SOc) (2d C'ir. 1(55). 
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example, a New York consignee brought suit in the Southern District of New 
York for damages to goods on board a Swedish vessel. The Swedish carrier 
inserted in the bill of lading a clause requiring "any claim against the carrier 
arising under this bill of lading [to] be decided .. .in the Swedish courts"S5. Let 
us assume that the bill of lading required the application of the Swedish law 
instead of the Swedish courts. If the United States court, in this case, applied 
the proper law of the contract, which would be the Swedish law according to 
Mann's proposition, then the consignee's expectation of applying the United 
States law would be defeated, since the consignee is not familiar with the 
Swedish law. This clarifies that in many situations the benefit of applying the 
proper law of the contract will be only for the carrier. Consequently, in many 
situations, Mann's proposition would lead the carrier alone, not the shippers or 
the consignees, to predict the outcome of litigation. 
3. Even if we suppose that the above difficulties do not exist and Mann's 
proposition can be applied in all situations without any problems, his argument 
still cannot lead the parties to predict the outcome of litigation in all situations. 
The real problem in Mann's argument is that it ignores the conflicts of 
interpretations of uniform rules within each country by itself. His proposition 
assumes that conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules are only among the 
countries. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there are conflicts 
of interpretations among the United States Circuit Courts, for example, in 
defining the terms "package" and "unit"s6. In addition, the United States 
55 Id, at 807. 
56 See the sixth chapter, supra, at 135-46 and 150-54. 
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Circuit Courts, which created the "fair opportunity" doctrine, could not put a 
standard on what constitutes a fair opportunity57. Likewise, as explained 
earlier in this chapter, there are conflicts among the United States Circuit 
Courts on whether carriage of containers on-deck constitutes unreasonable 
deviation 58. These conflicts of interpretations would not lead the parties to 
predict the outcome of litigation. In other words, even if the parties' 
expectations were that the United States law should be applied, the existence 
of the conflicts of interpretations in such law would not lead them to predict 
the outcome of litigation. 
7.2.3. The Creation of an International Court of Appeals 
Recourse to an international court of appeals for all litigation 
concerning the interpretation of the uniform rules is a possible solution for 
reducing the conflicts of interpretations of such rules. Some writers 59, in fact, 
suggest that international uniform interpretations of uniform rules could be 
achieved by creating an international supreme tribunal. For example, because 
57 See the sixth chapter, supra, at 166. 
58 Supra, at 186-89. 
59 See Charles L. Black, "The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of 
Conflicting Interpretation", (1973) 6 V and. J. Transnat'1. L. 365; David 
Michael Collins, "Admiralty-International Uniformity and the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea", (1985-1986) 60 Tul. L. Rev. 165 at 202-03; Grant Gilmore 
and Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty, (2d ed., 1975) at 191-92; R.J.C. 
Munday, "The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions", (1978) 
27 Int'l. Compo L.Q. 450 at 458; Honnold, Uniform Law For International 
Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, (1999) at 95; Robert F. 
Blomquist, "The Proposed Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange 
and Promissory Notes: A Discussion of Some Special and General Problems 
Reflected in the Form and Content, Choice of Law, and Judicial Interpretation 
Articles", (1979) 9 Cal. W. Int'I. LJ. 30 at 68. 
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of the differences between the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules a suggestion is 
proposed by Black to achieve such unifonn interpretations. Black argues that: 
The trouble is that technique for producing unifonnity in the world's 
bill of lading law-the technique of procuring agreement on a text-is 
fatally defective; a text must be interpreted, and interpretations will 
surely diverge6o. 
According to Black, there is one: 
... way to insure a satisfactory ongoing approximation to uniformity in 
the actual working law of ocean bills ... The solution would haye to be a 
single international court of appeals, whereto judgments interpreting 
COGS A [The U.S. cOGSA 1936], rendered in the national courts of 
last resort, could be brought by the nonprevai I ing part/I. 
Black explains that such international court of appeals would exercise a 
discretionary jurisdiction, but would be authorized to affinn or repeal the 
judgments of national courts on the points of interpretation62 . He also states 
that his suggestion could apply to subjects other than the unifonn rules that 
relate to carriage of goods by sea63 . 
Black's suggestion is indeed very effective for achieving international 
unifonn interpretations of unifonn rules. It could be argued that may be in the 
long tenn this suggestion would be brought in order to reduce conflicts of 
interpretations significantly. In fact, Black acknowledges that the creation of 
such court would not be sooner than fifty years, or eyen a hundred64 . Of 
course, this is according to the date when he wrote his Article. which is 1973. 
One of the obstacles, however, that may face the creation of an international 
60 lei, at 369. 
(11 Supra, at 370. 
62 Supra, at 365. 
63 ... \'lIfJra, at 373. 
(14 l' t .., 73 dupr(/. a.' . 
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court of appeals is that such court limits the states' sovereignty, where the 
creation of such court gives rise to constitutional objections. This obstacle, 
however, lacks persuasiveness. Every country in adopting an international 
convention accepts that it is bound by such convention. The claim that every 
country is itself the judge of the degree to which it is bound is likely to destroy 
the aim of the international convention, which is to achieve uniform text and 
uniform application of such text65 . Consequently, it is logical to suggest that 
Black's proposition could be considered as a final step towards achieving 
international uniform interpretations of uniform rules, while the first step, as 
this thesis argues, is to impose a duty on the national courts to consider foreign 
decisions. 
It should be noted, however, that Sturley66 acknowledges that creating 
an international supreme tribunal goes directly to the heart of the problem of 
conflicts of interpretations, but at the same time, he argues that it may create 
greater difficulties in the process. Sturley gives no additional explanation of 
what these difficulties could be. It could be argued that whatever these 
difficulties are, at least such a tribunal could significantly reduce conflicts of 
interpretations of uniform rules. Such an argument could be supported by the 
European Court of Justice, which plays an effective part in bringing 
international uniform interpretations among the European national courts. 
65 See Rene David, "The International Unification of Private Law", (chapter 5) 
(1975) 2 Int'I. Enc. Compo L. 1 at 115. 
66 Michael F. Sturley, "International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The 
Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation", (1987) 27 Va. 1. 
InCI. L. 729 at 801. 
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7.2.4. The Consultation of an International Organisation 
A possible solution of achieving international uniform interpretations 
of uniform rules is to take an advisory opinion from an international 
organisation as a guide of interpretation. Sauveplanne in his report to thc 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit)67 suggests 
that in order to achieve international uniform interpretations. an advisorv 
opinion on the meaning of the uniform rules should be compulsory on the 
judges to be requested from an international organisation. The opinion of the 
international organisation would be only advisory and would not bind the 
national courts, but the judges should be forced to suspend their judgment 
until they receive the opinion of the international organisation on the case 
before them. Sauveplanne argues that although the advisory opinion would not 
be binding on the judges, it could make a significant contribution towards 
ensuring international uniform interpretations of the uniform rules. Judges 
would not hesitate to accept an interpretation of the uniform rules given by a 
body, which might well be the best qualified expert on the question of 
interpretation, especially if the advisory opinion was properly reasoned and 
took into account the opinions expressed and the decisions issued in other 
countries. 
It IS doubtful to argue that Sauveplanne's proposition could 
signi ficantly reduce the conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules that relate 
to carriage of goods by sea. Suppose, for example. that the international 
organisation that should gi\'c the ad\isory opinion \\ as L!:\'CITRi\L or C\II. 
67 Unidroit 1959, at 283. 
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Of course, it is logical to suggest that one of these organisations should be 
consulted since the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules were created by the CML 
while the Hamburg Rules were created by UNCITRAL68 . These organisations 
are not at present capable to perform the task of giving advisory opinions. 
Therefore, they would probably resort to experts, especially to those who had 
written the draft of the Hague, Hague-Visby, or Hamburg Rules. In these 
circumstances, it is more likely that such experts might reach different 
opinions. However, even if we suppose that the latter argument lacks 
persuasiveness, there are still some difficulties that can face Sauveplanne's 
proposition. The advisory opinion of the international organisation, under 
Sauveplanne's proposition, should be compulsory on the judges. This 
obligation not only creates delay and expense but also implicates the 
international organisation in some circumstances where it is not necessarily 
competent to intervene. 
Let us assume, on the other hand, that Sauveplanne's proposition was 
voluntary by which it applied by the judges in case of doubt, and in 
consequence, no delay, expense, and unnecessary intervention might arise. 
Again, this proposition would still be inadequate for achieving international 
uniform interpretations of uniform rules. The real problem in Sauveplanne's 
proposition is that since the opinion of the international organisation would 
not be binding, this might create another conflict of interpretations other than 
the conflicts of interpretations that were already among the various countries' 
68 See the third chapter of this thesis for a detailed discussion on this issue, 
supra. at 40, 44 and 50-51. 
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decisions. Thus, in many circumstances, instead of bringing unifonn 
interpretations, more conflicts of interpretations were likely to arise since 
these advisory opinions could be inconsistent with the various countries' 
decisions. 
7.3. The Importance of Considering Foreign Decisions 
The previous part of this chapter clarified that the different suggestions 
of achieving international unifonn interpretations of unifonn rules, except the 
suggestion of creating an international court of appeals, are inadequate. This 
second part, on the other hand, argues that the consideration of foreign 
decisions plays an important role in achieving such international unifonnity. 
In other words, the consideration of foreign decisions is an adequate solution 
for such achievement. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, some writers suggest that courts 
can achieve international uniform interpretations of uniform rules if they 
consider other foreign decisions, namely recognising the importance of 
comparative law in achieving international uniform interpretations of unifonn 
rules69 . For example, Sundberg70 observes that only the courts have the 
capability of coping with the developments covered by the uniform rules and 
the interpretation of uniform rules. Accordingly, he argues that courts could 
69 See the sixth chapter, supra, at 132, Jacob W.F. Sundberg, "A Unifonn 
Interpretation of Uniform Law", (1966) 10 Scandinavian Stud. L. 219 at 237; 
Berlingieri, supra note 1, at 317, 346 and 350; Munday, supra note 59, at 458-
59; Giles, Uniform Commercial Law, (1970) at 194; Erling Selvig, Unit 
Limitation of Carrier's Liability, (1961) at 4; Honnold, supra note 59, at 95-
98; F.A. Mann, "Documentary Credits and Bretton Woods", (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 
526 at 528; Mann, supra note 17, at 384-85. 
70 Jd, at 237. 
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achieve international unifolll1 interpretations of unifolll1 rules by referring to 
other countries' decisions relating to the same unifolll1 rules. Similarl\'. 
Berlingieri71 argues that, in practice, international unifolll1 interpretations of 
unifolll1 rules might only be achieved if the courts of each Contracting State 
consider the decisions of the courts of other Contracting States on the same 
issue. He believes that knowledge of other countries' decisions greatly 
contributes to international unifolll1 interpretations of unifolll1 rules, and 
therefore, all efforts should be made in order to guarantee the exchange of 
infolll1ation among the international community72. Likewise, Giles 73 argues 
that one of the chief factors militating against achieving international unifolll1 
interpretations of unifolll1 rules is the failure to consider foreign decisions. 
The above writers recognise the importance of considering foreign 
decisions in achieving international unifolll1 interpretations of unifolll1 rules 
generally. Our focus, of course, is on the importance of considering foreign 
decisions in achieving international unifolll1 interpretations of unifolll1 rules 
that relate to carriage of goods by sea. Unification of the rules relating to 
international carriage of goods by sea is the object of the Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules. The delegates who drafted the Hague Rules recognized 
the value of international unifolll1ity by stressing this purpose in the official 
title: "International con\'ention for the ulI(fication of certain ntles relating to 
71 Supra, at J..+(). 
7" -, -0 ~SlIpr(/.at-') . 
73 SlIpra, at 19"+, 
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bills of lading,,74. The Hamburg Rules also provide, under Article 3, that "in 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention regard 
shall be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
unifonnity,,75. This means that the national courts of all countries should 
interpret these unifonn rules in the same way. It would be absurd that the 
English courts, for example, should interpret the Hague-Visby Rules 
differently from the French, Gennan, and Australian courts. This impliedly 
suggests that the national courts of every country should consider the 
decisions of other national courts of other countries. It follows that national 
courts should be able to have recourse to other national courts' decisions. To 
deny them this recourse would be damage to the unification of the rules, which 
was the object of signing and enacting these conventions. The United States 
Vimar Segurosy Reaseguros, S.A. v MIV Sky Reefer case, for example, 
supports this argument, where it stated that: 
In light of the fact that COGSA is the culmination of a multilateral 
effort "to establish unifonn ocean bills of lading to govern the rights 
and liabilities of carriers and shippers inter se in international 
trade" ... we decline to interpret our version of the Hague Rules in a 
manner contrary to every other nation to have addressed this 
issue ... Conflicts in the interpretation of the Hague Rules not only 
destroy aesthetic symmetry in the international legal order but impose 
real costs on the commercial system the Rules govern76. 
74 (emphasis added) See John F. Wilson and Charles Debattista, World 
Shipping Laws: International Conventions v. Carriage by Sea, V/lICONV-
V /6/CONV, (October 1980) at 1. 
75 Id, at 53. 
76 115 S. Ct. 2322 at 2328, 1995, A.M.C. 1817 at 1823-24 (1995) (quoting 
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297 at 301, 1959, 
A.M.C. 879 at 882 (1959». 
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Consequently, this indicates that the belief of considering foreign decisions as 
a significant contribution to achieve international unifonn interpretations is 
not only suggested by commentators and courts but also suggested by the 
unifonn rules themselves. In other words, the Hague, Hague-Visby, Jnd 
Hamburg Rules indeed suggest that the national courts should consider each 
other's decisions. 
The previous chapter of this thesis examined and analysed ho\\' and 
why the consideration of foreign decisions is a significant factor in reducing 
conflicts of interpretations of unifonn rules that relate to carriage of goods by 
sea. This raises several questions: What are the difficulties in considering 
foreign decisions? Could these difficulties be handled? If the answer to the 
latter question is yes: what are the procedures of considering foreign 
decisions? To these questions, it is now necessary to turn. 
7.3.1. Difficulties in Considering Foreign Decisions 
Several obstacles may confront the national courts In considering 
foreign decisions when dealing with the interpretation of unifonn rules, or the 
statutes incorporating such rules. Collection of infonnation on foreign 
decisions may be difficult to obtain in many countries. Even if such collection 
was available, judges might not be ready or well prepared to study foreign 
decisions. It is, therefore, difficult to say exactly how much impact foreign 
decisions will have in litigation. In addition. national courts, \\"hich ha\"e a 
civi I law background, may tend to give greater regard to other ci\'il law 
judicial decisions than to common law judicial decisions, and vice versa. 
These obstacles, and how they could be handled, are explained below 
accordingly. 
7.3.1.1. The Difficulty of Accessing Foreign Decisions 
G'l 77 h' I es argues t at It would be wrong to blame the judges for the 
failure to consider foreign decisions, since many materials or references are 
hardly attainable. In other words, Giles acknowledges that there are difficulties 
in accessing foreign decisions. In fact, in the past, it was difficult to obtain and 
evaluate foreign decisions, since they were reported in unknown languages. 
Special measures, however, have appeared to meet this problem. 
The task of gathering materials dealing with decisions applying 
uniform rules is facilitated by international organisations, especially concerned 
with particular uniform rules. The International Institute For the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT), for example, has performed a facility to the public 
by publishing cases interpreting important conventions in relation to private 
law. This facility has been performed as follows: from 1956, UNIDROIT 
published decisions interpreting conventions in its Yearbook, from 1960 in 
Uniform Law Cases, and from 1973 in UNIDROIT's Uniform Law Review78 . 
Moreover, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)79, at its 1988 session, established procedures to collect and 
disseminate decisions applying conventions, including the Hamburg Rules 
77 Supra note 69, at 194. 
78 UNIDROIT Publications, from the Internet: 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/main.htm (accessed: 20/5/2001). 
79 UNCITRAL Yearbook, Vol. XIX: 1988, at 15-16 and 130-136. 
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1978, emanated from its work80. Each Member State that is a party to the 
Convention in question is requested to designate a "national correspondent" to 
obtain and send to the UNCITRAL Secretariat the full text of the decisions in 
their original languages, and in consequence the Secretariat will make these 
decisions attainable to the pUblic8!. The Commission observed that the 
pUblication of these decisions in full and in the six official languages of the 
United Nations would far exceed the resources available to the Secretariat. 
Thus, the "national correspondents" are requested to prepare abstracts of their 
countries' decisions in one of the official languages, and in consequence, the 
United Nations translate these abstracts into the other official languages as 
part of the regular documentation of the Commission. These abstracts could be 
initially included in an annual report and later in reports that are more 
frequent. The Commission also noted that it would be desirable for 
commercial publishers in the various countries to publish original decisions in 
full, regardless of whether they were in one of the official languages of the 
United Nations82 . Consequently, the Commission explained that: 
Information on the application and interpretation of the international 
text would help to further the desired uniformity in application and 
would be of general informational use to judges, arbitrators, lawyers 
and parties to business transactions83 . 
Considerable weight should also be given to one of the new 
technological developments regarding gathering legal information, which is 
80 This system also extends to model laws, such as UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration. 
8! Supra, at 15. 
82 Supra, at 16. 
83 Supra, at 15. 
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the Internet. This large electronic web contains unlimited infonnation 
regarding legal matters, and already facilitates accession to the judicial 
decisions of various countries. The Comite Maritime International (eM I) 
Singapore Conference 200 I, for example, indicated there are possible 
measures, which can be taken by the CMI to achieve international unifonn 
implementation and interpretation of international conventions. One of these 
measures is to establish on the CMI Website of a database of the decisions of 
the national courts of the States of member associations and of other State 
parties on the interpretation of international maritime conventions. Since the 
beginning of the year 2000, Professor Francesco Berlingieri started gathering 
and publishing in his journal II Diritto Marittimo summaries in the English 
language of various decisions on the interpretation of international maritime 
conventions. At present, Professor Berlingieri has made available to the CMI 
all the material published so far. The CMI suggests that the cooperation of all 
National Associations is very important to keep the database up to date. The 
CMI, therefore, requests the National Associations to kindly correspond to 
Professor Berlingieri, at his e-mail addresses, the text of all their national 
courts' decisions that relate to the interpretation of international maritime 
conventions. If these decisions are in languages other than English, a summary 
in English should possibly be provided84. 
84 See Comite Maritime International, from the Internet: 
http://comitemaritime.org/jurisp/jujntro.html (accessed: 10/9/2001). 
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Furthermore, Honnold85 argues that international scholarly writing 
should be referred to as another aid for reporting and analysing the decisions 
of various countries in relation to uniform rules. The problem, however. in this 
argument is that it necessitates weighing the standing, reputation, and 
expertise of the writers, since many writers may misinterpret the decisions, 
even of their own country. Such weighing might be impossible In mam 
situations; where usually the judges are not familiar with writers. 
In conclusion, accessing foreign decisions in recent days IS not as 
difficult as it was in the past since there are new technical developments for 
gathering legal information, such as the Internet, and sc\'eral international 
organisations, such as UNCITRAL, who are willing to make the accession to 
foreign decisions much easier and in different languages. 
7.3.1.2. The Difficulty of Preparing the Judges to Study Foreign 
Decisions 
Giles86 argues that even if foreign decisions are attainable, judges are 
not well prepared for studying foreign legal systems; where he states that: 
The proportion of a judge's work devoted to uniform law is very small 
compared with the bulk of his work, which deals with purely municipal 
rules. Considering this and the work load of judges little time and 
energy is left for general study of foreign legal systems, and the same 
applies of course to counsel, especially in jurisdictions where their 
function of providers of precedents is great87 . 
This statement impliedly suggests that since judges may ha\'c little time and 
ener~\' to refer to foreign decisions, then delay and difficulties in examining 
~ -
8:' Honnold, supra note 59, at 96. 
X(, SUpl'll note 69, at 19'+. 
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foreign decisions occur. It is not logical, however, to argue that judges will 
always face delay and difficulties in examining foreign decisions. If national 
courts, in dealing with the interpretation of uniform rules or statutes 
incorporating such rules, consider foreign decisions, then this may reduce the 
consideration of municipal rules; where judges usually give to their municipal 
rules heavy weight. In other words, the acceptance of considering foreign 
decisions by national courts may, to some extent, reduce the impact of 
domestic law in the interpretation of uniform rules. There is no logical reason 
to say that judges will always give heavy weight to their municipal rules in 
their interpretation, even if they accept to consider foreign decisions. The 
consideration of foreign decisions may make the national courts recognise that 
their interpretation shall be in conformity with other national courts. Such 
recognition, therefore, may lead the national courts to give weight to foreign 
decisions, at least, as much as they give weight to their municipal rules. 
Some measures also can help the judges to be well prepared to study 
foreign decisions. For example, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)88, at its 1988 session, considered a 
proposal to establish a permanent editorial board. The board would proceed to 
a comparative analysis of the decisions, which had been collected by the 
Commission, and report periodically to the Commission such analysis. The 
reports should evidence, for example, the existence of uniformity or 
divergence in the interpretation of a Convention. Such reports would be 
substantial aid for judges to study and analyse foreign decisions, and in 
88 UNCITRAL Yearbook, Vol. XIX: 1988, at 16. 
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consequence, they may saye time and effort in examining foreign decisions. 
Unfortunately, after deliberation, the Commission decided, for the time being, 
not to establish such a board. It was suggested, on the other hand, that this 
proposal would be reconsidered in the light of experience gathered in the 
collection and dissemination of decisions. 
7.3.1.3. The Difficulty of Knowing What Exactly the Impact of 
Foreign Decisions 
Both commentators and courts acknowledge that it is difficult to knO\\' 
what exactly the impact of foreign decisions will be in litigation. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter89 , Lord Wilberforce and Lord Diplock in 
Fothergill \'. Monarch Airlines90 explained that considering foreign decisions 
depends on different factors: whether the decisions are held by the highest 
comis; whether the decisions are binding; whether the process of law reporting 
varies; whether the facts of the decisions are examined carefully. Lord Diplock 
observed that an English court's decision, for example, would not foster 
international uniformity of interpretation if it were in conflict with a French 
comi of appeal's decision, where such French decision would not be binding 
on other French courts. The French court of appeal's decision might be 
inconsistent with another unreported French court of appeal's decision, and 
could be superseded by a subsequent Court of Cassation's decision, which 
would ha\'c binding effect on 100\'cr courts in France. Indeed, such observation 
89 Supra, at 186. 
l)() [19 Q 1] \ (' ').:; 1 ,t ') 7':; .., ( , d ") Q f ,," :.\.. __ 3 __ -I)<1n _~"-t. 
explains that it is difficult to know the exact impact of foreign decisions in 
litigation. 
Because of the uncertainty of knowing the exact impact of foreign 
decisions in litigation, some writers refuse to accept the idea that considering 
foreign decisions is an efficient solution for reducing conflicts of 
interpretation. Black91 , for example, explains that if national courts considered 
foreign decisions, then judges in all countries might at least be able to interpret 
uniform rules in the light of the fact that such uniform rules meant to achieve 
international uniformity. However, he states that he could not find any 
American case regarding carriage of goods by sea that is influenced by the fact 
that uniform rules meant to achieve international uniformity. Therefore, he 
argues that considering foreign decisions is not enough for solving the 
problem of conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules. Sundberg92, however, 
while acknowledging that it is difficult to know what exactly the impact of 
foreign decisions will be in litigation, argues that since many courts quote 
foreign decisions, then presumably these foreign decisions have some impact 
on the reasoning of the courts93 . 
It is possible to suggest, on the other hand, that some measures should 
be taken to guarantee that foreign decisions have an impact in litigation. 
91 Supra note 59, at 369-70. 
92 Supra note 69, at 137-38. 
93 Munday also argues that English courts in relation to uniform rules have 
referred to foreign decisions from time to time (citing, for example, the 
English case: Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, [1981] A.C. 251). Supra note 
59, at 459. 
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David94, for example, suggests that an international organisation could draw 
up periodically general reports, based on reports regarding the interpretation 
and application of the uniform rules, which the countries would undertake to 
provide periodically. These reports, according to David, would highlight the 
conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules, and might go further and explain 
in which countries the uniform rules were or were not correctly applied. In 
consequence, he observes that it would be possible to request the authorities in 
every country to take the steps necessary to avoid wrong interpretations of the 
uniform rules from being repeated. Such suggestion might guarantee the 
impact of foreign decisions in litigation. David, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that many countries might not welcome such suggestion since 
they might consider it as an attack on their sovereignty. In fact, many 
countries would be hesitant to accept any control over the way in which they 
apply the uniform rules. Therefore, David suggests that it would be better to 
only make it known to the countries how the uniform rules are understood and 
interpreted in different countries. He argues that perhaps this kind of 
documentation would make the judges be influenced and guided by foreign 
decisions applying the uniform rules in question. This kind of method would 
indeed in no way attack on the countries' sovereignty, but still there would be 
no guarantee that the national courts would at least consider this kind of 
documentation. In addition, it is not understandable, according to David's 
suggestion, how these reports would know which decisions were or were not 
correct in applying the uniform rules. 
94 Supra note 65, at 109. 
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On the other hand, an efficient measure that may increase the impact of 
foreign decisions in litigation is to oblige the courts to consider foreian 
:;, 
decisions. This idea, and how it could be achieved, is explained later in this 
chapter95 . At this stage it needs only be said that obliging the courts to 
consider foreign decisions may make the judges recognise the internationality 
of the uniform rules, and thus interpret them in an international way. This 
suggests that courts should be influenced by foreign decisions in order to 
interpret the uniform rules in an international way. However. it should be 
noted, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that the important factor in 
considering foreign decisions is the method by which foreign decisions had 
been interpreted96 . Some judges might look solely to the ordinary meaning of 
the words of uniform rules, while others might consider the purpose of the 
provisions or of the uniform rules themselves. Such divergence plays an 
important role in whether to consider foreign decisions or not. Consequently, 
it should be admitted that whether the national courts would consider foreign 
decisions in their decisions or not is a hard thing to predict, nevertheless, that 
does not mean that considering foreign decisions would not effect the national 
courts in deciding their cases, and this was explained in detail in the previous 
chapter. 
95 In/i-a, at 225-2 -:. 
% S~e the sixth chapter, supra. at 17~- (.+. 
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7.3.1.4. The Difficulty of Considering Common Law Decisions 
By Civil Law Courts and Vice Versa 
Blomquist97 states that achieving international unifonn interpretations 
of unifonn rules by considering foreign decisions is not a realistic solution. He 
argues that common law courts will tend to give greater attention to othcr 
common law foreign decisions than to civil law foreign decisions, and \ice 
versa. With great respect, Blomquist's suggestion is not a common sense 
argument. There is much to be said in favour of a conclusion in the opposite 
sense. 
Assume that common law courts will tend to give greater attention to 
other common law foreign decisions than to civil law foreign decisions, and 
vice versa. In practice, this assumption does not affect our proposition, \\hich 
is that considering foreign decisions significantly reduce the conflicts of 
interpretations of unifonn rules. It is clear that it was not our intention in this 
thesis to argue that our proposition would eliminate completely all conflicts of 
interpretations. Our proposition, however, aims to narrow the various 
countries' judicial decisions as close as possible with the hope to unify the 
international interpretations of unifonn rules as much as possible. 
Consequently, it would be logical to argue that there is nothing \\Tong \\ith the 
practice of \\hether to gi\c more attention to common la\\ or to civil la\v 
judicial decisions. At least, such practice, if happened, \\ould also contribute 
in achieving intenlational unifornl interpretations ofunifonn rules. 
97 Slipra note 69, at ()7-68. 
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It is satisfactory to note, on the other hand, that, from time to time, 
common law courts' decisions, for example, have considered other common 
law and civil law countries' decisions. For example, the "River Gurara .. 98 
case, which mentioned in the fifth chapter, was decided by the English courts 
in relation to the application of the Hague Rules 1924 to containers99. Since 
the provisions of the Hague Rules 1924 do not deal with the issue of 
containerisation, the English court traced the development of the issue in the 
United States, and also referred to Canadian, Australian, French, and 
Netherlands cases 100. The English court adopted the decisions, which was 
reached by the American, Canadian, Australian, French and Netherlands 
courts, in order to achieve international unifonnity. The English courts, in 
consequence, not only followed common law countries' decisions but also 
civil law countries' decisions. 
7.3.2. How Should the National Courts Consider Foreign 
Decisions? 
There are general points that should be discussed to clarify how 
national courts should consider foreign decisions of unifonn rules that relate to 
carriage of goods by sea. These points are explained below in detail. 
(1) We propose, in this thesis, that national courts should be obliged to 
consider foreign decisions in interpreting unifonn rules. It is important to 
recognise that we are not proposing that national courts should be obliged to 
follow foreign decisions. To oblige national courts to follow foreign decisions 
98 [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53. 
99 See the fifth chapter, supra, at 120. 
100 Supra, at 59-61. 
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means that foreign law would be binding. Such obligation raises the following 
question: will the national courts accept to be bound in following foreign 
decisions? It is doubtful that the national courts will welcome such idea. 
National courts of both common law and civil law countries may not accept 
that an unknown or unfamiliar foreign law controls their interpretation and 
application of the uniform rules, or the statutes incorporating such rules. Many 
countries may consider such idea as an attack to their sovereignty. In addition, 
it should be borne in mind that obliging the national courts to follow foreign 
decisions means that we are applying the common law system, namely binding 
precedents, but in an international way, and this may, and almost certainly, be 
rejected by the civil law countries. 
On the other hand, if the national courts of both common law and civil 
law countries accept to be bound in following foreign decisions, it is doubtful 
that such idea will lead to international uniform interpretations of uniform 
rules. In many cases, this can lead to conflicts of interpretations. For example, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Falcanbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chima Shipping Ltd. 101, refused to follow 
the United States' decisions in defining the term "unit", under Article 4(5) of 
the Hague Rules 1924, as a "customary freight unit,,102. Instead, the Supreme 
Court followed the United Kingdom authorities in defining the term "unit" as 
a shipping unit. If the Canadian Supreme Court was obliged to follow foreign 
decisions, then the question that might arise is: should the Canadian Supreme 
101 [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469. 
102 See the sixth chapter, supra, at 157-58. 
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Court follow the United States' decisions or should it follow the United 
Kingdom authorities? Whether it followed the United States' decisions or the 
United Kingdom authorities, the Canadian Supreme Court might face 
criticism. Some national courts might find that the Canadian Supreme Court 
should have followed the United Kingdom authorities while others might 
argue that it should have followed the United States' decisions. Such 
confusion would lead to more conflicts of interpretations of uniform rules. If, 
on the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court was obliged to consider 
foreign decisions then this would give such a court a choice to consider the 
most persuasive authority, and this is exactly what the Canadian Supreme 
Court did. The Canadian Supreme Court's decision in the Falconbridge case is 
only a very simple example that can illustrate the confusion that might arise if 
the national courts were obliged to follow foreign decisions. In many cases, 
the confusion would be more than the latter example; where a national court is 
faced, for example, with more than five different interpretations in different 
countries103 . 
Consequently, following foreign decisions should be a choice not an 
obligation that the national courts should practice. When the national courts 
are not obliged to follow foreign decisions, but to consider such decisions, at 
least the judges may recognise that the uniform rules shall be interpreted in an 
international way, instead of using their own domestic methods of 
interpretation. There would, therefore, be some hope of obtaining the 
103 See, for example, Ulster-Swift Ltd. v. Taunton Meat Haulage Ltd., [1977] 1 
W.L.R. 625 at 646. 
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international uniformity of interpretation desirable for the unifonn rules that 
relate to carriage of goods by sea. 
(2) As mentioned in the third chapter of this thesis, at present, there are three 
uniform rules that govern carriage of goods by sea, namely the Hague Rules 
1924, the Hague-Visby Rules 1968 and the Hamburg Rules 1978, where 
different countries adopted these conventions 1 04. This raises the following 
question: should the national courts, which adopted the Hague Rules for 
example, consider foreign decisions of other national courts that adopted the 
Hague-Visby or Hamburg Rules, and vice versa? The Hague-Visby Rules are 
an update to the Hague Rules, and therefore, many provisions in both 
conventions are similar. However, the Hague Rules do not deal with the 
containerisation and palletisation subjects for example, while the Hague-Visby 
Rules and even the Hamburg Rules deal with such subjects. Thus, there are 
differences and similarities in the provisions of these conventions 105. As will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter 106, this present situation is not 
satisfactory and desperately needs creation of new uniform rules governing the 
law that relates to carriage of goods by sea. If this happened, then there will be 
no need to answer the above question. However, for the present time, it is 
104 See the third chapter, supra, at 41-43,46-48 and 52-53. 
105 The differences and similarities among these conventions have been 
analysed and discussed by many writers. See, for example, Robert Force. "A 
Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules: Much. ~do 
About (?)", (1996) 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051; R. Glenn Bauer, "ConflIctmg 
Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules-A Case by Case 
Analysis", (1993) 24 J.M.L.C. 53; John O. Honnold, "Ocean Carriers and 
Cargo; Clarity and Fairness-Hague or Hamburg?", (1993) 24 1.M.L.C. 75; AJ. 
Waldron, "The Hamburg Rules-A Boondoggle For Lawyers'?", [1991] J.B.L. 
305. 
106 Infra, at 225-27. 
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worthwhile to answer such question. Our argument here, therefore, is that it is 
valuable if the national courts, which adopted the Hague Rules for example. 
are obliged to consider foreign decisions of other national courts that adopted 
the Hague-Visby or Hamburg Rules, but as long as such consideration does 
not lead to a different result. This can be explained by the following United 
States decision. 
In Vegas v. Compania Anonima Venezolana l07 , the shipper 
consolidated 109 cartons of automobile brake parts in two master cartons built 
on pallets. The bill of lading described the goods as "Palletised master cartons, 
STC [said to contain]: 109 cartons: auto brake parts". In reaching its decision, 
the Eleventh Circuit followed Allstate Insurance Co. v. Inversiones Navieras 
Imparca, C.A.108. In the latter case, the Fifth Circuit stated that if the shipper 
places his packages of goods in a container, and discloses the number of such 
packages in the bill of lading, then each package or unit within the container, 
not the container itself, constitutes one package for the limitation purpose. 
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found that there is no distinction between 
palletised master cartons and containers for the purposes of limitation. In other 
words, the rule, which applies to containers, must apply on pallets. The 
Eleventh Circuit supported its conclusion by referring to Article 4(5)(c) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules, which provides that: 
107 720 F.2d 629 (11 th Cir. 1983). See also, for example, Binladen BSB 
Landscaping v. M. V. Nedlloyd Rotterdam, 759 F.2d 1006 at 1015 (2d Cir. 
1985); Hayes-Leger Associates, Inc. v. MIV Oriental Knight, 765 F.2d 1076 at 
1080 (11 th Cir. 1985). See also the Australian case, P.s. Chellaram & Co. L.rd. 
v. China Ocean Shipping Co., [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 413, and the EnglIsh 
case, The River Gurara, [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53. 
108 646 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1981). 
1')') 
Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the 
bill of lading as packed in such article of transport shall be deemed the 
number of packages or units for the purposes of this paragraph as far as 
these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such article 
of transport shall be considered the package or unit l09. 
It is obvious that this Article interchangeably uses the words "container, pallet 
or similar article of transport". The Eleventh Circuit argued that: 
Looking solely to this provision of the protocol [Article 4(5) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules 1968] we perceive no basis for any reasoned 
distinction between a container filled with individual listed packages or 
cartons and a palletised master carton similarly filled IlO. 
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 109 cartons, and not the 
pallets, are the packages for the purposes of limitation, and in consequence 
applied the $500 limitation to each carton. 
Although the court, in the Vegas case, was applying Article 4(5) of the 
Hague Rules 1924, it supported its conclusion by referring to the same Article 
under the Hague-Visby Rules 1968. This impliedly suggests that courts might 
not only consider the provisions of other conventions but also foreign 
decisions that relate to such conventions. The court was so careful in referring 
to Article 4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules. The court just referred to Article 
4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules in relation to whether such Article applies on 
pallets or not. In so doing, the court was cautious in not considering such 
Article as a whole. If the court, on the other hand, have had considered Article 
4(5) of the Hague-Visby Rules as a whole, then it would have raised the 
carrier's liability to more than $500 per carton. Such increase would be wrong 
109 See Wilson & Debattista, supra note 74, at 7. 
110 Supra, at 630-31. 223 
since the United States did not adopt the Hague-Visby Rules 1968, which 
increase the amount of the carrier's liability. Such increase would also run 
against the expectations of the parties. The carrier, for example, expects that 
his liability under the United States COGS A, which incorporated the Hague 
Rules, is $500 per package or unit. It would be wrong, therefore, to suddenly 
increase the amount of the carrier's liability by applying, for example. the 
Hague-Visby Rules. This kind of application would surely run against one of 
the aims of unifying the rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea, which is 
to meet the expectations of the parties. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that the court, in the Vegas case, 
was not acting as a legislator in referring to Article 4(5) of the Hague-Visby 
Rules. Instead, the court was only clarifying and supporting its decision by 
such reference. There is nothing wrong with the idea that courts should refer to 
other conventions or foreign decisions that relate to such conventions. In many 
cases, this may help the courts to clarify and support their reasoning. The 
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, for example, do not clarify whether the term 
"unit" under Article 4(5) is a shipping unit or a customary freight unit. The 
Hamburg Rules, on the other hand, clarify that the term "unit" means a 
shipping unit. In addition, the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules do not deal with 
carriage of containers on-deck, while the Hamburg Rules deal with this issue. 
When dealing with the latter examples, courts may support their reasoning by 
referring to the Hamburg Rules or foreign decisions that apply such rules, but 
as long as such consideration does not effect the expectations of the parties. 
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(3) In order to reach international unifonn interpretations of uniform rules 
among the countries, we also need to have such unifonnity in every country 
itself. One can frequently see several systems in operation in the same country. 
The United States, for example, have a federal system. The United States 
Circuit Courts are not obliged to follow each other's decisions. Each Circuit 
Court has its own system and is only obliged to follow its own precedent. In 
dealing with the interpretation of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act, as discussed in the fifth and sixth chapters, there are conflicts of 
interpretations among the Circuit Courts 111. Consequently, how could we 
achieve uniform interpretations among the Circuit Courts in the United States? 
Since every Circuit Court is not obliged to consider other Circuit Courts' 
decisions, this implies that every Circuit Court considers the other Circuit 
Courts' decisions as being foreign decisions. It is, therefore, logical to argue 
that in order to achieve unifonn interpretations of unifonn rules in the United 
States, every Circuit Court should be obliged to consider other Circuit Courts' 
decisions. In other words, our proposition in this thesis should be applied 
domestically in countries such as the United States, since it has a federal 
system. 
(4) The above arguments, in this section, clarify that national courts should be 
obliged to consider foreign decisions. This raises the question: how could we 
oblige the national courts to consider foreign decisions? It is logical to suggest 
that if in the future a new convention governing carriage of goods by sea 
III See the fifth chapter, supra, at 99-102, 106-113 and 115-18; the sixth 
chapter, supra, at 135-46, 150-55 and 164-72. 
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appears, the drafters can add a provision, which states that for the purpose of 
the interpretation of this Convention, every Contracting State shall consider 
other decisions of other Contracting States. The best example for this issue is 
Section 39(1)( c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which 
provides that: "when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum ... may consider foreign law"I12. 
As mentioned in the third chapter, the Comite Maritime International 
(CMI) created the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, while the Hamburg Rules 
were created by UNCITRAL I13 • Accordingly, the cooperation between the 
CMI and UNCITRAL and even other international organisations for 
producing a comprehensive convention relating to carriage of goods by sea 
can eliminate the result of the appearance of several conventions in the future 
that relate to the same subject. Perhaps this suggestion leads to the creation of 
uniform rules that may fill the gaps, which are in the Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg Rules, and accordingly may lead the world community to adopt it. 
Of course, it is possible, on the other hand, that such new convention would be 
adopted by few nations, which would then lead to another convention beside 
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Still, the present situation is not 
satisfactory. 
112 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (as adopted on 8 May 1996 
and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly), Chapter 2, 
Bills of Rights, Section 39(1)( c), from the Internet: 
http://www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/constitutionisaconst02.html#39 (accessed: 
20171200 I). 
113 See the third chapter, supra, at 40, 44 and 50-51. 
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Unfortunately, as mentioned in the third chapter, at present. the C\lI 
and UNCITRAL gave up the proposition of creating a new convention 
governing carriage of goods by seal14 . In spite of this matter, that does not 
mean that the nations should also give up the issue. Instead, the nations should 
press on the CMI and UNCITRAL in order to re-evaluate the issue, as the 
Canadian Maritime Law Association did in 1999, which mentioned in the third 
chapter I 15 . The present position desperately needs a co-operation between the 
CMI and UNCITRAL for creating a new convention covering the law that 
relates to carriage of goods by sea. On the other hand, there is a hope 
elsewhere for creating a new convention on the carriage of goods by sea 
horizon. A group of lawyers from nine European countries, who have no 
attachment to shipowners, shippers, cargo insurers or P & I, are preparing an 
intermodal regime, which will be the basis of a Directive of the European 
Union. This project will start out as non-mandatory and will be such that 
carriers, outside the European Union, could join in, too. The project 
demonstrates that there is a will to unify the law that relate to carriage of 
goods by sea in the European Union, and may extends to the rest of the 
114 See the third chapter, supra, at 55-56. 
115 Supra, at 56. .. 
116 See William Tetley, "Support Griggs: Plan of Action for the CMI , (from 
Fairplay Magazine, October 22, 1998) from the Internet: 
http://www.admiraltylaw.comltetley/fairplay.htm (accessed: 22/1111999). 
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7.4. Conclusion 
Some measures should be brought to achieve international unifonn 
interpretations of uniform rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea. In fact, 
the range of possibilities of such achievement is wide. Some measures, such as 
developing uniform principles and rules of interpretation for the unifonn rules , 
are hardly convincing or adequate. The text, the context, and the purpose are 
usually the most important elements in the interpretation of unifonn rules, but 
they do not always lead to clear results, nor is their priority undisputed. Of 
course, some other rules, such as the preparatory work of the unifonn rules, 
can come into play or are even considered more important by some writers 
and courts 117. Other measures, such as applying the lex causae, and In 
particular the proper law of the contract, do little to avoid conflicts of 
interpretations, since they do not recognise the conflicts that arise in every 
country by its own. Such measures, of course, ignore the importance of 
achieving international uniform interpretations of uniform rules, and 
concentrate on avoiding the conflicts of interpretations in order to meet the 
expectations of the parties. Further measures, such as taking an advisory 
opinion form a competent international organisation as a guide of 
interpretation, may create more conflicts beside the national courts' conflicts 
of interpretations. Radical measures, such as creating an international court of 
appeals for construing the uniform rules, are an effective solution for 
achieving international uniform interpretations of uniform rules. Such 
117 See, for example, Honnold, supra note 59, at 89-90; Fothergill \', for/anarch 
Airlines, [1981] A.C. 251. 
measures have not been proposed or evaluated by the international shipping 
community or even international organisations. Therefore, it could be argued 
that may be in the long term such measures would be brought to solve the 
problem of conflicts of interpretations. 
The consideration of foreign decisions, on the other hand, is a 
significant factor in achieving international uniform interpretations of unifonn 
rules that relate to carriage of goods by sea. Access to foreign decisions 
nowadays can be obtained by various methods. The publications of foreign 
decisions to date have been useful, but primarily national courts have not 
exercised their influence, in many cases. The advances of using foreign 
decisions by the national courts of both common law and civil law countries 
may result in the reduction, or even the abandonment, of referring to the 
domestic methods of interpretation. Such advances could be achieved by 
obliging the national courts to consider foreign decisions. The key point that 
should be borne in mind in this context is that the importance of the 
recognition of achieving international uniform interpretations of unifonn rules 
that relate to carriage of goods by sea is as much as and may be more than the 
drafting of such rules. 
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION 
In practice, the international conventions that relate to carnage of 
goods by sea have not been interpreted uniformly among the various national 
courts of the countries that implemented them. The subject of containerisation 
covers many cases that relate to such conflicts. Among these conflicts of 
interpretations are whether the container is the package or its contents are the 
packages, and whether carriage of containers on-deck deprives the carrier 
from limiting his liability. The subject of containerisation also has an indirect 
influence on several conflicts that already existed in relation to the "fair 
opportunity" doctrine and the "customary freight unit" concept. These 
conflicts of interpretations increase transaction costs and litigation. The huge 
financial differences in determining the meaning of the term package, and in 
deciding whether the limitation clauses should be applied on the on-deck 
carriage of containers, defeat the economic purpose of the limitation clauses of 
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules in reducing transaction costs. 
Such differences, in consequence, increase conflicts of interpretations and 
therefore litigation increases. In addition, the appearance of containerisation 
increases the conflicts of interpretations that relate to the "fair opportunity" 
doctrine and the "customary freight unit" concept. This means, in 
consequence, that litigation increases. The increase in transaction costs and 
litigation because of the conflicts of interpretations of international 
conventions runs against the argument that international uniformity is 
valuable. One, however, must be realistic and resigned to the fact that there 
will always be a tendency for the national courts of the various countries to put 
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differing interpretations upon international conventions, but at the same time 
, 
it is possible to reduce the scope for such divergence significantly. 
Many attempts have been made by national courts and commentators 
to achieve international uniform interpretations of international conventions 
that relate specifically to carriage of goods by sea, and generally to other 
subjects. Most of these continual attempts create nothing but total 
unpredictability and uncertainty, and therefore, they are far away from 
reaching substantive uniformity. Many are unworkable and unrealistic. They 
do little to avoid conflicts of interpretations, and even some may create more 
conflicts. In sum, most of these solutions are hardly convincing or adequate. 
With proper intention given to how the national courts of the various 
countries interpret international conventions that relate to carriage of goods by 
sea, the consideration of comparative law is a significant factor in reducing 
conflicts of interpretations of such conventions. At present and at least for the 
near future, the consideration of foreign decisions by the national courts is 
convincing and adequate in reducing conflicts of interpretations significantly. 
When the national courts of the various countries interpret international 
conventions, they should investigate the international understanding of such 
conventions. In doing so, they should consider the interpretation of these 
conventions by other foreign decisions. Such consideration, indeed, brings 
many advantages for the national courts in reaching their decisions. The 
consideration of foreign decisions assists the national courts to formulate 
questions regarding the reasons behind the divergence between domestic 
interpretations and foreign interpretations of the issue in question. In addition, 
2)1 
this consideration gives the national courts source of possible solutions to the 
issue in question. When the national courts evaluate these solutions, they may 
decide to follow the domestic interpretations or the foreign interpretations in 
relation to the issue before them. The consideration of foreign decisions may 
also helps the national courts to use such decisions in justifying their own 
decisions. 
The consideration of foreign decisions, on the other hand, reqUIres 
more than a brief citation of foreign decisions. The brief and the careless 
examination and evaluation of foreign decisions may, in many cases, create a 
new round of conflicts of interpretations, and in consequence, inconsistent 
decisions among the various national courts. In considering foreign decisions, 
therefore, the national courts should put an effort in examining and evaluating 
these decisions carefully. The use of foreign decisions as a ready-made 
solution for solving the issue before the national courts also may, in many 
cases, lead to inconsistent decisions. This adds little or perhaps nothing to the 
recognition of the international understanding of the international conventions. 
The detailed, the careful, and the sensible examination and evaluation of 
foreign decisions, therefore, are the key point in helping the national courts of 
the various countries to reach international uniform interpretations of 
international conventions. The probability of reaching such uni form 
interpretations can be increase if the national courts examine and evaluate 
more than one country's decisions. The more examination and evaluation of 
other countries' decisions the better international uniformity would be served. 
In other words, many conflicts of interpretations of international conventions 
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can undoubtedly be avoided when the national courts examine and evaluate 
several countries' decisions. 
The idea of considering comparative law by the national courts is 
realistic. Access to foreign decisions nowadays can be obtained by various 
methods. Several international organisations, for example, are at present 
collecting the decisions of the various countries in relation to international 
conventions in order to be accessed by the Internet. The capability of 
accessing foreign decisions, however, is not enough for encouraging the 
national courts of the various countries to examine and evaluate such decisions 
when dealing with the interpretation of international conventions. In fact, the 
publications of foreign decisions to date have been useful, but the national 
courts have not referred to such decisions in many cases. Therefore, there 
should be an obligation on the national courts to consider foreign decisions. 
The rational solution would be that if in the future a new convention on the 
subject of carriage of goods by sea occurred, the drafters could add a provision 
stating that every Contracting State must consider the other decisions of other 
Contracting States. 
The cooperation among the CMI, UNCITRAL, and other international 
organisations may result in producing a comprehensive new convention that 
relate to carriage of goods by sea. In fact, this should be done specifically by 
the CMI and UNCITRAL since the CMI created the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules, while UNCITRAL created the Hamburg Rules. This, in consequence, 
may avoid the appearance of several conventions in the future that relate to the 
law of carriage of goods by sea. It is probable, however, that such new 
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convention would be ignored and only adopted by C".ew co t' 'h h' l~ un nes, \\ ere t IS 
would lead to the creation of a fourth convention beside the H H ague, ague-
Visby and Hamburg Rules. Nevertheless, the present position of the 
unification of the law of carriage of goods by sea is not satisfactory. Each of 
the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules is at present implemented by 
different countries. This situation represents partial uniformity to the law of 
carriage of goods by sea so that such law, to a certain degree, is neither 
uniform nor universal. 
At present, the CMI and UNCITRAL gave up the proposition of 
creating a new convention that relate to the law of carriage of goods by sea. 
Instead, they decided to create a broadly based convention on aspects of 
marine transport. It is worthwhile, on the other hand, to mention that, at 
present, there is in the United States a proposed Senate Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1999 (USCOGSA 1999) 1• This proposed Act is a combination of 
Hague-Visby, Hamburg, and new rules. It is an attempt to harmonise the 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, although primarily based on the Hague-
Visby Rules2• It deals with the subject of containerisation in a very similar 
way to the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, but adds new provisions on 
I See William Tetley, "Law Conventions Trampled: US COGSA Sails Its Own 
Quirky Course", (From Fairplay Magazine, October 15, (1998)) from the 
Internet: http://www.admiraltylaw.comltetley/fairplay.htm (accessed: 
22/11/1999). 
2 This proposal represents a commercial compromise in which shippers and 
carriers made real concessions to achieve such an agreement. No one was 
entirely happy with the results, but everyone agreed that the pr~posal 
represents the only reasonable solution for the foreseeable future. See MIchael 
F. Sturley, '"Proposed Amendments to the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: 
A Response to English Criticisms", [1999] L.M.C.L.Q. 519 at 520-21. 
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containerisation. In addition, this proposed Act unlt'ke the pre t' . 
, sen sItuatIOn 
under the USCOGSA 1936, does not consider the "fair opportunity" doctrine 
and the "customary freight unit" concept. In this context, McDaniel observes 
that: 
Just this o?e proviSion. [Section (9) of the new proposed COGS A] will 
save consIderable claIms expense since the cargo interests will no 
longer be able to defeat the carrier damage limitation with technical 
arguments such as a claim that there was "no fair opportunity to 
declare full value" on the carrier bill of lading3. 
Many American commentators4 agree with the adoption of this new 
proposal and argue that this proposal will be the leading part for a new 
international uniform convention on the subject of carriage of goods by sea 
that will make the world community follow, as it was the case of the Harter 
Act. The United States' Maritime Law Association (USMLA) created the 
proposed USCOGSA 1999. It is interesting to note that on May 1996, during 
the debate of drafting this proposal, Mr Healy observed that: 
I think if the contents of the proposed bill are approved by the 
Association, it should be submitted to the CMI as a draft convention. 
Then let the CMI work over it and take what they want, disregard what 
they do not want, and come up with a convention that we can 
recommend for ratification by our government5. 
3 Michael S. McDaniel, "Emerging U.S. Liability Trends for Freight 
Forwarders" (21/1 0/1998) from the Internet: (The Journal of Commerce 
Online) http://www.joc.com (accessed: 22/11/1999). 
4 See Sturley, supra note 2; Charles S. Haight, "Babel Afloat: Some 
Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime Law", (1997) 28 J.M.L.C. 189; Samuel 
Robert Mandelbaum, "Creating Uniform World-wide Liability Standar~s f?r 
Sea Carriage Under the Hague, COGS A, Visby and Hamburg Conventions • 
(1996) 23 Trans. LJ. 471; Chester D. Hooper, "Carriage of Goods and Charter 
Parties", (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1697 at 1730. 
5 MLA Doc. No. 723 (May, 3, 1996), at 10885. 
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While this observation may contribute in encouraging the world community to 
create a new convention on the subject of carriage of goods by sea, some 
commentators argue that if the United States' new proposal ever come into 
force, this will put the United States isolated from the whole world 
community. Tetley, for example, argues that: 
Of major importance, the different wording of the proposed Senate 
COGSA'99 will make most American jurisprudence under COGSA 
1936 up to the present time redundant. American carriage of goods by 
sea jurisprudence will no longer be relevant in the rest of the world. 
Similarly, America will no longer look outward to the jurisprudence of 
the rest of the world .. .Internationally, Senate COGSA'99 contains 
some useful Hague/Visby and Hamburg Rules provisions, but the other 
particular provisions, apparently adopted in the negotiations with 
various interests, would seem to put the proposed statute far out of the 
mainstream of international law on carriage of goods by sea. May one 
not therefore question whether Senate COGSA'99 fulfils its original 
purpose which was: " The proposal to amend COGSA is intended to 
bring the United States into unity with the rest of the maritime 
nations" ... The advantages of Senate COGSA'99 can also be found for 
the most part in the HagueNisby Rules and almost completely in the 
Hamburg Rules. Would it not have been better, had one or other of 
those Conventions been promoted for adoption by the U.S. Congress, 
rather than Senate COGSA'99?6. 
In another short article by Tetley7, he states that he has elicited many letters, 
faxes, phones and e-mails, from American, British, Belgian, German, Italian, 
and others lawyers and professors specialized in maritime law, in relation to 
6 William Tetley, "The Proposed New U.S. COGS A (The important 
International Consequences)", from the Internet: 
http://www.admiraltylaw.comltetley/comment.htm (accessed: 22/11/1999) 
(quoting MLA Doc. No. 724 of May 3, 1996 at p. 3). See also Allan I. 
Mendelsohn and Edward Schmeltzer, "U.S. Should Join Trade Partners on 
Cargo-Damage Limits, from the Internet: (The Journal of Commerce Online) 
http://www.joc.com (1711111998) (accessed: 14112/1998). , " 
7 William Tetley, "Comments on the U.S. Senate COGS A 99, from the 
Internet: http://www.admiraltylaw.comitetley/cogsacom.htm (accessed: 
2211111999). 236 
his various lectures that commented on the United States' new proposal. He 
explains that all of them agreed and support his criticism to the new prop I osa. 
The amendment of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(USCOGSA) in the manner the MLA proposed would force the United States 
government to denounce the widely ratified international convention, known 
as the Hague Rules 1924, on which the present United States COGSA is 
based. In doing so, it could be argued that the United States government would 
close a chapter on one of the very few reasonably successful efforts at 
bringing some uniformity into the law of carriage of goods by sea. In 
supporting this argument, in 1995, during the debate between shippers and 
carriers in drafting the MLA proposal, one criticism had united the opponents 
on both sides of shippers and carriers. The opponents claimed that since the 
MLA proposal would only amend the United States COGS A, this would 
breakdown international uniformity, where such uniformity is essential to the 
efficient operation of the shipping industry8. This leads us to argue that in the 
interests of efficient global commerce and international uniformity of law, the 
United States should work with other countries and international organisations 
to create an effective and uniform international convention on the subject of 
carriage of goods by sea into the twenty-first century. 
8 See for example, Dissenting Report of Members of the Committee ~n 
Carriage of Goods About Revising the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (3 Apnl. 
1995), reprinted in MLA doc. No. 716, at 10749-50 (5 May, 1995); Letter of 
Peter D. Fenzel (4 April, 1995), reprinted in MLA doc. No. 716. at 10764-65 
(5 May, 1995); and Letter of Prof. Joseph C. Sweeney (3 April. 1995), 
reprinted in MLA doc. No. 716, at 10766 (5 May. 1995). 
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The need for unifonnity in the law of carriage of goods by sea, and the 
desire for hannony between the various national courts of the various 
countries in the interpretation of international conventions regarding carriage 
of goods by sea, remains persuasive and viable goals. Such goals can certainly 
be expanded beyond the limits of the law of carriage of goods by sea to many 
other issues in maritime law and even other subjects. To finish on an 
optimistic note, comparative law is now available in many countries. We are 
becoming better infonned on foreign law, and more often, we see the national 
courts considering foreign decisions when they have to interpret international 
conventions. We will probably never achieve full unifonnity, but we must 
continue to try, by whatever legal or political means seem most promising at 
that time. There is surely much to be done, but the writer looks forward to see 
how well we will achieve international unifonnity in the law of carriage of 
goods by sea. 
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